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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the recent discussion about the flexibility of the German labor
market. The empirical studies analyze individual mobility between jobs using German
data. Specifically, chapters 2 and 3 rely on integrated employer-employee data, while in
chapter 4 household data is applied. After a brief introduction about the relevance of la-
bor market mobility in Germany (chapter 1), chapter 2 focuses on monetary consequences
of individual between-establishment transitions. Counterfactual wage trajectories are es-
timated in order to compare the wage trajectories at different employers simultaneously.
The main finding is that only few immediate wage cuts pay off because of steeper wage
growth in the new job. Chapter 3 enhances the literature by an examination of the rela-
tionship between quit decisions and the relative wage position within an establishment.
The main assumptions are that individuals compare themselves to colleagues within the
same establishment and that workers form rational expectations about where they lie in
the pay ordering. Voluntary mobility with wage cuts is analyzed in chapter 4, in which
the effects of different subjective comparisons between the previous and the current job
on the decision to accept earnings losses are investigated.
Keywords: Mobility, wage cut, relative wage position.
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Kurzzusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Flexibilität des deutschen Arbeitsmarktes,
wobei die empirischen Studien individuelle Arbeitsplatzwechsel anhand deutscher Daten
untersuchen. Dabei beruhen Kapitel 2 und 3 auf integrierten Betriebs- und Person-
endaten, während in Kapitel 4 Haushaltspaneldaten herangezogen werden. Nach einer
kurzen Übersicht zur Bedeutung der individuellen Mobilität (Kapitel 1) folgen die em-
pirischen Analysen. Kapitel 2 beschäftigt sich mit dem Vergleich von kontrafaktischen
Lohnkurven, um den Lohn eines mobilen Arbeitnehmers im Ausgangs- und Zielbetrieb
vergleichen zu können. Der Einfluss der relativen Lohnposition auf die Entscheidung den
Betrieb zu wechseln ist Gegenstand von Kapitel 3. Dabei wird zugrunde gelegt, dass
Individuen ihre relative Lohnposition anhand von Lohnvergleichen mit den Kollegen in-
nerhalb ihres Betriebes abschätzen. Schließlich behandelt Kapitel 4 die Frage warum
Personen bei einem Wechsel des Arbeitgebers Lohnabschläge akzeptieren. Die Studie
basiert dabei vor allem auf subjektiven Vergleichen zwischen dem aktuellen und dem
vorherigen Arbeitsplatz.
Schlagwörter: Mobilität, Arbeitsplatzwechsel, Lohnabschlag, relative Lohnposition.
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1 Introduction
The German labor market is characterized by a significant degree of dynamism, leading to
a continuous creation and destruction of jobs. As a result, employees change their labor
market status, moving from one job to another, from employment to non-employment,
from employment to unemployment, from unemployment to non-employment, and vice
versa. Labor market mobility, on the one hand, might increase efficiency and productivity
because of reallocation of resources where they are most productive. On the other hand,
this progress pushes responsibility for careers as well as uncertainty about income security
onto workers. Peter Capelli (1999, p. 17) describes this with the following words: ”THE
OLD employment system of secure, lifetime jobs with predictable advancement and stable
pay is dead.” This thesis analyzes job-to-job mobility in Germany and, thus, contributes
to the aspect of the worker’s responsibility for the own career. In fact, todays employees
are characterized by a large degree of self-determination and flexibility. This also includes
the improvement of the own career by finding a new job and quitting the previous one. In
one of his speeches, Earl Nightingale (1921–1989, American author) implicitly motivates
workers to quit their jobs to a new one for climbing up the career ladder because ”Jobs
are owned by the company, you own your career”.
The seminal literature on the on-the-job search introduced the possibility that work-
ers search for new jobs while employed. These studies, then, intended to explain quit
rates and individual quit behavior. This early literature, however, mainly focused on
wage maximization problems in voluntary mobility. This implies that workers form their
decisions to change jobs only by comparison of wages which can be obtained in differ-
ent firms. The next chapter of this thesis empirically contributes to this literature and
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examines whether mobility to a new job pays off in the long run. This work differs
from other studies because it applies an innovative methodology based on firm-specific
estimation of counterfactual wage trajectories. More recent on-the-job search literature
change focus from wage-maximization to utility-maximization where bundles of various
job characteristics (including wages) affect the decision to quit a job voluntarily. Chapter
3 enhances this literature via an empirical examination of the relationship between quit
decisions and the relative wage position within a firm. This is an important determinant
of the own career because it might signal future career prospects and could be interpreted
as reputation or status within a firm. The analysis explicitly controls for the monetary
component, in order to account for wage effects in labor market quit decisions. Another
aspect of this chapter is whether workers are mobile to lower wages if they can improve
their relative wage position in the new firm. Individual quits with earnings losses are
further analyzed in chapter 4, in which the effects of different job-specific (non-wage)
characteristics on the decision to accept wage cuts are examined. Therefore, this study
contributes to the so far sparse literature about the reasons for this behavior. It is im-
portant to note that empirical analyzes always have some drawbacks. The most serious
problem in this thesis concerns the definition of voluntary job-to-job mobility. The data,
in fact, do not allow for distinct definitions regarding voluntary quits in chapters 2 and
3. The studies, however, refer to measures which are arbitrary to those used by other
researchers and provide robustness checks with respect to different definitions of volun-
tary quits to a new job. In the following part of this introduction, the main findings and
conclusions are summarized.
Chapter 2 is to conclude on whether staying at the same employer or moving to a
different employer pays off in the medium term. This study is the first which estimates
individual counterfactual wage profiles in order to compare wages at different employers
simultaneously. This allows conclusions about the monetary consequences of individual
mobility. The results show that most mobile workers achieve permanently higher wages
when being mobile once. A substantial share of mobile workers, in turn, suffers wage
cuts when changing the establishment. A major finding of this study is that less than
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one in three immediate wage cuts is beneficial in the future. One explanation is that job-
specific amenities play a role for transitions to permanently lower wages. An important
topic for further research is comparison of the basic findings achieved with German linked
employer-employee data with those obtained in other countries. A further promising
field for future research is the inclusion of job-related amenities to conclude about the
individual trade-off reasoning between job-specific amenities and wages.
Chapter 3 deals with the effect of individual relative wage positions which can be
interpreted as a worker-specific amenity. The main point of interest is the effect of the
relative wage position on the decision to voluntarily quit a job. The results show that
relative wage positions have a significant impact on the probability to voluntarily quit
a job. In addition, the study concentrates on both, linear as well as nonlinear effects.
When considering linear effects, the analysis suggests that workers with high relative
wage positions within their firms are more likely to quit a job in comparison to workers
with low relative wage positions. This finding is consistent with the results of a study
conducted with Italian data. The results can also be incorporated into the literature about
interdependent preferences and the determinants of subjective well-being because the
position in the pay ordering within a firm also has significant impact on job satisfaction,
as found in a recent study conducted in Denmark. This thesis, however, goes beyond
the scope of existing studies and introduces considerations about a nonlinear relationship
as well as individual trade-off reasoning when changing jobs. The analysis of nonlinear
effects of relative wage positions in quit decisions reveals a U-shape between the wage
rank and the decision to quit. An explanation is that workers at the bottom of the within-
establishment pay scale are more sensitive to status considerations and those at the top
to signal considerations. In other words, workers in low relative wage positions quit their
jobs because of their low status while workers in high relative wage positions quit because
of low future career prospects. Finally, this chapter reveals that relative wage positions
are significantly correlated with the probability to be mobile to lower wages. Workers
who improve their relative wage position compared to the previous establishment are,
on average, less likely to pay for mobility by lower wages. Trade-off reasoning between
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wages and relative wage positions, thus, is not evident in this study.
The last part of this thesis concentrates on mobility to lower wages. Studies show that
more than one in three individuals pay for a new job by lower wages in the U.S., Germany,
France, and Denmark. Literature, however, lacks detailed information on the reasons for
mobility to lower wages. Chapter 4 sheds light on this behavioral pattern and examines
the relationship between a variety of different subjective improvements in a diversity
of job-specific amenities between two jobs and the willingness to pay for them. The
results suggest that individual trade-off reasoning is evident. Specifically, individuals
are found to pay for improvements in workload by lower wages. As chapter 2 shows
that transitions to permanently lower wages are common, it might be hypothesized that
workers trade off permanently lower wages with subjective improvements in job-specific
characteristics (e.g., improvements in workload). The results also indicate compensating
wage differentials for job-specific disamenities which are, however, to the largest extent,
statistically insignificant.
In sum, this thesis shows that labor market mobility is very complex in nature. Com-
bination of all the different aspects discussed in this thesis is a promising field of research.
Nevertheless, it is problematic to find linked employer-employee data which combine long
time horizons, job-specific amenities, wage information, and detailed information on the
reason of mobility that allow for a joint investigation of all of the points addressed in this
thesis.
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2 Inter-Firm Labor Mobility and Wages
Individuals who want to leave their employer usually raise the question whether mobility
to a new employer pays off in the future. This paper contributes to this question by
examining the consequences of labor market mobility in the medium-term. Conclusions
regarding whether an individual’s wage trajectory at the new employer exceeds the one
of the previous employer are drawn by application of an innovative procedure which
involves the simultaneous investigation of wage trajectories at different employers. The
main finding is that a considerable number of workers experience wage cuts which are of
permanent nature. Only few of the transitions to lower wages pay off because of steeper
wage growth in the new job.1
1This chapter was originally published as ”Inter-Firm Labor Mobility and Wages”, Jahrbuch für
Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Review of Economics), Vol. 61, 196–211. Publication within this thesis
with kind permission of Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG. This study uses the Cross-
sectional model of the Linked-Employer-Employee Data (LIAB; years 1993-2006) from the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB). Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data
Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the IAB and remote data access.
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2.1 Introduction
Labor market mobility is an outstanding characteristic of labor markets (Burgess et al.
2000, OECD 1997). This is also true for the German private sector, where individuals are
unlikely to stay in one job over their entire working life. In fact, Winkelmann (1994) shows
that male German workers hold an average of four lifetime jobs. Jolivet et al. (2006),
Nosal and Rupert (2007), and Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) show that wage markups
and wage cuts coexist with mobility. It is further illustrated that a small proportion of
workers is mobile and experiences no wage changes2. This paper is motivated by these
results and contributes to the investigation of medium-term consequences of immediate
wage cuts and wage markups.
Literature on the immediate consequences of job-to-job mobility is wide spread and
states that wage markups as well as wage cuts coexist. Borjas (1981) emphasizes that an
individual’s earnings profile is discontinuous across jobs because job mobility on average
results in a higher wage. Upward mobility is empirically confirmed by other studies (e.g.,
Topel and Ward 1992). Jolivet et al. (2006) show that 60.4% of German job-to-job
transitions are to higher wages. Downward mobility is also shown to be frequent. In
Denmark, France, and Germany, more than one in three mobile individuals change jobs
at the price of a wage cut (Jolivet et al. 2006). In the U.S., Nosal and Rupert (2007)
show that 42% of individuals voluntarily changing jobs suffer wage cuts.
However, individuals who are confronted with thoughts of leaving the employer usually
evaluate their alternatives and raise the question whether mobility to a new employer
pays off in the future.3 Individuals, thus, are interested in the medium- or long-term
consequences of their decision rather than in an evaluation of immediate success. In fact,
it is hard to assess the consequences of mobility because it is problematic to conclude
whether the individual within-firm wage path exceeds the between-firm (i.e., mobility)
wage path. The main problem is, obviously, that individual wages of the main job are not
2Nosal and Rupert (2007) show that about 8% of all workers and approximately 5% of voluntarily
mobile workers change jobs to the same wage.
3In the data used here, establishments are observed. From now on, firm, employer, and establishment
are used interchangeably.
6
simultaneously observable across firms. The availability of matched employer-employee
data and application of the firm-specific estimation approach of Abowd et al. (2006)
help to solve this problem. The innovative procedure applied here involves estimation
of wage equations for each single firm. In a next step, the results are applied to predict
average wage paths at different employers which are used for the simultaneous analysis
of individual wage trajectories at different firms. This procedure allows to address the
following questions:
1. In comparison to the old employer, do mobile workers achieve permanently higher
wages at the new employer?
2. Do workers change to lower wages?
3. How many immediate wage cuts pay off in the future?
This paper, thus, contributes to the immediate wage change of mobility and assesses the
long-run consequences. A special focus is on the acceptance of wage cuts in the period
of mobility. Connolly and Gottschalk (2008) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) argue
that wage cuts are accepted by mobile individuals because of greater wage growth in
the new job. Downward mobility, therefore, can be justified as an investment in future
wage growth. The results, however, show that workers frequently change to permanently
lower wages while only a small share of workers is shown to pay for steeper wage growth
at the new employer by wage cuts. This might be explained by differences in non-wage
characteristics between the old and the new job which also might enter mobility decisions
(Nosal and Rupert 2007).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 explains the data and the empirical
procedure. Section 2.3 presents the results and section 2.4 the conclusions.
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2.2 Data and procedure
2.2.1 Data
This analysis utilizes the linked employer-employee data set from the Institute for Em-
ployment Research4 (Alda et al. 2005). This data set includes data from a representa-
tive annual establishment survey (the IAB Establishment Panel) and process-produced
person-specific data from the IAB. The underlying data set (called LIAB) is an unbal-
anced panel of cross-sections from 1993 to 2006 at the corresponding record date of June
30th. Hence, 14 periods are available to investigate the working careers of individuals in
an unbalanced panel design. In order to obtain efficient estimates, the analysis includes
only establishments with at least 50 observations. The main advantage of this data set
is that counterfactual wage trajectories can be separately constructed for each firm.
The sample is restricted to German citizens working in full-time jobs in West Germany
because the data lacks information on individual working hours. The analysis focuses on
males aged between 18 and 60 years who are subject to social insurance contributions. Of
foremost interest is the average individual daily wage5 achieved in the primary occupation
surveyed in the data. The consumer price index surveyed by the Statistisches Bundesamt
Deutschland is applied to deflate the nominal wages (annual averages, with year 2005 =
100). Wages below the marginal employment ceiling of 400 Euro per month (or 13.33 Euro
per day in 2005 wages) are excluded from the analysis.6 Wages above the upper earnings
limit for social security contributions are set to the corresponding ceiling. Wages, thus,
are censored in the data. Experience is calculated with respect to the surveyed year of
labor market entry.7 Hence, possible unemployment spells after schooling are considered
by construction of experience.
Essentially, the paper focuses on mobile employees who change from one LIAB estab-
4Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB).
5The data contain the average daily gross wages of individuals, which are calculated via information
on "the total wage for the spell of notification" and "the duration of the spell of notification in days".
Information on hours worked, thus, is not available.
6See Jacobebbinghaus (2008) for an explanation of such implausibly low wages.
7In particular, the earliest year of an individual’s surveyed labor market entry is considered in order
to obtain strictly increasing experience in the data. For East Germans, the surveyed labor market
entry is left-censored before 1990, which is the main reason for exclusively focusing on workers in
West Germany.
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lishment to another LIAB establishment where the establishment identifier in the data is
used to determine such transitions. A major concern regarding mobility is the distinction
between involuntary and voluntary mobility. Jolivet et al. (2006) consider voluntary
mobility as an unconstrained choice of the worker, which is difficult to ascertain using
this data set.8 Instead, I distinguish between direct and indirect transitions. Direct
transitions are defined as changes between establishments whereas the individual must
be full-time employed at another establishment eight days before entering the new estab-
lishment. Workers who are indirectly mobile change from one establishment to another
one within a year.9
An advantage of this data set is that there are no problems regarding sorting or indi-
vidual selection into LIAB establishments, because workers are not expected to system-
atically move from one LIAB establishment to another LIAB establishment. It should be
noted that some types of moves cannot be accounted for; that is, transitions from a non-
LIAB establishment into the sample or transitions out of the sample are not identified.
Therefore, the number of transitions for an individual is unknown if the individual was
not observed in the sample for the entire career horizon, as the individual’s employment
history is not completely captured in the data. Furthermore, this analysis refers to an
employer-to-employer transition in which an individual changes establishments within
the same employer.
After implementation of all restrictions, 11,340,952 observations on 4,697 firms and
2,622,048 individuals are subject to analysis. Table A2.1 in the appendix displays the
descriptive statistics for the entire sample.
2.2.2 Procedure
The analysis focuses on the firm-specific estimation of individual wage trajectories. This
procedure becomes necessary as the wage of individual i cannot be observed in two
firms simultaneously. In the following, wage trajectories are estimated for each LIAB
8Basically, it is impossible to ascertain voluntary mobility of individuals because the data does not
provide information on whether a quit occurred or whether the employee was, e.g., laid off.
9Individuals are allowed to receive public benefits or, for example, to be employed part-time eight days
before entering the new establishment.
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establishment at which an employee is employed. The main goal is the prediction of
a wage trajectory that displays the individual’s firm-specific wage path with respect to
experience.
Some studies focus on returns to tenure within a particular firm (Topel 1991), as
this relationship can be interpreted as firm-specific human capital. Another strand in
the literature argues that wage growth is essentially attributable to general labor mar-
ket experience (Altonji and Shakotko 1987), industry-specific experience (Parent 2000),
or occupational experience (Zangelidis 2008, Kambourov and Manovskii 2009a, 2009b).
Schönberg and Gathmann (2010) show that human capital is portable to a large extent
when individuals move to similar occupations with similar tasks (also see the concept
of task-specific human capital of Gibbons and Waldman 2004). In sum, the literature
examines wage growth primarily determined by the accumulation of human capital (see
Becker 1964, 1993). This analysis basically focuses on rewards to labor market experience
as it can be interpreted as general human capital which is expected to be more portable
than firm-specific human capital.
Starting from a simplified framework with one mobility event, the paper continues to
obtain a more complex setting by inclusion of multiple transitions. The basic framework
considers wage trajectories at different employers simultaneously and consists of four
different scenarios which are displayed in Figure 2.1. Workers start their careers at
employer 1 and subsequently switch to employer 2; as can be seen, extensive differences
in mobility are illustrated. Scenario 1 depicts upward mobility in combination with
permanently higher wages. Individuals, thus, are able to achieve permanently higher
wages at employer 2 in comparison to employer 1. Mobility, further, is characterized by
a wage markup independently of the period of realized mobility.
Scenario 2 illustrates that workers who change to jobs with lower wages might also
suffer permanently lower wages. In this case, workers change to lower wages regard-
less of the period of realized mobility. One possible explanation is involuntary mobility
where individuals might accept permanently lower wages because the alternative is non-
employment. In addition, workers may accept a job with a lower wage in order to maintain
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their labor market insider status (Lindbeck and Snower 2002). Alternatively, this type
of mobility might be attributable to non-wage amenities (Nosal and Rupert 2007). The
sheer number of studies on the acceptance of wage cuts enforces this analysis, which also
informs about the persistence of lower wages. Scenario 3 describes a situation where an
individual is employed at firm 1, where the wage is larger in firm 2, and then changes
jobs when the wage of employer 1 exceeds the wage of employer 2.
Figure 2.1: Mobility scenarios
Of foremost interest is the last scenario in Figure 2.1, because it provides an explanation
for mobility to lower wages, to higher wages, and to equal wages. Changing to equal
wages implies mobility at the intersection point of the wage trajectories. Mobility of
this type is wage maximizing because the individual achieves the upper wage path of
both wage trajectories. Mobility to lower wages is characterized by mobility before the
intersection point such that individuals pay for higher future wages by immediate wage
cuts. The interpretation of investments in future wage growth as proposed by Connolly
and Gottschalk (2008) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), hence, becomes apparent.
Finally, scenario 4 illustrates mobility with wage markups for workers who are mobile
after the intersection point. Analogously to Bingley and Westergard-Nielsen (2006),
the probability of mobility increases synchronously with the wage differential between
employers 1 and 2.
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In the following, I describe the empirical procedure in more detail. As the LIAB is set
up as a panel, I can make efforts to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. In
order to check for the prevalence of individual-specific effects, I apply the Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan 1979). The test rejects that there is no in-
dividual heterogeneity at the 1% level. Considerations about the structure of unobserved
individual characteristics tend to favor fixed-effects estimation because unobserved in-
dividual characteristics are expected to be correlated with the regressors. In line with
this consideration, the formal test developed by Hausman (1978) reveals that fixed-effects
estimation is superior in comparison to random-effects estimation.10 As a consequence,
the fixed-effects estimator is applied.
The specification is given as:
wijt = βij + β1j(experience)it + β2j(experience)2it + δ′jXit + uijt (2.1)
wijt is the log wage of individual i in firm j in period t, uijt is the error term, and Xit
corresponds to a set of further control variables.
Xit consists of tenure (squared), dummy variables for the occupation, and dummy
variables for the educational degree which are all shown in Table A2.1. The estima-
tion approach, thus, follows an extended Mincer-type wage equation which includes the
main individual characteristics surveyed in the data. Clerks and secondary school level
I certificate with completed vocational training provide the usual reference categories. If
establishments do not employ any clerks, I choose another group as reference category
in order to avoid problems regarding multicollinearity. Analogously, the same holds if a
LIAB establishment does not engage any worker with a secondary school level I certificate
with completed vocational degree.11
In the next step, the establishment-specific estimates are used to predict individual
10Note that I perform the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test and the Hausman test using the entire
sample. The corresponding p-values are <0.001.
11This might introduce similar problems as in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition which is problematic
when it comes to calculation of the contributions from indicator variables because the result depends
on the reference group (see Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973), and Oaxaca and Ransom (1998)).
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wage trajectories in different firms.12
wˆijt = βˆij + βˆ1j(experience)it + βˆ2j(experience)2it + δˆ′jXit (2.2)
The wage differentials between two different firm j and j’ can, then, be calculated by
application of the counterfactual wage paths in equation (2.2).
wˆijt − wˆij′t =
[βˆij + βˆ1j(experience)it + βˆ2j(experience)2it + δˆ′jXit]
− [βˆij′ + βˆ1j′(experience)it + βˆ2j′(experience)2it + δˆ′j′Xit], ∀ j 6= j′
(2.3)
Table 2.1 presents the calculation of the different mobility patterns illustrated in Figure
2.1. wˆijt is the predicted log wage based on equation (2.2), while equation (2.3) shows the
calculation of the differences in accordance to the wage specifications. Note that the main
focus is on workers who are mobile exactly once. For each mobile individual changing
from one LIAB establishment (i.e., firm 1) to another LIAB establishment (that is, firm
2), the wage differential between the predicted wages is used to determine the mobility
scenario.
12I only calculate predictions if establishments are observed in the sample. This assures that workers
really are able to work at either establishment 1 or establishment 2. In addition, workers who leave
the sample for at least one period are not considered for the analysis of mobility but, however, these
individuals are included in the firm-specific estimation procedure. As the wage is censored in the
data, the predictions correspond to a lower boundary of the within-firm wage.
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Table 2.1
Description of the calculation of the various mobility scenarios
Predicted between-firm wage
differential of individual i in t t1,i, ... , tint,i tint+1,i, ... , tT,i Scenario (see Figure 2.1)
wˆi1t − wˆi2t < 0 < 0 Scenario 1*
wˆi1t − wˆi2t > 0 > 0 Scenario 2*
wˆi1t − wˆi2t < 0 > 0 Scenario 3**
wˆi1t − wˆi2t > 0 < 0 Scenario 4**
* persistent wage differential from t=1, ..., T → no intersection point (int) is ex-
istent.
** wage differential non-uniform in t=1, ..., int and t=int+1, ..., T → intersection
point (int) is existent.
Scenarios 1 and 2 verify steady between-firm wage differentials.13 Scenarios 3 and 4
exhibit exactly one intersection point. Note, however, that the inclusion of individual-
specific time-variant variables in the Mincer-type wage equation might produce saw-blade-
shaped counterfactual wage trajectories that may cause multiple intersection points. In
this case, wage paths cannot precisely be assigned to one of the scenarios described
above. For this reason, I exclude wage trajectories with multiple intersection points from
the analysis of the different mobility scenarios.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Main results
The empirical investigation provides 19,741 individual wage profiles of individuals who
are mobile exactly once and in accordance to the scenarios shown above. Application
13Scenarios 1 and 2 should be examined in a more differentiated manner. The wage profiles can exhibit
an intersection point when enlarging the sample horizon. Hence, mobility as displayed in scenario 1
could change to scenario 3-type mobility, whereas mobility to permanently lower wages could change
to scenario 4-type mobility before the intersection point. Here, it is stipulated that wage trajectories
do not intersect during the observed working career horizon of individual i.
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of the counterfactual wages according to the specification enforces exclusion of 455 indi-
vidual wage paths which intersect at least twice. The corresponding maximum is four
intersection points. The average observations period for the counterfactual wages equals
about five years. Figure 2.2 displays the frequencies of the mobility scenarios. Most
individual transitions are characterized by a steady between-firm wage differential, as
suggested by scenarios 1 and 2. Together, at least seven in ten of the wage paths are
characterized by steady between-firm wage differentials. Both procedures show that a
low fraction of workers is mobile in accordance with scenarios 3 (12.91%) and 4 (12.77%).
Scenario 1 addresses the first question raised in the introduction and reveals whether
workers achieve permanently higher wages when changing employers. The last bar of
Figure 2.2 shows that upward mobility (in combination with permanently higher wages)
is most common across workers changing establishments once.14 According to the results,
the period of realized mobility does not matter in order to achieve a wage markup for
about eight in twenty workers. This finding is in line with other studies which show that
workers frequently change to higher wages.
Figure 2.2: Frequencies of the mobility scenarios
Includes individuals who changed firms exactly once during the observed period
Number of observations: Nall= 19,741; Ndirect= 15,672; Nindirect= 4,069
14Note that establishment-to-establishment transitions within the same employer might affect the re-
sults. If workers start at employer-specific low-wage ports of entry and are promoted to a high-wage
establishment afterward, I conclude that workers are mobile to permanently higher wages. This
paper, thus, is not responsive to this special type of investment in future wage growth.
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Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
Apart from that, workers are also shown to be mobile to establishments with perma-
nently lower wages. In fact, I find that individuals are frequently mobile in accordance
to scenario 2. About seven in twenty workers change to a permanently lower paying
establishment. This result might be explained by job-specific amenities in the new es-
tablishment. Alternatively, involuntary job reallocations might enforce the acceptance of
permanently lower wages when the alternatives are unemployment or non-employment.
In addition, mobility toward less working hours in the new job compared to the previous
one might introduce permanently lower wages.15 In brief, Figure 2.2 reveals that a large
share of workers changes to permanently lower wages.
Distinguishing between direct and indirect mobility reveals that mobility to perma-
nently lower wages is more common across indirectly mobile workers (41.12%) in com-
parison to individuals changing directly (33.81%). In other words, workers who are not
changing employers within eight days are more likely to suffer permanent wage cuts in
comparison to workers who change employers within eight days. This can be explained
by involuntary mobility, whereby workers accept lower wages because the only alternative
is unemployment. In addition, employers are more likely to hire full-time employees in
comparison to unemployed individuals. Workers possibly accept a job with permanently
lower wage in order to maintain their labor market insider status (Lindbeck and Snower
2002). Workers who change indirectly, in turn, are said to have failed in keeping their
(full-time) employee status and thus must accept lower paying jobs in order to re-enter
the full-time workforce.
The large share of mobility to permanently lower wages within eight days is, however,
in line with the literature on involuntary job reallocations. In the words of Jolivet et
al. (2006, p. 882), ”Surely, many of the quick job re-accessions at very short durations
correspond to voluntary job changes [...]. Yet some of them are likely to reflect involuntary
reallocation – essentially job losses followed by the immediate finding of a replacement
job”. This is in line with the paper of Jolivet (2009), according to which workers accept
15Remember that the data lacks information on individual working hours. It is to expect that working
time is comparable across jobs because of pure consideration of employees in full-time jobs.
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lower wages because the only alternative is non-employment (or unemployment). The
large share of downward mobility in this data suggests the existence of such involuntary
job reallocations.
The third question raised in the introduction can be answered by examination of sce-
nario 4 in combination with scenario 2. Almost all individuals who are mobile in accor-
dance with scenario 4 leave the first employer before the intersection point which implies
that the immediate wage cut pays off in the future. In fact, consideration of the baseline
predictions reveals that 2,498 workers (direct: 2,063; indirect: 435) pay for steeper wage
growth at the new employer by immediate lower wages. This allows for the calculation of
the share of investments in future wage growth among all wage cuts. The results clearly
suggest that only few wage cuts act as investment in future wage growth (26.38%16).
The results, thus, suggest that the majority of wage cuts are of permanent nature. A
possible explanation is that expectations about future wage growth are hardly to con-
duct. Workers, however, also might accept lower wages because of job-specific (non-wage)
amenities.
The fraction of investments in future wage growth differ by distinction of direct and
indirect mobility. Compared to the old employer, steeper wage growth at the new em-
ployer is more frequent across direct transitions (28.03%) compared to indirect mobility
where the baseline specification finds that 20.64% of immediate wage cuts pay off in the
future. This result illustrates that workers who change jobs with virtually no intervening
unemployment are more successful in turning immediate wage cuts into higher payoffs at
the new employer.
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics on the difference between realized mobility
and the predicted intersection point in scenario 4. On average, workers are shown to
invest for about two years. Some workers seem to invest for a very long time horizon
of 13 periods until the wage paths intersect. This finding can be interpreted in the
way that investments in future wage growth correspond to individual career planning
in the very long run. For individuals changing after the intersection point, the data do
16 early Scenario 4-type mobility
Scenario 2 + early Scenario 4-type mobility =
2,498
6,971+2,498 = 0.2638
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not provide evidence for comparable time spans. The corresponding maximum equals
4 years. This result illustrates that the quit probability synchronously increases with
the wage differential introduced by mobility after the intersection point. In sum, Table
2.2 shows that the wage choice is interpretable only in the long run. At least for some
individuals, it is expected that downward mobility might become an investment in future
wage growth under an extended time horizon.
Table 2.2
Deviation of the intersection in case of scenario four
Observations Difference between realized Range
mobility and predicted intersection point
(mean)
Scenario 4-type mobility 2,520 -1.9048 [-13; 4]
(1.8131)
Standard Deviations in parenthesis.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations).
In order to assess the long-run consequences of mobility, I consider only individuals who
are observed for at least eight periods and who are mobile within the first five years. This
allows for an observation of wage paths for at least three periods after the establishment
change. The number of observations decreased substantially because only 2,712 of the
19,741 initial observations remain. Figure 2.3 shows that mobility to permanently higher
wages is substantially higher for this subsample of workers. Mobility with permanent
wage cuts remains relatively stable for direct mobility while indirectly mobile workers
are significantly less affected by permanent lower wages. Again, more than one in three
individuals changes establishments at the price of permanently lower wages. The share
of scenario-4 type mobility is very low for this sample. For this reason, an extended time
horizon might not necessarily increase the share of investments in future wage growth.
However, this subsample does not suggest this pattern because most individuals are
mobile with wage markups.
18
Figure 2.3: Frequencies of the mobility scenarios for an individual panel length of at
least eight periods
Includes individuals who changed firms exactly once during in the first five years
Number of observations: Nall= 2,712; Ndirect= 2,018; Nindirect= 694
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
So far, this analysis has been restricted to workers who are mobile once during the
observed career horizon. Since Germans hold more than two lifetime jobs, this paper
examines workers who are mobile more often than once. In addition, I also make effort
to include wage paths with multiple intersection points of individuals. The following
analysis, then, focuses on the average wage path of all mobile workers. Accordingly,
this part of the analysis is adequate to conclude whether the above presented scenarios
describe real world mobility to a considerable extent or whether the scenarios above are
hardly to justify.
The data illustrate that individuals are mobile up to seven times, which corresponds to
eight predicted wage paths. Table 2.3 presents the average predicted wages at different
employers. It reveals that the average predicted lifetime wage is economically signifi-
cantly decreasing when changing to employer 2. Additional transitions help to increase
individual lifetime wages again. From this it follows that frequent mobility increases
average lifetime earnings. Increasing wages are in line with Borjas (1981), who suggests
that job mobility results on average in a wage markup. Note that the counterfactual
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wage trajectories at employer 1 and 2 vary substantial over the lifetime.
Table 2.3
Average counterfactual wages at different employers
Observations wˆijt
Establishment 1 128,659 4.7962
(11.2656)
Establishment 2 128,659 4.4589
(12.9566)
Establishment 3 13,394 4.8101
(1.0157)
Establishment 4 1,587 4.8761
(0.2473)
Establishment 5 243 4.8827
(0.1749)
Establishment 6, 7, 8 less than 50 observations available
Standard Deviations in parenthesis.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations).
For a more detailed examination, the average predicted wages are plotted in Figure 2.4.
More specifically, for each year of experience, I calculate the average predicted wages. I
only display four counterfactual wage trajectories for two reasons. First, German workers
hold an average of four lifetime jobs. Second, few observations remain after transition
three. A basic finding which can be found in all of the following graphs is that the
predicted wage paths at employers 1 and 2 vary substantially across years of experience
while the counterfactual wages at employers 3 and 4 are less dispersed. The large varia-
tion, however, is introduced by the peaks after 25 years of experience.17 Consistent with
the findings above, the graph provides an explanation for the large share of mobility to
permanently lower wages. From two to 21 years of experience, the average counterfactual
wage at employer 1 exceeds the one at employer 2. This suggests that mobility within
17The peaks might be explained by the low number of observations.
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that particular period might frequently be characterized by permanent lower wages when
not accounting for changes in other wage determinants such as tenure. Note that multiple
intersection points are observed. For this reason, the stylized scenarios described above
only present an approximation of wage mobility.
Figure 2.4: Average counterfactual wage paths at different establishments by
experience
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
Figure 2.5 turns the attention to the average counterfactual wage paths as a function of
tenure. The graph shows that the average predicted wage trajectory in establishment 1
and employer 2 vary substantial. Similar to Figure 2.4, the main variation is introduced
by the fluctuations in the late years of tenure. The average predicted wage path at
employer 1 suggests a positive trend in the rewards to tenure until 15 to 17 years of
tenure. Afterward, the counterfactual returns to tenure exhibit a negative trend. The
average counterfactual wage path at employer 2 provides an explanation why so many
workers are mobile to permanently lower wages. Tenure-related average predicted wage
growth at this employer is not steep enough to compensate for immediate wage cuts. In
fact, it is even negative rather than positive. The average counterfactual wage paths at
establishments 3 and 4 reveal increasing average returns to tenure in the long run whereas
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being employed at firm 4 yields higher average returns to tenure.
Figure 2.5: Average counterfactual wage paths at different establishments by tenure
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
To sum up, the results show that only few wage cuts act as investments in future wage
growth while the majority of immediate wage cuts are associated with permanently lower
wages. Analogously to Rosen (1974, 1987), jobs consist of bundles of various character-
istics with implicit prices. In other words, workers might accept even permanently lower
wages if the current job is better compared to the previous job. This includes non-wage
characteristics as well as monetary characteristics. For this reason, the discussion of Nosal
and Rupert (2007) about job-specific amenities affecting wage choice over the life cycle
becomes relevant. However, further research is needed to assess the reasons why workers
change to (permanently) lower wages. Another finding of this paper is that wage markups
in the realized period of mobility frequently stem from transitions to a firm which offers
higher wages during the observed career horizon. This result is in line with literature on
wage markups and upward mobility.
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2.3.2 A subgroup analysis
This section presents average counterfactual wage paths at different firms by years of
experience and by different groups in order to conclude about the consequences of mobility
for heterogeneous groups. Again, I utilize the wage regressions shown above in order to
compare wages conditional on experience (squared), tenure (squared), occupation, and
educational degree. The main reason for focusing on experience stems from portability
of general human capital which might allow for conclusions about a wage maximizing
mobility strategy. This methodology might be criticized because I compare individuals
with identical experience, but with different tenure. When the period of mobility remains
unconsidered, this procedure might introduce outliers because calculation of the mean
wage by experience does not ensure that I compare individuals with similar tenure. More
specifically, the weighted average of wages by experience might decrease sharply when
considering a large share of workers who changed jobs in this period which, then, reduces
wages because these individual wage profiles are calculated on the basis of zero tenure.
When I consider a period where most workers have some tenure, then the counterfactual
wage additionally includes tenure effects, which might increase wages considerably. Note
that distinct conclusions are not possible because of the U-shape of tenure. I start with
an examination of average counterfactual wage paths by education, whereas I define three
skill groups of workers in analogy to Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007): The first category
consists of individuals with neither a completed vocational training nor a university degree
(low skilled). The second group corresponds to workers with a vocational training degree
but without university degree (medium skilled). The third group are persons with a
(technical) university degree (high skilled).
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Figure 2.6: Counterfactual wage paths for low skilled workers
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
Figure 2.6 presents four counterfactual wage-experience trajectories for the group of low
skilled workers. Note that statements about the fourth wage trajectory are ambiguous
because of few observations. The graph reveals three intersection points for the average
predicted wage trajectories of employers 1 and 2 within the first ten years. This does
not allow for distinct answers regarding a wage-maximizing mobility strategy in the long
run for this group of workers. Scenario 3-type and scenario 4-type mobility, however,
are suggested to be usual for this group of workers in the short run. More experienced
low skilled individuals seem to suffer permanently lower wages within 17 and 22 years of
experience. From 22 years to 25 years, the average counterfactual wage trajectory exceeds
the one of employer 2. Outliers are suggested to have sizable impact on the calculation
of the average counterfactual wage after about 27 years. Figure 2.6 also reveals that the
wage paths of all four employers intersect very often. In sum, distinct conclusions about
a possible wage-maximizing mobility strategy are hardly to justify.
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Figure 2.7: Counterfactual wage paths for medium skilled workers
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
Figure 2.7 shows that medium skilled workers are, on average, upwardly mobile after
their labor market entry. Up to 17 years of experience, the average predicted wage of
firm 2 exceeds the one of employer 1 during almost all years of experience.18 The average
counterfactual wage paths at employers 3 and 4 are, on average, not economically signif-
icantly higher than at employer 2 over the career horizon. Individuals with completed
vocational training, however, are suggested to change employer once in order to improve
their lifetime wages. Inspection of the predicted average wage paths in Figure 2.7 could
lead to the conclusion that the expected wage in firm 1 is lower because this partic-
ular employer might have paid for vocational training. Literature reasonably suggests
that employer and employee share the rent of vocational training after graduation while
employers pay somewhat lower wages to self-trained employees. For employers without
any costs for training it might be possible to offer higher wages because of no expenses
for training. Employers without vocational training programs, then, might try to poach
skilled workers from firms that take on trainees by offering higher wages. This, however,
must not be true because we do not observe the entire working biography in the data.
18An exception is shown at eleven years of experience where the average counterfactual wage at employer
1 exceeds the one of employer 2.
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In other words, firm 1 must not be the firm where the vocational training is originally
completed.
Finally, Figure 2.8 presents the predicted average wage paths for highly skilled indi-
viduals with (technical) university degrees. On average, multiple mobility (at least two
transitions) pays off over the observed career horizon. In addition, the graph suggests
that multiple mobility should be executed at early stages of the working life which is in
line with job shopping (Altonji and Shakotko 1987) as a promising strategy to improve
wages over the career horizon. Note that the average predicted wage paths at employers
1 and 2 are significantly lower for high skilled than for medium and low skilled workers at
the beginning of the career. In addition, downward mobility is indicated between firm 1
and firm 2 until about 20 years of experience. For this reason, the wage profiles displayed
in Figure 2.8 suggest to stay at employer 1 or to change jobs more often than once.
Figure 2.8: Counterfactual wage paths for high skilled workers
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
The average counterfactual wage paths presented in Figures 2.6 to 2.8 might be a first step
to provide a guide to wage-maximizing mobility. Unfortunately, the predicted average
wages do not reveal a distinct or wage-maximizing mobility strategy. One job change,
however, is suggested for medium skilled workers while multiple job changes are sug-
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gested for workers with (technical) university degrees. For individuals without completed
vocational training and (technical) university degree, a clear wage maximizing strategy
cannot be shown because of multiple intersection points of the wage trajectories.19
The following figures display the average counterfactual wage paths by occupation while
experience is limited to 25 years because of outliers at later stages of experience.20
Figure 2.9: Counterfactual wage paths for clerks
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
The low starting wage of the highly skilled workers with academic education might be
explained by the average counterfactual wage paths of clerks (see Figure 2.9). Irrespec-
tive of the employer, an upward trend in wages is obvious for this particular group of
workers over years of experience. It is also shown that the first job change of clerks
might frequently be accompanied by permanently lower wages. More specifically, Figure
2.9 indicates scenario 2-type mobility between three years and 20 years of experience.
Figure 2.10 shows the predicted average wages at different employers for workers with a
completed vocational training in skilled jobs. Multiple intersection points do not allow
19As above, the peaks after 25 years of experience stem from low number of observations. I do not
display any confidence bands in the figures because of multiple intersection points of the confidence
bands which indicate insignificant differences.
20See the corresponding Figure A2.1 in the Appendix for the counterfactual wage paths over the complete
time horizon. At very late stages of experience, the counterfactual wage paths at establishments 1
and 2 result in a rapid increases or decreases, respectively.
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for conclusions about a wage-maximizing career strategy. In contradiction to workers in
skilled jobs, workers (without vocational degree) in unskilled jobs are suggested to stay at
employer 1 for three years (see Figure 2.11). Afterward, the wage trajectories show that
(multiple) job mobility increases the wage until about 15 years of experience. After 15
years of experience, however, peaks and multiple intersection points mitigate this finding.
For this reason, unskilled workers are suggested to profit from job shopping at the very
beginning of the career. As suggested by Figure 2.12, technicians should stay at employer
1 for about two to three years and then change to another employer in order to maximize
the wage.21 A further transition pays off after about seven years of experience while a
third transition is also suggested by the figure. This suggestion for a wage maximizing
career path only holds for years of experience below 16 because of multiple intersection
points afterward.
Figure 2.10: Counterfactual wage paths for skilled workers
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
21For the group of technicians, only very few observations are available. For this reason, the graphs are
to interpret with caution.
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Figure 2.11: Counterfactual wage paths for unskilled workers
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
Figure 2.12: Counterfactual wage paths for technicians
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
The figures in this section indicate that mobility to lower wages as well as transitions to
higher wages are common and, to some extent, upward and downward mobility depend
on the years of experience in the labor market. The long-run consequence of a transition
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between employers, however, is hardly to assess because of multiple intersection points
of the average counterfactual wage profiles at the different employers. More precisely,
consideration of a long career horizon (e.g., 10 years of experience or more) leads in
most cases to multiple intersection points which are not in line with the stylized mobility
scenarios shown in section 2.2.2. In addition, workers might change employers more often
than once. Hübler (1989) discusses an optimal number of mobility whereas the procedure
in this paper is inadequate to conclude about an optimal number of mobility. In sum,
mobility and wage growth seem to be very complex and pure consideration of average
counterfactual wage paths by years of experience is one strategy to reveal the complexity
of mobility.
2.4 Discussion
This paper analyzes the performance of individual employer-to-employer mobility via
investigation of individual wage trajectories at multiple firms simultaneously. The four
mobility scenarios in the paper contribute to an analysis of the medium-term and long-
run consequences of wage cuts and wage markups in the period of mobility.
The most common scenario is mobility to permanently higher wages. In other words,
compared to the previous employer, workers change to employers where they earn higher
wages in the long run. This result is in line with the literature on wage markups induced
by mobility (Borjas 1981, Topel and Ward 1992) and might be explained by on-the-job
search for higher wages.
The analysis also shows that individuals change to lower wages. Specifically, it is shown
that more than one in three workers suffer permanently lower wages at the current em-
ployer in comparison to the previous one. As discussed in Nosal and Rupert (2007),
job-specific amenities might affect job mobility and wage choices throughout an indi-
vidual’s life cycle. Unfortunately, the underlying data set is not adequate to check for
individual amenities. An alternative interpretation can be derived from the literature on
job reallocations, according to which workers accept lower wages because the only alter-
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native is unemployment. The results corroborate this interpretation because workers who
are mobile within eight days are less likely to suffer permanently lower wages compared
to workers changing jobs with longer intervening periods of time.
A major finding is that immediate wage cuts rarely pay off in the future. For workers
who are mobile exactly once, more than 70% of immediate wage cuts result in permanent
lower wages at the current employer. According to the different types of mobility (direct or
indirect), less than 30% of individuals accept wage cuts in order to improve their future
wages, as proposed by Connolly and Gottschalk (2008) and Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002). The results also show that individuals change employers years before the pay-off
period. Note that I consider an average observation period of about five years which
might be to small for an examination of long-run consequences of wage cuts, although
few individuals can be shown to invest in future wage growth in this chapter.
Finally the paper suggests that further research is needed to assess the reasons of
mobility to lower wages. Possible explanation arises from considerations about job-specific
non-wage amenities which might affect mobility decisions. In line with the results, jobs
are not necessarily ranked according to their wages and, therefore, conclusions about
transitions based on the wage alone might be misleading. My findings directly advert
to the importance to examine the importance of non-wage characteristics in more detail.
Inclusion of job-related amenities to conclude about the individual trade-off reasoning
between job-specific amenities and wages might be a fruitful avenue for further research.
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2.5 Appendix
Table A2.1
Descriptive statistics (entire sample)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Endogenous Variable
log(w)i,f,t 4.7218 0.2620
Exogenous Variables
Experience 16.6203 7.3975
Experience2 330.9575 238.0060
Tenure 11.4736 7.7798
Tenure2 192.1686 209.7652
Unskilledi 0.2405 0.4274
Skilledii 0.2938 0.4555
Technicianiii 0.0260 0.1592
Clerkiv 0.4396 0.4963
Secondary school level I certificate 0.1190 0.3238
Secondary school level I certificate & vocational training 0.6812 0.4660
Advanced (technical) college entrance qualification 0.0083 0.0909
Advanced (technical) college entrance qual. & vocational training 0.0406 0.1974
Advanced technical college certificate 0.0648 0.2462
University degree 0.0860 0.2804
Number of observations 11,340,952
Number of individuals 2,622,048
Number of establishments 4,697
Note: German terms:
i) nicht formal qualifiziert.
ii) Facharbeiter.
iii) Meister, Poliere.
iv) Angestellter.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations).
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Figure A2.1: Counterfactual wage paths for complete time horizon
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB, Years 1993-2006 (own calculations)
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3 Relative Wage Positions and Quit
Behavior
This paper utilizes a large linked employer-employee data set in order to analyze the
impact of relative wage positions on the individual decision to quit a job. At first, the
analysis concentrates on linear effects and finds that a possible signal effect might domi-
nate a possible status effect in quit decisions. In a next step, we establish consideration
of nonlinear effects which improves understanding of quits substantially. Finally, we are
interested in the relationship between the change in wages and the change in relative wage
positions when workers change jobs. The results suggest that workers who experience a
loss in their relative wage positions are also more likely to have a wage cut.1
1This chapter is co-authored with Prof. Dr. Christian Pfeifer, Institute of Economics, Leuphana Uni-
versität Lüneburg. The chapter is a revised version of ’Relative Wage Positions and Quit Behavior:
New Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data’, Leibniz University Hannover Discussion Pa-
per, 438, Hannover. This study uses the Cross-sectional model of the Linked-Employer-Employee
Data (LIAB) (Years 1996-2006) from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). Data access was
provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment
Agency (BA) at the IAB and remote data access.
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3.1 Introduction
The empirical analysis of the impact of relative wage positions on workers’ decisions to
voluntary quit their job in the current firm is important in the context of two streams
of the economic literature. On the one hand, recent labor turnover literature points to
the importance of fair wages and status concerns of workers as well as to the fact that
many workers experience a wage cut after a job-to-job transition (e.g., Galizzi and Lang
1998, Postel-Vinay and Robin 2006, Jolivet et al. 2006). On the other hand, our results
can be incorporated into the broader literature about interdependent preferences and
the determinants of subjective well-being (e.g., Hamermesh 1975, Frank 1985, Easterlin
1995, Solnick and Hemenway 1998, Clark et al. 2008) because quits are driven to some
extent by utility maximizing behavior. With regard to both streams of the literature,
we can contribute empirical findings from German linked employer-employee data, which
allows us to compute measures for workers’ relative wage positions within their firms and
to assess their impact on decisions to quit full-time employment. Our sample contains
almost three million annual observations of nearly 850 thousand full-time employed male
prime-age workers in more than four thousand West German firms for the period from
1996 to 2005.
Our paper enhances the analysis of relative wage positions on the decision to quit a job
in several ways. At first, we are contribute findings on this relationship using German
data. Second, we apply several measures for the investigation of relative wage positions
in order to strengthen the generality of our results. Third, we include nonlinear effects
of relative wage positions on the decision to quit. Finally, we are interested in whether
a change in the relative wage position balances out monetary losses. Our findings are
in line with other studies which suggest that relative wage positions have a significant
impact on the probability to voluntarily quit a job. Regarding possible nonlinearities,
we suggest the prevalence of a U-shaped relationship whereas we also come up with a
proposal to interpret this result. In addition, the results reveal that losses in the relative
wage position are, on average, accompanied by wage cuts. For this reason, individuals
who experience decreasing relative standing at the new establishment compared with the
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previous one are also more likely to change to lower wages.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section illustrates briefly the basic theo-
retical framework and our research hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes our data set, main
variables, and econometric models. In section 3.4, we present our econometric results
for the impact of relative wage positions on the individual quit probability and for the
consequences of quits on absolute wages and relative wage positions. We conclude with
a short summary in Section 3.5.
3.2 Basic theoretical framework and hypotheses
The relationship between wages and the decision to quit can be incorporated in the
broad framework of individual utility maximizing behavior. In equation (3.1), utility U
of individual i who works in firm j at time t is a simplified function of the individual
absolute wage (wabsijt ), the individual relative wage position within the firm (wrelijt ), and
other individual and job characteristics (Xijt).2 Moreover, we assume that the individual
probability to quit a job in firm j during period t is negatively correlated with utility as
described in equation (3.2) (Freeman 1978, Akerlof et al. 1988, Clark et al. 1998, Clark
2001, Clark and Georgellis 2006, Lévy-Garboua et al. 2007).
Uijt = Uijt(wabsijt , wrelijt , Xijt) (3.1)
Pr(quit = 1|Uijt) = Pr(quit = 1|wabsijt , wrelijt , Xijt) (3.2)
Standard economic theory (e.g., search models, efficiency wage models) usually accounts
explicitly for absolute wages, which should positively affect a worker’s utility (Salop and
Salop 1976, Salop 1979, Akerlof 1982). Our main focus is on workers’ relative wage
positions, which have received increasing attention in happiness research in the last two
decades (Clark et al. 2008). The impact of the relative wage position within a firm
2Note that this framework only considers the current wage while individuals might also consider wage
changes over time. The framework presented here rather considers myopic individuals but, however,
measures for wage growth can easily be implemented in the empirical analysis.
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(wrelijt ), which includes wages of co-workers as comparison income, is, however, ambiguous.
Studies find support for both, either status as well as signal. More specifically, Clark et
al. (2008) corroborate status concerns while the more recent study of Clark et al. (2009)
favors the signal effect which are described in the following.
If the individual wage is held constant, higher wages of co-workers are associated with
a lower relative wage position of an individual worker within his firm. A lower relative
wage might be perceived as unfair and of low social status (Adams 1965, Garner 1986,
Akerlof and Yellen 1990, Clark et al. 2008, Frank 1984a, 1984b), which consequently
decreases utility and increases the quit probability, ceteris paribus. This is called the
’status effect’. The relative wage position within a firm, in turn, can also cover a ’signal
effect’ as it provides workers with information about their own future income and career
prospects (Hirschman and Rothschild 1973, Senik 2008, Clark et al. 2009). Higher wages
of co-workers might signal better career prospects in the firm, which increases utility
and decreases the quit probability. If a worker is already high up in the pay scale, he
cannot expect to have further career advancements in the current firm and consequently
he might decide to quit his job and to join another firm.3 This illustrates that the effect
of relative wage positions might be ambiguous because good fortune of co-workers could
introduce either jealousy (low own status) or it might provide information about own
career opportunities (signal). Note that status and signal are contradictory in that the
workers in low relative wage positions have large career prospects but low status, while
in the case of workers in high relative wages the reverse is true.
Hypothesis 1a: Workers are less likely to quit their job if they have a higher relative
wage position within their firm (’status effect’ dominates ’signal effect’).
3See Clark et al. (2009) for an extensive discussion of status and signal effects. The study of Carporale
et al. (2009) who analyze the impact of comparison income on happiness is a good example to explain
both effects. The authors find that higher reference income lowers satisfaction in Western European
countries while in Eastern Europe countries, reference income is likely to increase satisfaction. The
results for East Europe are consistent with the signal effect because reference income is likely to be a
source which provides information about own future economic possibilities. In other words, the higher
the income of the comparison group, the higher my own level of satisfaction because of prosperous
future perspectives. The results for West European countries correspond to the status effect which
predicts that higher reference income lowers my own level of satisfaction because of low own social
status within the reference group.
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Hypothesis 1b: Workers are more likely to quit their job if they have a higher relative
wage position within their firm (’signal effect’ dominates ’status effect’).
Many studies find a significant relationship between relative wage positions, satisfac-
tion, and labor turnover (see, e.g., Galizzi and Lang 1998, Clark et al. 2008, Clark et al.
2009). One question, however, remains unanswered: Is the relationship between relative
wage positions and individual mobility decisions simply linear or does it contain a non-
linear component? An examination of nonlinear effects becomes necessary because Clark
and Oswald (1996) show in their descriptive analysis that, on average, the most satisfied
male workers are in the highest and lowest income quintiles and the least satisfied in the
middle income quintiles. Consideration of possible nonlinearities also might shed light
on the relationship between relative wage positions and the quit propensity since it is
problematic to separate status from signal by application of one single measure for the
relative standing.
Consider a worker i who obtains utility from status as well as from career advancement
opportunities within his firm j in period t. Empirical studies usually apply a single
measure for the relative wage position, but this renders separation of status from signal
problematic, because status is a byproduct of signal and vice versa.4 In the following, the
wage rank of a worker within his firm is applied to measure the relative standing within
a particular firm so that U statusijt and U
signal
ijt are functions of rank. To calculate the rank,
workers in each firm are sorted in the ascending order of their wages in each period t.
When the workers are sorted, those with the lowest wage occupy rank zero and those
with the highest wage hold the highest rank. Workers in rank zero are not allowed to
obtain utility from status because they occupy the lowest rank. As a consequence, it is
assumed that these workers have the lowest status within a particular firm. Workers in
the highest rank, in turn, are imposed to achieve no utility from signal because of the lack
of future career advancement opportunities. Apart from that, workers with the highest
rank achieve all their utility from status while workers in rank zero only accumulate utility
4See Clark et al. (2009) for a discussion of this particular problem.
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from future career prospects. A worker’s total utility in equation (3.3), given below, is the
sum of the utilities from status, signal, and other job characteristics X, which include,
for example, own absolute wages and tenure.
Uijt = U statusijt (rank) + U
signal
ijt (rank) + U otherijt (X)
with
∂U statusijt
∂rank
> 0;
∂2U statusijt
∂rank2
< 0
∂U signalijt
∂rank
< 0;
∂2U signalijt
∂rank2
< 0
(3.3)
It is assumed that individual utility from status increases with rank and workers in higher
positions gain lower additional utility from climbing up the hierarchy. The underlying
reasoning stems from individual downward comparisons, that is, workers compare them-
selves to colleagues below their own position to make themselves feel better. Workers in
the lowest rank, then, are constrained in terms of such comparisons because all colleagues
occupy higher relative wage positions. Perceptions of low own status might introduce jeal-
ousy or subjective thoughts of unfairness and, hence, decrease satisfaction. Being in the
middle of the hierarchy allows for individual downward comparisons which significantly
increases the utility obtained from status. But still there are co-workers who have higher
status. At the top of the hierarchy, individuals are expected to be generally satisfied
with their own status and are assumed not to gain much additional (status-related) util-
ity from ascensions to the highest positions. As a result, marginal utility from status is
positive but at decreasing marginal rates. Individual utility from signal is described as a
decreasing function of rank, which implies that workers in low relative wage positions de-
rive larger utility as compared to those in high relative wage positions. Utility from signal
is likely to be a concave function of rank. Workers in low and medium ranks have more
career advancement opportunities because of the availability of further positions in the
top ranks of the hierarchy. Being at the top position reduces the promotion possibilities
considerably because of diminishing career advancement possibilities.
Given the individual position within a particular firm, the amount of total individual
utility Uijt depends on the individual valuation of status and signal. Addition of the func-
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tions U statusijt and U
signal
ijt , leads to an inverse U-shaped path of Uijt with respect to rank.5
This implies that workers in the highest position achieve all utility from status, while
workers in the lowest rank solely obtain utility from future career prospects. However,
workers in positions between the highest and the lowest rank add up utility from status
and utility from signal which leads to a higher total utility compared with sole utility
from either status or signal.
As discussed above, individual quit decisions are described as an inverse measure of
job satisfaction. It is assumed that workers stay with their firms if total individual utility
in those firms exceeds an alternative utility Uiat that can be obtained in another firm.
Equation (3.4) shows that the probability of quitting a job is described by the probability
that total utility in another firm (Uiat) plus an idiosyncratic error term  exceeds the
utility in the current firm (Uijt). As related to our framework, it should be more likely
that workers quit their jobs if they are in very high or very low relative wage positions,
because utility is almost solely determined by either status or signal.
Pr(quitijt = 1) = Pr(Uijt < Uiat + )
= Pr(U statusijt + U
signal
ijt + U otherijt < U statusiat + U
signal
iat + U otheriat + )
(3.4)
Pr(quitijt = 1) = Φ(α0 + α1rankijt + α2rank2ijt +Xijtβ) (3.5)
We test our hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship between status effect and signal effect
by application of the probability model in equation (3.5) in which Φ is the cumulative
density function of the standard normal distribution. Xijt denotes a large set of control
variables which are described in the following section. From the considerations about
status and signal effects described above, we derive hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: Workers in high relative wage ranks are more likely to change jobs be-
cause of few career advancement opportunities while workers in low relative wage ranks
5Linear or convex functions of Usignalijt also allow for inverse U-shaped utility functions. Convex in-
creasing Ustatusijt only allows for an inverse U-shaped utility function if signal is defined as a convex
decreasing function. We decided for, at least in our view, the most reasonable utility functions. We
also impose that the maximum of Ustatusijt equals the maximum of U
signal
ijt .
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change jobs because of their low status.
In a further step, our paper aims to shed some more light on the empirical observa-
tion that many mobile workers experience wage cuts. Table 3.1 outlines some results of
recent studies on wage cuts induced by mobility. Mobility to a lower wage is common
in the U.S. and in Germany. Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) report for Germany that
about one quarter of mobility events is associated with a wage cut. Jolivet et al. (2006)
find that about 36% of job-to-job transitions in Germany and 23% of transitions in the
U.S. are accompanied by wage cuts.6 Nosal and Rupert (2007) provide evidence for the
U.S. that about two out of five (voluntarily) mobile individuals change to lower wages.
Table 3.1
Recent studies about job mobility and wage changes
Authors Country Mobility (in percent)
(data set) to lower wage to same wage to higher wage
Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) Germany (IABS) 22.2 - 24.5 3.8 - 7.1 70.7 - 72.7
Jolivet et al. (2006) Germany (ECHP) 36.3 3.3 60.4
U.S. (PSID) 23.3 21.1 55.6
Nosal and Rupert (2007) U.S. (PSID) 42.1 - 42.4 8.4 - 4.8 49.5- 52.8
Note: Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) refer to establishment-to-establishment transitions. The authors use different
subsamples for their analysis on wage cuts which do not differ much. Nosal and Rupert (2007) consider individuals
who report an employer change. Jolivet et al. (2006) define mobility as job-to-job transition if the interval between
jobs was one month or less (Germany) or less than three weeks (U.S.).
’IABS’: IAB employment subsample 1975-2001. ’ECHP’: European Community Household Panel Survey. ’PSID’:
Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Theoretical approaches explain voluntary and immediate wage cuts commonly as invest-
ments in future wage growth (Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002, Connolly and Gottschalk
2009). These approaches have in common that individual decisions are simplified to a
monetary maximization problem in which workers maximize the long-run value of job op-
portunities and wages. Nosal and Rupert (2007) contribute to this literature by inclusion
6Jolivet et al. (2006) report the shares of mobility to lower wages also for a number of further European
countries.
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of job-specific (non-wage) amenities which affect the job choice and consequently indi-
vidual mobility decisions. We expect that the relative wage position is such an amenity
because of its fairness and status aspects. Thus, relative wage positions within a firm
should affect the voluntary acceptance of wage cuts. The total effect is, again, ambiguous
due to opposing signal and status effects. On the one hand, workers might accept wage
cuts if they can improve their status in the new firm, which is measured as a higher
relative wage position in the new firm. On the other hand, workers might be more likely
to accept a wage cut if they have better career prospects in the new firm, that is, higher
future wages, which is signaled by a lower current relative wage position.
Hypothesis 3a: Workers trade off absolute wages and relative wage positions when chang-
ing firms (’status effect’ dominates ’signal effect’).
Hypothesis 3b: Lower absolute wages and lower relative wage positions go hand in hand
when workers change firms (’signal effect’ dominates ’status effect’).
3.3 Data and methodological remarks
3.3.1 Data set
As the interest of this study is in the relative wage positions within firms, the estimation
framework requires information about workers, co-workers, and their firms. It is also
desirable that the data relate to as many workers as possible in each firm so that relative
wage positions in each firm can be computed accurately. The German linked employer-
employee data set of the Institute for Employment Research (’Institut für Arbeitsmarkt
und Berufsforschung (IAB)’, LIAB in the following) fulfills these requirements (Alda et
al. 2005). The LIAB links employer side information from the IAB Establishment Panel
with employee information from process-produced person specific data. The IAB Estab-
lishment Panel is an annual survey that includes a random sample of establishments with
at least one employee covered by social security. The sample is drawn from stratifica-
tion cells of establishment size classes and industries. The firms are asked about their
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employment structure, personnel policy, industrial relations etc. The process-produced
person specific data stem basically from the notification procedure for unemployment,
pension, and health insurances. Employers have to notify the social security agencies
about all employees that are covered by social security at the start and at the end of an
employment relationship as well as on the last day of each year.
The underlying data set is set up as a panel of cross-sections from 1996 to 2006 at the
corresponding record date of June 30. In the last period of the sample, the individuals
cannot exactly be assigned to be movers or non-movers because we do not observe their
subsequent employment status. The year 2006 is, hence, not subject to the analysis. The
analysis focuses on the years from 1996 onwards because sample size was considerably
enlarged and information about collective contracts are only available for this time hori-
zon. The main interest is on the daily wage which is surveyed in the data. The consumer
price index surveyed by the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland is applied to deflate the
nominal wages (annual averages, with year 2005 = 100). The data reveal some implau-
sible low daily wages (Jacobebbinghaus 2008). The analysis is responsive to these values
and excludes wages below the marginal employment ceiling of 400 Euro per month (or
13.33 Euro per day in 2005 wages). Another problem of the data is that wages above the
upper earnings limit for social security contributions are set to the corresponding value
of the ceiling. This implies that all wages above are censored in the data. To reduce the
impact of the censoring, the sample is restricted to workers who do not have more than
a high-school degree with completed vocational training.7
The sample is restricted to male, full-time employees of West German firms, who are
aged between 25 and 55 years, and who do not have any academic qualification. We
focus on workers exceeding 25 years of age because, at least for our sample, schooling and
apprenticeship degrees are basically completed. Analogously to Galizzi and Lang (1998),
7Note that imputation methods are available but imputation procedures increase the uncertainty about
the relative wage positions of workers within an establishment. Moreover, it seems questionable
whether regular workers compare themselves with employees with academic degrees who typically
perform other tasks. This choice, however, might also be a critical one because possible frustration
about low own status within an organization can be a bigger problem for those individuals who had
made the effort of investing in their education. For this reason, we might exclude the group of workers
for whom status might matter the most.
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we limit the sample to men who are less than 55 years old as older workers might be
more concerned with retirement decisions. Furthermore, only full-time employed German
citizens are included because no information about working hours is available in the data.
Our analysis concentrates on establishments located in West Germany because of different
labor market conditions in East and West Germany (e.g., unemployment, wages) and the
fact that our data contain mostly West German firms. A methodological reason for the
restriction is that some of the control variables are left-censored before unification in
1990 in East Germany. The data consequently report only a lower boundary for tenure
and experience in East Germany. The focus on low and medium educated workers also
alleviates possible criticism of Brown et al. (2008, p. 380) who state that ”[...] it
seems important to understand exactly how a person chooses a reference group. [...]
We are forced in our econometric specification simply to assume that the workplace is
the comparison set.” It seems to be reasonable that medium and low educated workers
compare themselves more likely with the coworkers within a particular establishment
in comparison to the highly qualified workers. For example, consider highly qualified
managers or highly qualified specialists who meet other specialists all around the world
at conferences and meetings. These individuals might be expected to be more likely to
compare themselves with specialists in other firms all around the world. Workers with
completed vocational training or workers in factories, in turn, are expected to be more
often in contact with a set of more similar coworkers which might be an explanation why
they compare themselves to colleagues within a firm.8
Establishments with less than ten workers under the above restrictions are excluded
from the analysis because we need to estimate earnings functions for single firms and need
sufficient wage variance within firms for our analysis of relative wage positions.9 The final
8See Selezneva (2010) for a summary on reference groups and income comparisons with a special focus
on economies in transition. Empirical evidence for Germany finds that gender-specific comparisons
are the most important, followed by comparisons within certain professions (Mayraz et al. 2009).
Especially for males, income comparisons are better predictors of subjective well-being than for
females. Our data allows for the identification of a more distinctive reference group which enables
comparison between co-workers within the same establishment. Clark and Senik (2010) state that
the most frequently cited comparison group is that of the colleagues. Accordingly, we focus on males
in combination with co-workers as comparison group.
9Consideration of more than ten annual observations per establishment decreases the number mobility
events which are already a rare event. Table A3.1 in the appendix presents number of mobility
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sample for analysis, covering the period 1996 to 2005, contains 2,902,724 observations
from 833,359 workers in 4,260 different firms in an unbalanced panel design. Only few
observations (3.8%) comply with the upper earnings limit for social security contributions
in our sample so that wage censoring is not of much concern.
The present analysis of quit behavior relies on the assumption that individuals leave
their employer voluntarily. In our data, we do not have any information on the reason
for the separation of employer and employee, but we expect to approximate quits via the
following conditions which need to be met. The worker has been a full-time employee
for two successive periods in two different establishments. Identification is possible via
observation of changes in the establishment identifier which is associated with the worker.
Additional information is gathered on the individual’s employment relationship eight days
prior to the commencement of his new job because direct transitions without intervening
unemployment is more likely to be of voluntary nature. If the worker was a full-time
employee at another establishment eight days before entering the new establishment, he
is expected to have voluntarily quit the previous job, because he switched establishments
with virtually no unemployment.10 In sum, 5,464 mobility events are observed whereas
5,280 individuals have been mobile up to four times.
3.3.2 Wage measures
We have introduced different wage variables in the theory section, which need to be gen-
erated from the data. At first, the individual absolute wage (wabsijt ) is measured straight-
forwardly as the log mean daily wage in Euro of individual i in firm j in year t surveyed
events and number of observations for different samples with respect to annual observations per
establishment. In addition, it is shown that most quits occur in establishments with more than 100
workers.
10Following our definition of quits we cannot assure that all but that most transitions are voluntary.
Jolivet et al. (2006, p. 882) note: ”Surely, many of the quick job re-accessions at very short durations
correspond to voluntary job changes [...]. Yet some of them are likely to reflect involuntary reallocation
- essentially job losses followed by the immediate finding of a replacement job.” This very low share
stems from the nature of our data set and voluntary quit variable, which is defined as changes from
one firm to another firm in our data set. As our sample contains a little less than one percent of the
entire relevant population of firms in West Germany, we can only observe a low share of quits. Our
randomized sample of firms should, however, mitigate this possible problem, because workers with
observed quits should not be different from workers who voluntary change to firms not included in
our sample.
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in the data. Moreover, we construct five different measures to analyze the relative wage
position within a firm. Following the literature (Freeman 1978, Akerlof et al. 1988, Topel
and Ward 1992, Clark and Oswald 1996, Galizzi and Lang 1998, Clark et al. 2009),
the average wage of workers in a firm (w¯jt) is used as comparison income.11 Holding
the individual wage constant, an increase of the average wage is associated with a lower
individual relative wage position. As a second measure for comparison income, we use
predicted inside wages (wˆinsideijt ) obtained from separately estimated earnings functions
for every firm in every year12 which include the worker characteristics schooling, expe-
rience13, squared experience, and occupation.14 A summary of all calculated (relative)
wage measure is provided in Table 3.2.
We also construct measures which might be intuitively more appealing in the context of
relative wage positions as they actually measure the individual wage position. Following
Brown et al. (2008)15, we construct the wage rank (wrankijt ) as well as the wage range
(wrangeijt ) of a worker within his firm so that both variables lie in the unit interval (0, 1).
Value one indicates that the individual is at the top of the pay scale.16 In general, the
higher the rank, the higher the worker is up the pay scale of his firm. The wage range
measures the normalized distance of individual i’s wage in firm j in period t to the lowest
wage in his firm as proportion of the wage spread between the highest and the lowest wage
in the firm. The impact of both variables can be compared to assess if the ordinal rank
11The data reports a lower boundary of the average wage within the establishment because of the
censoring. This problem can be neglected in our analysis because of the low frequency of censoring
in the underlying data.
12This approach closely follows Clark and Oswald (1996) and Senik (2008), who include predicted wages
conditional on schooling, occupation, sector, region, and other variables in satisfaction equations.
The authors interpret the predicted wages as comparison income of individuals.
13Experience is calculated with respect to the surveyed individual labor market entry. Hence, possible
unemployment spells or apprenticeships directly following after school are accounted for.
14We do not include tenure in these estimates because the comparison group should also include compara-
ble workers at later career stages (career prospects). Another reason is related to problems involving
the degrees of freedom because we observe establishments with at least ten annual observations.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A3.2 in the Appendix.
15Brown et al. (2008) draw on insights from research in psychology and the range frequency theory
(Parducci 1965) to analyze the impact of wage positions within a firm on workers’ satisfaction with
different job related items. They find that workers with higher relative wage positions are more
satisfied with their pay, influence, achievement, and respect.
16The exact values cannot be computed due to the upper censoring of wages, which might lead to a
compression of our rank and range measures. See Pfeifer and Schneck (2010) for a slightly different
calculation of rank. The following results, however, are robust to both calculations of rank.
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(wage rank) or the cardinal rank (wage range) is more important to workers (Fields and
Fei 1978, Brown et al. 2008). The individual wage rank indicates, in an ordinal sense,
a worker’s position in his firm’s wage hierarchy. To analyze nonlinearity, the squared
wage rank of workers is used. A further measure of the relative wage position within a
firm, which is very closely related with the previous two measures and especially with
wage rank, is calculated on the basis of the empirical cumulative distribution function
(CDF) for each establishment in each period (wCDFijt ). Equally paid workers get the same
cumulative value. Analogously to wage rank and wage range, a larger value implies a
higher relative wage position within the firm and the variable is restricted to the unit
interval (0, 1).
Table 3.2
Definition of wage measures
wabsijt Log wage of individual i in period t in
establishment j
wabsijt = ln(wageijt)
w¯jt Average log wage paid in establishment
j in period t
w¯jt = 1Njt
∑Njt
ijt
wabsijt
with Njt: number of employees in firm j in
period t
wˆinsideijt Predicted comparison wage in own es-
tablishment (given individual charac-
teristics) in period t
Annual regression for establishment j:
wˆinsideijt = αˆj + ιˆ′jXijt
with X: experience (squared), dummies for
occupation, and schooling
wrankijt Ordinal relative wage position of indi-
vidual i in establishment j in period t
wrankijt =
wage rankijt−1
wage rankmax
jt
−1
Workers with equal wages within establish-
ment j have the same rank.∗
wrangeijt Cardinal relative wage position of indi-
vidual i in establishment j in period t
wrangeijt =
wijt−wminijt
wmax
jt
−wmin
jt
wCDFijt Empirical cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) of wijt in establishment j in
period t
wCDFijt = Pr(Wjt ≤ wijt)
with Wjt is the set of wages within establish-
ment j in period t. wijt denotes the individual
wage of individual i working in establishment
j in period t
∗ In such cases we calculate the average rank of workers with same wages. For example, if the two
lowest paid workers are paid the same, both employees exhibit a non-normalized wage rank of 1.5.
47
Table 3.2 summarizes the definitions of our wage measures. Table A3.2 presents means
and standard deviations of the constructed relative wage measures. As already noted by
Brown et al. (2008, p. 372), the ”different measures of pay are [...] somewhat correlated.
Nevertheless, the large number of observations makes it possible, in practice, to estimate
the separate variables’ effects”. As the measures also contain quite similar information,
we only account for one measure of the relative wage position in a single specification
when estimating the determinants of quits and compare their effects. In case of wrankijt
and wrangeijt , we compare the impact of ordinal and cardinal ranks. Furthermore, wCDFijt
provides a valuable robustness check on the effect of the ordinal wage rank because both
measures differ especially at the tails of the distribution. Note that we do not say that
workers actually know co-worker’s wages: ”All we can say is that people act as though
they are able to form a reasonable estimate of where, as individuals, they lie in the pay
ordering and the range” (Brown et al. 2008, p. 379).
3.3.3 Econometric models
Our basic estimation framework looks as in equation (3.6), in which Quit* denotes the
latent individual quit probability, α the constant, β the coefficients of the relative wage
position wrijt for which we incorporate the different relative wage measures discussed in
the previous section (w¯jt, wˆinsideijt , wrankijt , w
range
ijt , wCDFijt ), κ the coefficients for the absolute
wage17, γ the coefficients of worker characteristics X (schooling degree, tenure, squared
tenure, experience, squared experience, professional status), δ the coefficients of firm
characteristics Y (share of unskilled workers within the establishment, establishment size
classes, firm-reported number of layoffs, firm-reported number of quits, works council,
collective bargaining, sector, and federal state), λ time fixed effects, and  the remaining
residual term. For descriptive statistics of the variables see Table A3.2 in the Appendix.
Quit∗ijt = α + β′wrijt + κ′wabsijt + γ′Xit + δ′Yjt + λt + ijt (3.6)
17Analogously to Galizzi and Lang (1998), we include information on the lagged absolute wage. This
specification can be reparameterized in order to allow for either wage growth and present wage because
the decision to quit is not expected to be a myopic one. Note that we utilize the individual wage
information of the year 1995 as lagged wage information in year 1996.
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As the quit probability cannot directly be observed, we concentrate on the actual quit
behavior.18 The dependent variable here is binary and that is why binary choice models
are preferable. In addition, Table A3.1 shows that quits are a rare event and, therefore,
linear models should not be applied. As the data are set up as a panel, effort can be made
to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Note that individual fixed-effects probit models
are inappropriate because these models are affected by the incidental parameter problem.
This problem decreases when the individual observations increase (see Heckman 1981)
but, here, the panel is too short with an average individual panel length of 3.5 years. For
these reasons, the individual random-effects probit model is utilized here in which Φ is the
cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution and νi is the individual
random effect. Our explanatory variable of interest is the discussed measure of a worker’s
relative wage position within his firm. To ensure that the relative wage variable does not
reflect the absolute wage, the individual’s absolute wage also is included in addition to
the individual’s relative wage position. Because of our interest in average comparison
wages within firms, which do not vary across workers in one firm, we do not control for
firm fixed effects.
Quitijt =

1 if worker i quits his job in firm j in period t
0 if worker i stays in firm j in period t
(3.7)
Pr(Quitijt = 1) = Φ(α + β′wrijt + κ′wabsijt + γ′Xit + δ′Yjt + λt + νi) (3.8)
β is a scalar when testing hypotheses 1a and 1b because the main interest is on linear
effects of relative wage positions while β becomes a vector by consideration of hypoth-
esis 2 because we test the hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship between rank and quit
probability by application of wrankijt and squared wrankijt . Evidence in favor of hypothesis 2
is provided in case of a negative estimate for the coefficient of wrankijt in combination with
a positive estimate for squared wrankijt .
In addition to the determinants of individual quit behavior, we also analyze the conse-
18Each worker in the consecutive empirical investigation is observed in at least two consecutive periods.
Calculation of the wage measures also includes individuals who are observed only once.
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quences of quits. Many empirical studies report a large share of workers who experience
an individual wage loss when changing firms, which might be explained by factors like
future wage growth, non-pecuniary rewards, and other job characteristics (Bartel and
Borjas 1981, Bartel 1982, Ruhm 1987, Akerlof et al. 1988, Polsky 1999, Yankow 2003,
Nosal and Rupert 2007, Connolly and Gottschalk 2008). We extend this perspective by
our measures for the relative wage position within firms introduced in the previous sec-
tion (wrankijt , w
range
ijt , wCDFijt ). As discussed in section 3.2, utility and quit probability also
depend on status from relative wage positions as well as on signals for career advancement
opportunities. For example, a quitting worker might experience a loss in absolute wages
but is compensated by a gain in status. It is, therefore, straightforward to compare not
only the differences between individual absolute wages in the old and the new firm but
also the differences between relative wage measures in the new and the old firm. For this
purpose, non-parametric methods like kernel density estimates of the differences can give
first insights.
In addition, it is possible to regress the absolute wage difference on the difference in
relative wage positions to assess possible trade-offs in the utility function. Equation (3.9)
presents the estimation framework, in which (wnew- wold)it is the difference of individual
absolute wages between the new and the previous firm, α the constant, η the coefficients
of the differences in relative wage measures (wrankijt , w
range
ijt , wCDFijt ) between the new and
the previous firm, γ the coefficients of worker characteristics X (schooling degree, change
in establishment size class, experience, squared experience), λ time fixed effects, and 
the remaining residual term. This estimation framework further allows us to investigate
which socio-demographic groups (e.g., workers without completed vocational training)
are more affected by wage cuts.
(wnew − wold)it = α + η(wr,new − wr,old)it + γ′Xit + λt + it (3.9)
If workers accept lower absolute wages in the new firm because they are compensated
with higher status, that is, higher relative wage positions, we would expect the coefficients
η’s to be negative. If the signal effect of better career opportunities dominates, we
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would expect the coefficients η’s to be positive. As robustness check an additional probit
regression for accepting a wage cut can be estimated that is presented in equation (3.10).
Equation (3.11) displays that the dependent variable takes the value one in case of a wage
cut and zero otherwise.
Pr(wage cutit = 1) = Φ(α + η(wr,new − wr,old)it + γ′Xit + λt) (3.10)
wage cutit =

1 (wnew − wold)it < 0
0 (wnew − wold)it ≥ 0
(3.11)
3.4 Results
This section is to reveal which of the hypotheses derived above meet the data. At first,
we discuss the results on whether a linear status effects dominates a possible linear signal
effect or whether it is vice versa. In a next step, we present estimates related to possible
nonlinearities. Finally, results on the consequences of quits are addressed.
In the following, we present the results of the individual random effects probit model
as discussed in equation (3.8) in section 3.3.3. Likelihood-ratio tests reject the null
hypothesis of no individual unobserved heterogeneity in all specifications (see Table A3.3),
which indicates that the random effects probit model is more appropriate compared to a
pooled probit model. Note that we primarily discuss marginal effects of our wage variables
at the means of all covariates and under the assumption that the individual error term
is zero. The estimated absolute marginal effects which are presented in Table 3.3 might
seem very small and not of economic significance at first glance. As the mean probability
is, however, also very small, the relative marginal effects are in fact quite sizable.19 The
complete estimation output and the corresponding coefficients are presented in Table
A3.3 in the Appendix.
Before presenting the estimation results of the relative wage measures, we discuss the
estimated effects of the absolute wage shown in Table A3.3. The first specification in Table
19For example, an absolute marginal effect of 0.0001 is a relative marginal effect of 33.3% if the mean
predicted probability is only 0.0003.
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A3.3 only focuses on the effect of the absolute wage. We can conclude that individuals are
somewhat myopic when deciding to leave their employer. To be more precise, the current
absolute wage exhibits significant impact on the decision to quit while the lagged absolute
wage is found to be insignificant and considerably smaller in size. This finding is confirmed
when we include the measures for the relative wage position. At first glance, this result
is counter-intuitive as we would expect that a worker’s utility depends positively on
his current wage. For this reason, a higher wage should decrease the individual quit
propensity. Galizzi and Lang (1998) provide an explanation for this result and suggest
that better paid workers might have better outside job opportunities because differences
in wages might reflect some degree of unobserved productivity differences.
We now turn the focus on the relative wage measures. The first specification in Table
3.3 presents the marginal effect of the average within-establishment wage as relative wage
measure which is obtained via specification (2) in Table A3.3. The marginal effect indeed
seems to be quite small but, however, the relative marginal effect is quite sizable. The
marginal effect presented below can be interpreted in the way that an increase of the
average wage within a firm j at time t of one log unit decreases the quit probability by
0.0000439 percentage points or by 12.30%, respectively. Note that the coefficient is not
statistically significant which does not allow for distinct conclusions about hypothesis 1.
From specification (2) in Table 3.3, we can learn that the coefficient of wˆinsideijt is also
statistically insignificant. In brief, the presented coefficients in specifications (1) and (2)
of Table 3.3 are not adequate to provide a distinct answer in favor or against hypotheses
1a and 1b.
Specifications (3) to (5) in Table 3.3 present the results for the rank measure, the range,
and CDF which are obtained via specifications (4) to (6) in Table A3.3. The correspond-
ing coefficients are shown to be significant but, however, the estimated coefficients advert
to different effects because the effects of wrankijt and wCDFijt are positive while the coefficient
for wrangeijt is negative. This implies that the estimated effects for wrankijt and wCDFijt support
hypothesis 1b. In other words, workers in higher relative wage positions quit their jobs
more likely compared with workers in lower relative wage positions because of the lack of
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future career prospects. The results for the range measure, however, are reverse because
the lower the worker’s position, the higher the probability to change employers. Accord-
ingly, this implies that the status effect dominates the signal effect which is in line with
hypothesis 1a. To conclude, the results in Table 3.3 do not clearly support hypothesis
1a or hypothesis 1b because it depends on the definition of the measure for the relative
wage position.
Table 3.3
Random-effects probit results for quit probability
x¯ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
w¯jt 4.6921 -0.0000439
(0.00007)
[-0.1230]
wˆinsideijt 4.6987 0.0000459
(0.00008)
[0.1286]
wrankijt 0.5114 0.0000946**
(0.00004)
[0.2657]
wrangeijt 0.6500 -0.000106*
(0.00005)
[-0.2969]
wCDFijt 0.5212 0.0000873**
(0.00004)
[0.2452]
Pr(quit=1| x¯) 0.000357 0.000357 0.000356 0.000357 0.000356
Number of observations 2,902,724
Number of individuals 833,359
Note: Random-effects probit estimation. The table presents marginal effects at x¯, standard errors
in parentheses, and relative marginal effects in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The corresponding coefficients of the probit estimates and the complete results are presented in
Table A3.3. Table A3.2 contains descriptive statistics.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
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The individual-specific and establishment-specific control variables which are included
into the above specifications are robust across the different specifications. The higher
the educational level, the higher the probability to quit a job. This effect is in line
with expectations because highly productive employees are more likely to find a new
job. The effect of individual tenure on the decision to quit is U-shaped which reveals
that individuals are most likely to change jobs very early (or after a very long tenure in
the same firm). The effect of general human capital (experience) is not significant. The
effects of the firm characteristics are also highly robust across specifications.
When turning the focus on an examination of hypothesis 2 and possible nonlinearities,
we estimate the individual random-effects probit model as discussed in equation (3.8) in
section 3.3.3 and include a linear as well as quadratic term of wrankijt . Significant coefficients
for either the linear and the quadratic term for the relative wage, then, suggest the
presence of an (inverted) U-shape relationship regarding quits and relative wage positions.
Evidence in favor of hypothesis 2 can be found if the estimated coefficient for wrankijt is
negative while wrankijt squared is estimated to be positive.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the predicted quit probabilities for an average worker (at x¯) as
a function of of wrankijt which are obtained from the linear specification (see specification
(4) in Table A3.3) and the quadratic specification (see specification (1) in Table A3.4).
The linear specification reveals a linear increasing quit probability for the average worker.
Starting from 0.032% in lowest relative wage positions, it rises until about 0.041% in the
highest ranks. Figure 3.1 illustrates that workers in higher relative wage positions are
more likely to change employers voluntarily. In addition, the predicted quit probability
of the quadratic specification is presented. The U-shape in Figure 3.1 directly supports
hypothesis 2. Specification (1) in Table A3.4 presents the results in detail and shows
that both coefficients of interest are highly significant and have the expected signs which
confirms our expectations derived in the theoretical framework. This effect is interpreted
in the way that workers in low relative positions quit their jobs because of concerns
regarding their low status. Workers in high relative wage positions, in turn, are suggested
to be more likely to change jobs because of few career advancement opportunities within
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the firm. An interpretation which is closer to the theoretical part above is that workers
change employers more likely if utility is obtained purely by status or solely by signal in
comparison to workers who are able to add up utility from both, signal as well as status.
Figure 3.1: Predicted quit probabilities and relative wage positions (at x¯) for wrankijt
We conducted several robustness checks in order to check the sensitivity of the nonlinear
effect. At first, we checked the effect of a cubic term in specification (2) of Table A3.4.
Again, the linear and the quadratic coefficient advert to a U-shaped relationship while
the cubic term is found to be insignificant. This suggests that the quadratic specification
is satisfactory. Specification (3) in Table A3.4 considers the relative standing as dummy
variables which indicate the relative wage position of workers within a firm’s wage distri-
bution in each year. As reference category, we decided to apply the middle wage quintile
because this allows for direct evidence regarding a possible U-shape. Precisely, if the
coefficients for the remaining wage quintiles are positive, then workers in the third wage
quintile have the lowest probability to quit. The results show that mobility is signifi-
cantly more common in the first and the fifth quintile, compared to workers in the third
quintile. This directly illustrates a U-shaped quit probability because workers at the left
and at the right margin of the firm’s wage distribution are significantly more likely to
quit jobs in comparison to workers in the middle of the firm’s wage distribution. Also the
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workers in the fourth wage quintile are shown to be more likely to quit when compared
with workers in the third quintile. Note that workers in the second wage quintile are
less likely to change jobs voluntarily compared with workers in the middle wage quintile
whereas this effect is not statistically significant. In sum, the robustness checks shown in
Table A3.4 confirm the presence of a U-shape relationship of the rank in quit decisions.
Table A3.5 displays further robustness checks for the nonlinear effects. Application of
wrangeijt in specification (1) does not support the results obtained for wrankijt . In fact, an
inverse U-shape relationship is estimated but, however, the coefficients are insignificant.
As a result, application of wrangeijt does not allow for distinct conclusions against or in favor
of the theoretical expectations. The quadratic specification of wCDFijt in specification (2)
of Table A3.5 confirms the significant U-shape as shown in Table A3.4, Figure 3.1, and
the theoretical part. The graph (see Figure A3.1 in the appendix) generally confirms
the relationship as shown in Figure 3.1 but reveals some differences in the levels of the
predicted quit probability of an average worker as a function of wCDFijt . To sum up, the
results basically are in line with a U-shaped relationship and are robust to several relative
wage measures (wrankijt , wCDFijt , and within-firm wage quintiles) with exception of w
range
ijt .
In a last step, we turn the focus on hypothesis 3 where we analyze the consequences
of quits with respect to absolute wages and relative wage positions within a firm. More
precisely, we are interested in trade-off reasoning between absolute wages and relative
wage positions after a voluntary job change and the question whether mobile workers are
compensated for wage cuts by an increase in their relative wage positions, that is, by a
gain in status. Previous studies have found most voluntary job mobility to be associated
with wage gains but also that a substantial share of quits is accompanied with wage cuts.
When only focusing on mobile workers, 42.86% of individuals experience a wage cut when
changing the firm (see Table A3.6). This number exceeds the size of previous studies for
Germany (see Jolivet et al. 2006, Fitzenberger and Garloff 2007).
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Table 3.4
Descriptive statistics for consequences of quits
Mean Std. Deviation
(wnew − wold)it all 0.0170 0.1426
wage markup 0.0934 0.1031
wage cut -0.0847 0.1230
(ranknew − rankold)it all -0.0244 0.2390
wage markup 0.0576 0.2145
wage cut -0.1336 0.2261
(rangenew − rangeold)it all 0.0109 0.1977
wage markup 0.0597 0.1934
wage cut -0.0542 0.1843
(CDFnew − CDF old)it all -0.0203 0.2386
wage markup 0.0648 0.2147
wage cut -0.1338 0.2210
Note: 5,464 transitions of 5,280 individuals are observed. 3,122 moves are executed to higher wages
and 2,342 moves to lower wages (wage cut).
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics about changes in absolute wages (wnew − wold)it
and relative wage positions within the new and the old firm ((wrank,newijt − wrank,oldijt )it,
(wrange,newijt −wrange,oldijt )it, and (wCDF,newijt −wCDF,oldijt )it). Workers gain, on average, 0.0170
log points in wages when changing the firm. The consequences are, however, quite hetero-
geneous as can be seen from the separated analysis for workers with wage cuts and wage
markups. Workers with a wage cut receive, on average, 0.0847 log points lower wages,
while workers with a wage markup receive an average of 0.0934 log points higher wages.
For the wage position measures wrankijt and wCDFijt , we find that the average mobile worker
has a lower relative wage position in the new firm compared to the previous one. The car-
dinal wage range measure (wrangeijt ), in turn, is slightly positive and indicates that workers
change to higher relative wage positions. One might be tended to misleadingly conclude
that the average gain in absolute wages and the loss in ordinal relative wage positions
directly supports Hypotheses 3a which states that workers trade off absolute wages and
relative wage positions when changing firms (status effect). If we look at workers with
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wage cuts, we see that those workers also suffer lower relative wage positions, whereas
workers with wage markups also gain in their relative wage positions. Thus, the first
descriptive findings are more in line with our Hypothesis 3b that lower (higher) absolute
wages and lower (higher) relative wage positions go hand in hand when workers change
firms. The rationale behind this finding is that workers are more likely to accept wage
cuts if they start at a lower relative wage position in the new firm as they might have
more chances for career advancements (signal effect).
In the following, we present Epanechnikov kernel density estimators for changes in
relative wage positions to shed some more light into the heterogeneous consequences of
quits. Figure 3.2 distinguishes between mobile workers with wage cuts and wage markups
in order to visualize the changes in relative wage positions by wage change. It displays
the distributions of changes in the wage positions and in the relative wage positions.
All the results for the different measures of relative wage positions are quite similar.
Most workers who suffer lower wages additionally lose in relative wage positions. In
contradiction, most mobile workers with wage markups do not experience losses in their
relative wage positions. Their relative wage positions, however, remain relatively stable.
Nevertheless, it can be seen that a somewhat larger fraction of workers with wage markups
rather gain than lose with respect to relative wage positions. Only few workers seem to
accept wage cuts in order to improve their relative wage positions and to gain additional
status by inspection of Figure 3.2.
The kernel density estimators shown below do not account for further determinants
of consequences of quits such as educational level or labor market experience. Thus, we
use linear regressions in order to regress changes in absolute wages on changes in relative
wage positions and a set of control variables (see equation (3.9) for the econometric model
and Table A3.6 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics).
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Figure 3.2: Kernel density estimator for changes in relative wage positions
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Table 3.5
Linear regression results for wage change
(wnew − wold)it (1) (2) (3)
(ranknew − rankold)it 0.302***
(0.0114)
(rangenew − rangeold)it 0.340***
(0.0145)
(CDFnew − CDF old)it 0.309***
(0.0114)
Mobility to larger establishment 0.0358*** 0.00691 0.0368***
(Dummy variable) (0.00540) (0.00496) (0.00534)
Secondary school leaving certificate reference
Secondary school leaving certificate 0.0174** 0.00787 0.0160**
and apprenticeship (0.00718) (0.00764) (0.00718)
(Technical) college entrance qualification 0.0117 -0.00331 0.00949
(0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0120)
(Technical) college entrance qualification 0.0255*** 0.0143* 0.0197**
and apprenticeship (0.00815) (0.00850) (0.00813)
Experience -0.00460*** -0.00385*** -0.00445***
(0.00139) (0.00144) (0.00138)
Experience2 0.0000662 0.0000527 0.0000605
(0.0000405) (0.0000420) (0.0000404)
Firm-reported quits 0.0000557** 0.000108*** 0.0000617**
(0.0000279) (0.0000287) (0.0000278)
Firm-reported layoffs 0.0000499 0.000446*** 0.0000596
(0.0000762) (0.0000821) (0.0000772)
Constant 0.0354*** 0.0175 0.0389***
(0.0138) (0.0148) (0.0137)
Annual Dummy variables included
R2 0.2981 0.2575 0.3091
Number of observations 5,464
Note: OLS coefficients are presented. Robust standard errors clustered for 5,280 individuals in
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Table A3.6 contains descriptive statistics.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
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The results in Table 3.5 support our previous findings that changes in absolute wages and
changes in relative wage positions are positively correlated. This implies that workers who
are able to improve their relative wage position when changing establishments are more
likely to achieve higher wages. We, further, estimate probit models for the determinants
of accepting wage cuts (see equation (3.10)). Table 3.6 presents the estimated marginal
effects at x¯. The results show that workers who improve their relative wage positions
are less likely to experience a wage cut. Note that the effects of the control variables
vary somewhat across the different specifications and estimation approaches. The effect
of education, for example, is significant in the linear regression while it is insignificant in
the probit model on wage cuts.
The results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 also shed light on the question which groups are more
likely to suffer wage cuts. In the linear models on the wage change, specifications (1)
and (3) suggest that workers who are mobile to larger establishments20 gain by mobility.
Also in the probit model, specifications (1) and (3) corroborate that individuals who
change to larger establishments are significantly less likely to suffer wage cuts. This
result corresponds with findings about positive wage premiums in larger firms, which are
reasoned for example by efficiency wages (e.g., Brown and Medoff, 1989; Idson and Oi,
1999). In addition, the linear regression results as well as the probit estimates suggest
that in times of increasing quits, workers are more likely to achieve wage markups. This
might be explained by poaching strategies where firms try to attract highly skilled and
experienced workers via higher wages.
20Mobility to larger establishments is defined as a binary variable, which takes the value one if the new
firm is in a larger establishment size class than the previous firm. The establishment size classes can
be found in Table A3.2 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.6
Probit estimation results for wage cuts
wage cutit (1) (2) (3)
(ranknew − rankold)it -1.0294***
(0.0414)
(rangenew − rangeold)it -0.805***
(0.0402)
(CDFnew − CDF old)it -1.104***
(0.0429)
Mobility to larger establishment -0.0999*** -0.0178 -0.1047***
(Dummy variable) (0.0199) (0.0190) (0.0199)
Secondary school leaving certificate reference
Secondary school leaving certificate -0.0483 -0.0264 -0.0450
and apprenticeship (0.0301) (0.0304) (0.0304)
(Technical) college entrance qualification 0.0668 0.0896 0.0738
(0.0741) (0.0712) (0.0742)
(Technical) college entrance qualification -0.0565 -0.0414 -0.0379
and apprenticeship (0.0347) (0.0351) (0.0355)
Experience 0.00887 0.00754 0.00872
(0.00542) (0.00521) (0.00547)
Experience2 0.0000251 0.0000210 0.0000398
(0.000158) (0.000153) (0.000160)
Firm-reported quits -0.000278* -0.000393*** -0.000300**
(0.000146) (0.000147) (0.000146)
Firm-reported layoffs 0.000501 -0.000591 0.000501
(0.000384) (0.000373) (0.000391)
Annual Dummy variables included
Pseudo R2 0.1704 0.1029 0.1840
Number of observations 5,464
Note: Marginal effects at x¯ are presented. Robust standard errors clustered for 5,280 individuals
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Table A3.6 contains descriptive statistics.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
The data do not allow for distinct definitions regarding voluntary mobility. For this rea-
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son, we conduct a robustness check, where we relax the assumption that individuals have
to change jobs within eight days. We, now, refer to job-to-job mobility within one year
and relax the assumption of mobility with virtually no intervening unemployment.21 Ap-
plication of this definition for mobility reveals 6,835 transitions of 6,403 individuals who
are mobile up to 4 times. Tables A3.7 and A3.8 present the main results. Specification (1)
in Table A3.7 reveals that the coefficient of w¯jt is positive. This particular effect is shown
to be non-robust when compared to the corresponding effect presented in Tables 3.3 and
A3.3 because of different signs. The effects, however, are statistically insignificant in all
the discussed tables which suggests that the effects are imprecisely measured. An increase
of wˆinsideijt increases the quit probability, confirming the results presented in Tables 3.3 and
A3.3. Table A3.7, further, shows that the main results for wrankijt and wCDFijt hold because
the effects are comparable to the ones shown above (see specifications (3), (4), (7), and
(8)). Similar to the results for mobile individuals within eight days, a positive coefficient
in the linear model and a U-shaped relation in the quadratic model, respectively, are indi-
cated. The effect of wrangeijt is robust in the linear case (see specification (5)). Specification
(6) in Table A3.7 shows that a quadratic relationship cannot be confirmed. Precisely,
the results suggest that increasing wrangeijt decreases the quit probability linearly because
of the insignificant effect for wrangeijt squared. Table A3.8 refers to the consequences of
mobility and applies the definition of job-to-job mobility within one year. Similar to
Table 3.5, the linear models in Table A3.8 reveal that transitions to higher relative wage
positions, on average, lead to wage markups (see specifications (1) to (3)). Specifications
(4) to (6) refer to the probit models and show that mobility to a higher relative wage
position decreases the probability for wage cuts. The effects, thus, are robust to the ones
presented for mobility between two establishments within eight days.
In sum, our analysis does not provide evidence that wage cuts are accepted in exchange
for an increase in status which is associated with higher relative wage positions. Workers
who suffer decreasing relative wage positions are, in fact, also more likely to suffer lower
wages when changing establishments and vice versa. On the one hand, this finding can
21The only requirement for individual mobility is a change in the establishment identifier in consecutive
periods.
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be interpreted from the point of view that mobile workers with wage cuts are double
losers because of their additional loss in status. If these workers, on the other hand,
do not care much about status but about their chance for career advancement, a lower
relative wage position might signal better future career opportunities and, consequently,
the quit decision would be rational. Consistent with this argument, Fairris (2004) finds
evidence that firms have on average lower quit rates if internal promotions and seniority
are important and job ladders are long. Overall, we find more support for our Hypothesis
3b than 3a because the signal effect seems again to dominate the status effect.
3.5 Conclusions
Our main results are that relative wage positions have a significant impact on the proba-
bility to voluntarily quit a job. For wrankijt and wCDFijt , we find that a possible status effect
is dominated by a possible signal effect because workers with higher relative wage posi-
tions within their firms are more likely to quit a job than workers with lower relative wage
positions. The former might expect fewer opportunities for further career advancement
in their current firm so that they switch to a different firm. This might be even the case
if they have to accept a short-term wage cut in exchange for new career opportunities.
Workers with lower relative wage positions within their firm, in turn, have much space
for career advancement in their current firm, which would make quits unnecessary in this
context. Our results imply that better relative wage positions are not the often cited
factor to reduce quits, because they have the counter acting effect of signaling workers
few further career advancement opportunities. In contradiction, wrangeijt suggests that the
reverse status effect is dominant which implies that workers quit their jobs more often
because of low own status. In brief, the presented results are mixed. For this reason it
is hard to draw distinct conclusions about whether the status effect dominates the signal
effect in quit decisions or whether it is vice versa.
More detailed insights into the relationship between relative wage positions and the quit
behavior can be derived by examination of nonlinear effects. This enhancement to the
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literature basically reveals U-shaped relation between the individual rank and the decision
to quit. This finding is consistent with the expectations outlined in the theoretical part
of this chapter. We also come up with an interpretation of this effect. Specifically, we
interpret this U-shaped relation in the way that workers at the bottom of the within-
establishment pay scale are more sensitive to status considerations while those at the top
are suggested to be more responsive to signal considerations. In other words, workers in
low relative wage positions seem to care more about their low status than about future
career advancement opportunities while for individuals in high relative wage positions
the reverse is true because these workers seem to be more sensitive to their low future
career prospects than to their high status. The present study of nonlinear effects, thus,
provides detailed insights into the complex relationship between comparison income and
economic behavior.
In the last part of the analysis, we find that relative wage positions significantly affect
the probability to accept a wage cut when changing firms. Workers who are able to
improve their relative wage position are, on average, less likely to pay for mobility by
lower wages. Workers changing to lower relative wage positions, in turn, are found to be
confronted with an additional loss in earnings. This is in line with the hypothesis that
across mobile individuals lower absolute wages and lower relative wage positions go hand
in hand. From the theory about signal effects, we suggest that workers accept short-term
wage cuts and lower relative wage positions in order to climb up the career ladder at the
new employer in the long run.
As quits are driven to some extent by utility maximizing behavior, our results can also
be incorporated into the broader literature about the determinants of subjective well-
being. One limitation of our study, which we have in common with previous studies, is
that we cannot separately identify status and signal effects of relative wage positions.
Future research should therefore emphasize the distinction between status and signal
and try to separate their effects. Our paper is nevertheless important because it shows
that some previous results on comparison income, which are mostly based on survey
data and laboratory experiments, are also found in real world about important decisions
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in peoples’ life, which do not suffer from a subjectivity bias and from the critique of
unrealistic laboratory environments (Falk and Heckman, 2009).
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3.6 Appendix
Table A3.1
Quits by annual observations per establishment
Annual observations per establishment
N ≥ 10 N ≥ 15 N ≥ 50 N ≥ 100
Number of quits 5,464 5,434 5,198 4,791
Number of observations 2,902,724 2,897,110 2,812,568 2,671,678
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
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Table A3.2
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Quit = 1 0.0019 0.0433
wabsijt 4.7017 0.2288
wabsijt−1 4.6893 0.2277
within-firm wage quintile 1 0.1788 0.3832
within-firm wage quintile 2 0.2041 0.4031
within-firm wage quintile 3 0.2127 0.4092
within-firm wage quintile 4 0.2167 0.4120
within-firm wage quintile 5 0.1877 0.3904
w¯jt 4.6921 0.1416
wˆinsideijt 4.6987 0.1936
wrankijt 0.5114 0.2796
wrankijt squared 0.3398 0.2912
wrangeijt 0.6500 0.2280
wCDFijt 0.5212 0.2901
Tenure 13.1255 7.4479
Tenure2 227.7509 217.0195
Experience 18.4650 6.6272
Experience2 384.8737 233.8787
Professional status (dummies)
Unskilled workeri 0.2777 0.4478
Skilled worker/ Craftsmanii 0.3561 0.4788
Technician/ Foremaniii 0.0310 0.1733
Clerkiv 0.3353 0.4721
Highest schooling degree (dummies)
Secondary school leaving certificatev 0.1200 0.3250
Secondary school leaving certificate and apprenticeshipvi 0.8169 0.3867
(Technical) college entrance qualificationvii 0.0088 0.0932
(Technical) college entrance qualification and apprenticeshipviii 0.0543 0.2265
Establishment size class (dummies)
Workforce of establishment in [10;49] 0.0039 0.062
Workforce of establishment in [50;199] 0.0445 0.2062
Workforce of establishment in [200;999] 0.2475 0.4315
Workforce of establishment in ≥ 1000 0.7041 0.4564
Share of unqualified workers within the establishment 0.2719 0.2455
Works council 0.9793 0.1425
Collective bargaining 0.9627 0.1895
Firm-reported quits 20.077 38.7673
Firm-reported layoffs 7.5058 16.3732
Sector (dummies)
Agriculture 0.0000 0.0000
Mining 0.0502 0.2184
Building 0.0108 0.1034
Credit 0.0611 0.2395
Traffic 0.0513 0.2205
Retail 0.0235 0.1516
Continued on next page
68
Table A3.2 (continued)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Hotel 0.0051 0.0713
Education 0.0118 0.1080
Service 0.0254 0.1574
Welfare 0.0262 0.1597
Public utility 0.0570 0.2319
Production 0.6775 0.4674
Federal region (dummies)
Schleswig Holstein 0.0250 0.1562
Hamburg 0.0723 0.2589
Lower Saxonyix 0.1243 0.3299
Bremen 0.0181 0.1331
North Rhine-Westphaliax 0.2931 0.4552
Hesse (Hessen) 0.0811 0.2730
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.1324 0.3389
Bavariaxi 0.1593 0.3660
Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarlandxii 0.0944 0.2924
annual dummy variables
1996 0.1225 0.3278
1997 0.1059 0.3078
1998 0.0911 0.2877
1999 0.0931 0.2905
2000 0.0873 0.2823
2001 0.1007 0.3009
2002 0.1013 0.3018
2003 0.0994 0.2993
2004 0.1011 0.3014
2005 0.0976 0.2967
Number of observations 2,902,724
Number of individuals 833,359
Number of establishments 4,260
Note: German terms:
i) nicht formal qualifiziert.
ii) Facharbeiter.
iii) Meister, Poliere.
iv) Angestellter.
v) bis mittlere Reife ohne Berufsausbildung.
vi) bis mittlere Reife mit Berufsausbildung.
vii) bis (Fach-)Hochschulreife ohne Berufsausbildung.
viii) bis (Fach-)Hochschulreife mit Berufsausbildung.
ix) Niedersachsen.
x) Nordrhein Westfalen.
xi) Bayern.
xii) Rheinland Pfalz, Saarland.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
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Table A3.3
Random-effects probit results for quit probability
Quit=1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
w¯jt -0.0338
(0.0533)
wˆinsideijt 0.0353
(0.0583)
wrankijt 0.0729**
(0.0293)
wrangeijt -0.0814**
( 0.0414)
wCDFijt 0.0672**
(0.0289)
wabsijt 0.204*** 0.2136*** 0.192*** 0.132* 0.267*** 0.136*
(0.0716) (0.0731) (0.0744) (0.0770) (0.0787) (0.0770)
wabsijt−1 0.0163 0.0173 0.0129 0.0193 0.0211 0.0157
(0.0709) (0.0709) (0.0710) (0.0707) (0 .0712) (0.0707)
Tenure -0.0370*** -0.0370*** -0.0372*** -0.0372*** -0.0370*** -0.0371***
(0.00274) (0.00274) (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00274) (0.00274)
Tenure2 0.000585*** 0.000586*** 0.000588*** 0.000590*** 0.000585*** 0.000587***
(0.000104) (0.000104) (0.000104) (0.000104) (0.000104) (0.000104)
Experience -0.00223 -0.00236 -0.00261 -0.00275 -0.00211 -0.00276
(0.00387) (0.00388) (0.00392) (0.00388) ( 0.00387) (0.00388)
Experience2 -0.0000860 -0.0000837 -0.0000780 -0.0000765 -0.0000884 -0.0000767
(0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000115) (0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000114)
Unskilled worker reference
Skilled worker/ Craftsman -0.0254* -0.0258* -0.0265* -0.0283* -0.0254* -0.0277*
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0150)
Technician/ Foreman -0.0895** -0.0914** -0.0953*** -0.0983*** -0.0882** -0.0971***
(0.0359) (0.0360)* (0.0371) (0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0360)
Clerk 0.0444*** 0.0432** 0.0395** 0.0395** 0.0452*** 0.0396**
(0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0188) (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0171)
Secondary school leaving certificate reference
Secondary school leaving certificate 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.130***
and apprenticeship (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207)
(Technical) college entrance qualification 0.0905* 0.0913* 0.0881* 0.0939* 0.0910* 0.0920*
(0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0519)* (0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0518)
(Technical) college entrance qualification 0.262*** 0.262*** 0.259*** 0.264*** 0.262*** 0.264***
and apprenticeship (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0275)
Workforce of establishment in [10;49] reference
Workforce of establishment in [50;199] 0.0550 0.0560 0.0545 0.0583 0.0544 0.0597
(0.0661) (0.0661) (0.0661) (0.0661) (0.0661) (0.0661)
Workforce of establishment in [200;999] -0.0665 -0.0647 -0.0675 -0.0603 -0.0647 -0.0592
(0.0652) (0.0653) (0.0653) (0.0653) (0.0653) (0.0653)
Workforce of establishment in ≥ 1000 -0.174*** -0.172*** -0.176*** -0.164** -0.169*** -0.164**
(0.0656) (0.0658) (0.0657) (0.0657) (0.0657) (0.0658)
Share of unqualified workers within the -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.137*** -0.154*** -0.136*** -0.152***
establishment (0.0247) (0.0258) (0.0248) (0.0255) (0.0247) (0.0253)
Works council -0.147*** -0.145*** -0.149*** -0.139*** -0.152*** -0.140***
(0.0318) (0.0321) (0.0319) (0.0320) (0.0319) (0.0320)
Collective bargaining 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.245***
(0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312)
Firm-reported quits 0.00163*** 0.00164*** 0.00162*** 0.00166*** 0.00161*** 0.00165***
(0.000110) (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000110) (0.000111)
Firm-reported layoffs 0.0000672 0.0000747 0.0000616 0.0000864 0.000111 0.0000875
(0.000315) (0.000315) (0.000315) (0.000314) (0.000315) (0.000314)
Sector dummy variables included
Regional dummy variables included
Annual dummy variables included
Constant -4.107*** -4.000*** -4.187*** -3.824*** -4.374*** -3.827***
(0.150) (0.226) (0.201) (0.188) (0.203) (0.192)
LR test of rho=0 (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Log-Likelihood -37269.05 -37268.85 -37268.86 -37265.94 -37267.12 -37266.34
Number of observations 2,902,724
Number of individuals 833,359
Number of establishments 4,260
Note: Random-effects probit (coefficients). Standard errors in parentheses. ’LR’ denotes likelihood-ratio.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
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Table A3.4
Random-effects probit results for quit probability
Quit=1 (1) (2) (3)
wrankijt -0.687*** -0.709***
(0.0743) (0.182)
wrankijt squared 0.767*** 0.820**
(0.0692) (0.404)
wrankijt cubic -0.0346
(0.261)
within-firm wage quintile 1 0.0645***
(0.0184)
within-firm wage quintile 2 -0.00319
(0.0168)
within-firm wage quintile 3 reference
within-firm wage quintile 4 0.0293*
(0.0165)
within-firm wage quintile 5 0.165***
(0.0187)
wabsijt 0.145* 0.146* 0.115
(0.0761) (0.0766) (0.0754)
wabsijt−1 -0.00464 -0.00479 0.00551
(0.0699) (0.0699) (0.0701)
Tenure -0.0354*** -0.0354*** -0.0360***
(0.00276) (0.00276) (0.00275)
Tenure2 0.000530*** 0.000530*** 0.000545***
(0.000105) (0.000105) (0.000105)
Experience -0.000629 -0.000633 -0.00123
(0.00389) (0.00389) (0.00388)
Experience2 -0.000146 -0.000146 -0.000128
(0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000114)
Unskilled worker reference
Skilled worker/ Craftsman -0.0147 -0.0147 -0.0192
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0150)
Technician/ Foreman -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.133***
(0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0362)
Clerk 0.0240 0.0239 0.0228
(0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172)
Secondary school leaving certificate reference
Secondary school leaving certificate 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.132***
and apprenticeship (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0207)
(Technical) college entrance qualification 0.100* 0.100* 0.101**
(0.0519) (0.0519) (0.0519)
(Technical) college entrance qualification 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.266***
and apprenticeship (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0275)
Workforce of establishment in [10;49] reference
Workforce of establishment in [50;199] 0.0640 0.0640 0.0605
(0.0663) (0.0663) (0.0662)
Workforce of establishment in [200;999] -0.0512 -0.0512 -0.0586
(0.0655) (0.0655) (0.0654)
Workforce of establishment in ≥ 1000 -0.154** -0.154* -0.164**
(0.0659) (0.0659) (0.0658)
Share of unqualified workers within the -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.167***
establishment (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0254)
Works council -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.1345137***
(0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0320257)
Collective bargaining 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.2415764**
(0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0312386)
Firm-reported quits 0.00171*** 0.00171*** 0.0017156***
(0.000111) (0.000111) (0.0001111)
Firm-reported layoffs 0.0000934 0.0000930 0.0000535
(0.000315) (0.000315) (0.0003157)
Sector dummy variables included
Regional dummy variables included
Annual dummy variables included
Constant -3.695*** -3.697*** -3.715***
(0.189) (0.189) (0.191)
LR test of rho=0 (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Log-Likelihood -37204.80 -37204.79 -37209.35
Number of observations 2,902,724
Number of individuals 833,359
Number of establishments 4,260
Note: Random-effects probit (coefficients). Standard errors in parentheses. ’LR’ denotes likelihood-ratio.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
71
Table A3.5
Random-effects probit results for quit probability: Robustness checks
Quit=1 (1) (2)
wrangeijt 0.0317
(0.1115)
wrangeijt squared -0.1005
(0.0919)
wCDFijt -0.619***
(0.0724)
wCDFijt squared 0.663***
(0.0644)
wabsijt 0.273*** 0.165**
(0.0791) (0.0764)
wabsijt−1 0.0255 -0.0258
(0.0714) (0.0700)
Tenure -0.0372*** -0.0350***
(0.00275) (0.00276)
Tenure2 0.000592*** 0.000522***
(0.000104) (0.000105)
Experience -0.00217 -0.00108
(0.003872) (0.00388)
Experience2 -0.0000862 -0.000136
(0.000114) (0.000114)
Unskilled worker reference
Skilled worker/ Craftsman -0.0266* -0.0126
(0.0150) (0.0151)
Technician/ Foreman -0.0868** -0.119***
(0.0359) (0.0362)
Clerk 0.0466*** 0.0261
(0.0170) (0.0173)
Secondary school leaving certificate reference
Secondary school leaving certificate 0.127*** 0.135***
and apprenticeship (0.0207) (0.0208)
(Technical) college entrance qualification 0.0913* 0.0898*
(0.0518) (0.0518)
(Technical) college entrance qualification 0.262*** 0.263***
and apprenticeship (0.0275) (0.0275)
Workforce of establishment in [10;49] reference
Workforce of establishment in [50;199] 0.0521 0.0627
(0.0661) (0.0662)
Workforce of establishment in [200;999] -0.0684 -0.0583
(0.0654) (0.0654)
Workforce of establishment in ≥ 1000 -0.173*** -0.166**
(0.0658) (0.0659)
Share of unqualified workers within the -0.136*** -0.149***
establishment (0.0247) (0.0253)
Works council -0.152*** -0.139***
(0.0319) (0.0321)
Collective bargaining 0.244*** 0.246***
(0.0312) (0.0312)
Firm-reported quits 0.00161*** 0.00166***
(0.000110) (0.000111)
Firm-reported layoffs 0.000126 0.0000962
(0.000315) (0.000315)
Sector dummy variables included
Regional dummy variables included
Annual dummy variables included
Constant -4.441*** -3.684***
(0.213) (0.192)
LR test of rho=0 (p-value) <0.001 <0.001
Log-Likelihood -37266.52 -37213.51
Number of observations 2,902,724
Number of individuals 833,359
Number of establishments 4,260
Note: Random-effects probit (coefficients). Standard errors in parentheses. ’LR’ denotes likelihood-ratio.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
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Table A3.6
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
(wnew − wold)it 0.0170 0.1426
wage cutit 0.4286 0.4949
(ranknew − rankold)it -0.0244 0.2390
(rangenew − rangeold)it 0.0109 0.1977
(CDF new − CDF old)it -0.0203 0.2386
1996 0.0897 0.2857
1997 0.0866 0.2812
1998 0.0650 0.2465
1999 0.1279 0.3340
2000 0.1288 0.3351
2001 0.1340 0.3406
2002 0.0653 0.2471
2003 0.0738 0.2614
2004 0.0882 0.2836
2005 0.1407 0.3478
Mobility to larger establishment (Dummy variable) 0.1827 0.3864
Secondary school leaving certificate 0.0631 0.2432
Secondary school leaving certificate and apprenticeship 0.7981 0.4014
(Technical) college entrance qualification 0.0124 0.1109
(Technical) college entrance qualification and apprenticeship 0.1263 0.3322
Experience 16.8494 6.8814
Experience2 331.2462 234.0323
Firm-reported quits 30.9771 59.9449
Firm-reported layoffs 7.0494 19.5800
Number of observations 5,464
Number of individuals 5,280
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Table A3.7
Random-effects probit results for quit probability (job-to-job mobility within one year)
Quit=1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
w¯jt 0.0756
(0.0518)
wˆinsideijt 0.148***
(0.0569)
wrankijt 0.0589** -0.806***
(0.0284) (0.0722)
wrankijt squared 0.878***
(0.0676)
wrangeijt -0.167*** -0.280***
(0.0396) (0.105)
wrangeijt squared 0.102
(0.0875)
wCDFijt 0.0632** -0.765***
(0.0281) (0.0703)
wCDFijt squared 0.806***
(0.0629)
Further control variables included
LR test of rho=0 (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Log-Likelihood -44490.86 -44488.55 -44489.77 -44405.59 -44483.07 -44482.39 -44489.40 -44407.59
Pr(quit=1| x¯) 0.000231 0.000230 0.000230 0.000223 0.000230 0.000230 0.000230 0.000225
Number of observations 2,904,095
Number of individuals 833,635
Number of establishments 4,279
Note: Random-effects probit (coefficients). Standard errors in parentheses. ’LR’ denotes likelihood-ratio.
Further control variables as in Table A3.3.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
Table A3.8
Estimation results for consequences of mobility (job-to-job mobility within one year)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
linear regression probit estimation
(wnew − wold)it wage cutit
(ranknew − rankold)it 0.295*** -1.005***
(0.0103) (0.0371)
(rangenew − rangeold)it 0.345*** -0.822***
(0.0129) (0.0366)
(CDFnew − CDF old)it 0.302*** -1.070***
(0.0104) (0.0386)
Further control variables included
(Pseudo) R2 0.2707 0.2472 0.2791 0.1636 0.1014 0.1754
Number of observations 6,835
Note: Marginal effects at x¯ are presented for the probit estimates. Robust standard errors clustered
for 6,403 individuals in parentheses.
Further control variables as in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Data: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB. Years 1995-2005 (own calculations).
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Figure A3.1: Predicted quit probabilities and relative wage positions (at x¯) for wCDFijt
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4 The Acceptance of Earnings Losses
After Voluntary Mobility
Because rational individuals know that they cannot always get what they want, they
are assumed to make appropriate adjustments. However, little is known about trade-off
reasoning in labor market mobility decision making. The objective of this paper is to
analyze the effect of job-specific amenities on the decision to voluntarily accept wage cuts.
Application of German household data reveals that voluntarily mobile workers are more
likely to accept lower wages when strain can be improved. In other words, the considered
mobile workers trade off amenities and monetary rewards when changing employers.1
1The chapter is a revised version of ”The Acceptance of Earnings Losses After Volun-
tary Mobility”, Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Vol. 5, 2011-2.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2011-2
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4.1 Introduction
Today’s labor markets are characterized by a large degree of flexibility. Among a variety
of aspects, labor market mobility contributes to this flexibility (OECD 1997). In recent
times, a growing strand of literature corroborates that a considerable fraction of workers
are changing jobs at the cost of wage cuts. In Germany, a large number of workers
are shown to be mobile toward lower wages. Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) refer to
establishment-to-establishment transitions during two successive years and show that
more than one in five individuals are mobile with wage cuts. Jolivet et al. (2006) apply
data from the European Community Household Panel Survey to reveal that 36.3% of
job-to-job transitions in Germany are accompanied by wage cuts. The authors define
job-to-job mobility as transitions without noticeable unemployment spells of less than
one month.
Transitions to lower wages are not a typical German phenomenon. In their cross-
country analysis, Jolivet et al. (2006) show that almost one in five individuals is mobile
to lower wages in Portugal and Belgium. The largest shares of wage cuts are observed in
Denmark, France, and Germany. In these countries, more than 34% of mobile individuals
suffer wage cuts in the period of mobility. In line with this result, Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002) show that more than one in three workers changing jobs directly did so at the cost
of a wage cut.2 For the United States, Jolivet et al. (2006) indicate that 23% of job-
to-job transitions are to lower wages.3 Nosal and Rupert (2007) utilize the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics and show that about two in five individuals (voluntarily) change to
lower wages. The results of these studies for different countries indicate that scientists
should turn their attention to the reasons for mobility with wage cuts.
This paper sets forth an analysis of the reasons for job-to-job mobility to lower wages
with a special focus on changes in different non-pecuniary job characteristics after the
transition. It utilizes the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP in the following; see
2Using French data, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) refer to direct mobility as job-to-job mobility with
a maximum intervening unemployment spell of 15 days.
3Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the authors refer to job-to-job mobility when intervening
unemployment, if any, does not exceed three weeks.
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Wagner et al. 2007), which includes questions on the reasons for job termination at
the previous employer and surveys comparisons between both jobs. This is a major
enhancement to previous papers because it allows one to determine whether workers
voluntarily accept wage cuts in order to improve job-specific non-wage amenities.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section illustrates briefly the basic
framework and the research hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the data set, main variables,
and econometric models. I present the econometric results for the impact of subjective
improvements in different job-specific characteristics on the decision to accept wage cuts
in section 4.4. A conclusion is presented in section 4.5.
4.2 Framework
Recent literature considers wage cuts a result of job termination. In Jolivet (2009),
workers are allowed to change jobs directly to lower wages because their only alternative
is non-employment. These transitions are referred to as job reallocations and are also
mentioned in other studies (e.g., Jolivet et al. 2006). Other theoretic approaches explain
wage cuts as an investment in future wage growth (Connolly and Gottschalk 2008, Postel-
Vinay and Robin 2002). It is also reasonable to change to a new employer offering lower
wages if the wage cut at the current employer had been larger (see, e.g., Shi 2009 or
Mortensen and Pissarides 1994). Schneck (2010) empirically suggests the prevalence of
investments in future wage growth but also revealed that a substantial fraction of workers
are mobile to permanently lower wages. Because workers are shown to accept lower wages
on a permanent basis, other determinants are hypothesized to affect mobility decisions.
For example, it is suggested that job-specific (non-wage) amenities affect the job choice
(Nosal and Rupert 2007).
Economic and psychological literature, however, lack detailed information about the
reasons for accepting lower wages. The basic idea of this paper proposes that differences
in wages between two jobs might be balanced out by differences in (non-wage) job char-
acteristics. Analogously to Rosen (1974, 1986) one could hypothesize that jobs consist
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of bundles of various characteristics with implicit, or hedonic, prices. Competent and
self-supporting individuals, however, know that they cannot always get what they want,
and that is the reason why they are expected to make appropriate adjustments. More
specifically, individuals are expected to know that it is unlikely to find a better job with a
higher wage, more flexible work time arrangements, and more job security right at their
front door. It is important to analyze the extent of trade-off reasoning in the context of
labor market mobility because ”Trade-off reasoning should be so pervasive and so well
rehearsed as to be virtually automatic for the vast majority of the [...] population” (Tet-
lock 2000, p. 239). For this reason, this analysis refers to utility maximizing individuals
who maximize their utility U .
Here, I assume that workers only change jobs if the utility U of worker i at employer
j in time t exceeds the utility at the previous employer:4
Uijt > Ui,j−1,t−1 (4.1)
Workers are confronted with job offers which contain information on the wage and a set
of various job-specific amenities. Wage offers of employer j are offered to worker i in t
independently of the worker’s marginal willingness to avoid disamenities or to pay for
amenities. Utility maximization implies that the worker changes employer if:
Uijt(wage, amenities) > Ui,j−1,t−1(wage, amenities) (4.2)
This paper concentrates on whether voluntary mobile workers accept a decrease in wages
in exchange of an improvement in amenities. For this reason, the article mainly focuses on
the theory of trade-off reasoning. The exclusive concentration on voluntary quits in the
paper is assumed to assure that the drop in wages is compensated for by improvements
4Mobility costs are ignored. In addition, this paper is only responsive to short-term wage cuts which
might pay off in the long-run.
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in amenities.
wageijt − wagei,j−1,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
= U(amenitiesijt − amenitiesi,j−1,t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(4.3)
Pr(Wage Cutijt = 1) = Uijt(improvement in amenities︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
, S)
Pr(Wage Cutijt = 1) = Φ(β0 + β′improvement in amenitiesijt + δ′Sijt)
(4.4)
The hypothesis about trade-off reasoning is summarized in equation (4.3). Worker i bal-
ances out improvements in job-specific amenities between two jobs and the wage decline
when changing employer in period t. The probability to accept wage cuts, then, is ex-
pected to be positively affected by certain job-specific amenities. S summarizes further
determinants which might affect the decision to accept lower wages. I tested the hy-
pothesis by application of the probability model in which Φ is the cumulative density
function of the standard normal distribution. Evidence in favor of trade-off reasoning in
mobility decisions is provided in case of a positive estimate for β. The following strategy
to estimate the willingness to pay for amenities (β) exploits the preferences about wages
and amenities that are revealed when workers change jobs voluntarily.5 Precisely, utility-
maximizing workers only change employers if job-specific amenities compensate them for
the loss in wages. In the following, I describe the effects of the job-specific amenities ’flex-
ible work schedules’, ’subjective job security against job loss’, ’commuting’, ’promotion
possibilities’, and ’strain’ on the probability to accept a wage cut.
The paper addresses whether workers trade off improvements in strain and wages.
Strain is shown to negatively affect individual satisfaction (see, e.g., Loscocco and Spitze
1990). Cornelissen (2009) finds a negative effect of hard manual labor and stress (which
are dimensions of job strain) on job satisfaction. According to Mobley (1977), dissat-
isfaction with a job is translated into thoughts of leaving the employer, evaluation of
5Note that selection of workers might bias the estimates. In regression analysis, biased estimates are
obtained when unobserved determinants of the outcome and unobserved determinants of selection into
the the sample are correlated. The correlation between unobservables, however, cannot be directly
evaluated. I expect that my estimates rather provide an upper bound for the acceptance for wage cuts
since the workers in my sample are indeed compensated for the loss in wages by amenities. Note that
some workers might also be compensated for the improvement in job-specific amenities by sacrificing
(large) wage markups.
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alternatives, and mobility because starting a new job is expected to result in a higher
satisfaction. In fact, Judge (1993) shows that dissatisfied workers are more likely to quit
than other individuals. Literature, however, lacks information on whether mobile indi-
viduals are willing to accept wage cuts in order to leave the dissatisfying job. This paper
assesses whether individuals who expect decreasing strain when changing jobs are willing
to accept lower wages. Analogous argumentation is expected to hold for improved job
security by wage cuts because Cornelissen (2009) shows that satisfaction with the job is
negatively affected by worries about (perceived) job security.
Based on the question of Altonji and Paxson (1988) on whether workers are willing to
sacrifice wage gains for better working hours when quitting a job, I ask whether workers
are even willing to accept wage cuts for an improvement of work time regulations. The
main reason for a special focus on the latter hypothesis is that individuals face a trade-
off between time constraints and monetary rewards. To be more precise, if the current
employer offers few possibilities for flexible leisure, then, working at a new employer
with more flexible working schedules might be preferred despite lower wages. In other
words, workers know that it is very problematic (almost impossible) to achieve the highest
flexibility without paying a price for it.
Do improvements in commuting expenses affect the acceptance of lower wages? Van
Ophem (1991) shows that the commuting distance exhibits a significant impact on the
search probability. Specifically, results show that the higher the distance from home to
the workplace (in minutes), the higher the search propensity. This result suggests that
commuting is an important determinant for labor market mobility because job search
is a good predictor of actual mobility (see Cornelissen 2009). However, little is known
about the relationship between commuting expenses and mobility to lower wages. For
this reason, the paper asks whether subjective improvements in commuting are paid for
by wage cuts. Note that commuting might also be expensive in monetary terms because
larger distances are assumed to increase the price to get from home to work which directly
reduces profitability of the job. Possible critique arises because commuting might be an
economic outcome variable because commuting can be seen part of the wage. More
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specifically, economic theory predicts that commuters are compensated for commuting
by higher wages. Stutzer and Frey (2008, p. 339), however, find that ”people spend a lot
of time commuting and often find it a burden” because subjective well-being decreases
with longer commuting time. For this reason, individuals also reveal trade-off reasoning
when deciding to quit a job in order to change to a job with shorter or longer commuting
time.
In addition, the possibilities for promotions at the new employer might affect the
decision to accept wage cuts. Pfeifer and Schneck (2010) show that workers who change
to higher relative wage positions compared to the previous establishment have, on average,
a lower probability to change to lower wages. Workers who change to lower relative wage
positions, in turn, likely suffer more wage cuts. For this reason, the authors do not present
evidence in favor of trade-off reasoning in relative wage positions and wages. However,
it is suggested that workers who change with wage cuts to a lower relative wage position
might benefit from better chances for future promotions within the new firm. For this
reason, it is argued that workers might pay for future promotion opportunities by wage
cuts.
Usually workers evaluate these job-specific amenities before the transition. The data,
in turn, refers to realized transitions with completed trade-off reasoning (a more detailed
description of the data follows in the next section). For this reason, individual answers
on the questions about subjective improvements in the new job might involve problems
regarding cognitive dissonance reduction theory (Festinger 1957). This particular theory
describes that unpleasant arousal drives people to resolve the cognitive inconsistency. In
other words, if two cognitions are discrepant, individuals simply change one to make it
consistent with the other. Here, workers might act contrary to their attitude because of
mobility to lower wages. As a consequence, these workers adjust their cognition about
the job in a positive way to balance out this effect. In the underlying case, workers might
change their attitude toward the new job in a positive way as a consequence from the
decision to be mobile to lower wages. As a result, workers who accept wage cuts report to
be more satisfied with the new job compared to workers changing without wage cuts. If
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this is true, the estimated coefficients on subjective comparisons (improvements) between
the previous and the current job would be upwardly biased. A direct test of this possible
critique cannot be conducted by application of the GSOEP.
4.3 Data and procedure
4.3.1 Data
This study utilizes the GSOEP household survey to examine the impact of job-specific
amenities on the probability of being mobile with wage cuts. The main advantage of this
data set stems from the fact that it includes subjective comparisons between the previous
and current jobs. I restricted the analysis to German citizens who are employed full-
time in two successive years during the period 1994–2007. The sample considers private
sector employees with permanent contracts aged between 20 and 60 years. The lower age
boundary is chosen because the school degrees are usually achieved before 20 years of
age.6
The data include annual information on the last monthly gross wage of individual i
in period t (measured in Euro) which is applied in the consecutive analysis. I apply
the consumer price index provided by the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (annual
averages, with year 2005 = 100) to deflate the wages. In addition, the questionnaire
asks the ”How many hours are stipulated in your contract (excluding overtime)?” The
corresponding information is utilized to calculate the hourly wage of individuals. The
hourly wage (wijt) as well as the real hourly wage (wrealijt ) of individual i in period t at
employer j are defined as follows:
wijt =
monthly wageijt
4.33 ∗ contractual weekly working timeijt
wrealijt =
deflated monthly wageijt
4.33 ∗ contractual weekly working timeijt
(4.5)
Note that the GSOEP also includes information on overtime or the actual hours worked.
6I consider the years of education which is based on information provided by the GSOEP.
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I decided to concentrate on the contractual working hours because this measure is less
affected by (cyclical or employer-specific) fluctuations. As the data are set up as a
panel, information about the wage in the previous year is utilized to determine wage cuts
and wage improvements. To examine the probability of wage cuts, a binary variable is
constructed to illustrate whether individuals are mobile to lower wages or not:7
Wage Cutijt =

1 mobility to lower wages (wit − wi,j−1,t−1 < 0)
0 mobility to higher wages (wit − wi,j−1,t−1 ≥ 0)
Wage Cutrealijt =

1 mobility to lower wages (wrealit − wreali,j−1,t−1 < 0)
0 mobility to higher wages (wrealit − wreali,j−1,t−1 ≥ 0)
(4.6)
In order to account for the individual trade-off reasoning appropriately, the analysis
attempts to identify voluntary mobility, which is defined as an unconstrained decision
of the individual. The underlying GSOEP includes detailed retrospective information
about labor mobility. Each year, the questionnaire asks whether a new job was started
at a new employer.8 Individuals who reported an employer change, then, are asked
whether they resigned on their own initiative. In the subsequent analysis, only those
reporting a resignation on their own initiative are considered. In addition, I focus on
mobile workers who changed employer within one month. This criterion was instituted to
meet the definition of job-to-job mobility where individuals have to be mobile within one
month (Jolivet et al. 2006, Royalty 1998). In sum, 800 voluntary employer-to-employer
transitions of 670 individuals who quit their jobs up to four times are considered. Note
that the sample size of the entire GSOEP data is considerably reduced by implementation
of the restrictions but the sample size is comparable to the one reported in Villanueva
(2007).
A diversity of subjective improvements of different job characteristics are surveyed in
7Wage information of the year 1993 is utilized to calculate the wage growth of mobile workers in 1994.
I drop reported wages of zero.
8The analysis excludes workers starting their first job or have a new job after a break. Individuals who
report a job change within a firm and individuals who become self-employed are also not subject
of the underlying analysis. The paper, hence, focuses on transitions between different employers.
Unique information about this special pattern is available from 1994 onwards.
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the data. More specifically, the data set includes information about comparisons between
the previous and current jobs if individuals reported a job change. The corresponding
question read as follows: ”How would you judge your present position compared to your
last one? In what ways has it improved, stayed the same, or worsened?” This particular
question considers the following characteristics:
1. wages
2. job type
3. chances for promotion
4. work load (strain)
5. length of commute to and from work
6. work schedule regulations (work time)
7. fringe benefits
8. security against job loss9
In the subsequent analysis, the answers to the question on strain, job security, commut-
ing, work time, and promotions are applied to analyze the impact of trade-off reasoning
on the decision to be mobile to lower wages. Another question asks whether the indi-
vidual uses his or her knowledge and skills more, the same, or less than in the previous
job. This variable is to describe whether the worker’s skills meet the required ones in
the new job and can be interpreted as a match quality indicator. Table 4.1 shows the
descriptive statistics and reveals that only very few transitions (9.5%) are accompanied
by a subjective worsening of wages. In the following, the paper concentrates on dummy
variables which describe improvements or worsenings of the subjective comparisons. The
corresponding frequencies of the subjective comparisons are shown in Table A4.1 while
means and standard deviations are presented in Table A4.2.
9The questions and potential answer categories differ slightly over the years. No information is available
in the 2008 wave of the GSOEP. Regarding fringe benefits, the German questionnaire refers to
”betriebliche Sozialleistungen” while the English questionnaire refers to ”benefits”.
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4.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics on wage changes induced by voluntary job-to-
job mobility. Application of nominal wages reveals that 24.38% transitions are executed
to lower wages. These numbers are comparable to the ones reported in Fitzenberger
and Garloff (2007). For real wages, however, the results are closer to the ones reported
in Jolivet et al. (2006), where about one in three transitions are to lower wages. On
average, all directly mobile workers generate a wage markup of about 15.40% (nominal)
and 13.68% (real), respectively. This average wage premium for mobility is another reason
for the conventional hypothesis that employer-to-employer mobility is voluntary.
Table 4.1
Descriptive statistics on wage changes after mobility
share of wage 10% mean 90% Number of
cuts percentile percentile observations
wijt
wi,j−1,t−1
0.2438 0.8756 1.1540 1.4463 800
(0.4296) (0.3440)
0.0000 1.0163 1.2488 1.5484 605
(—) (0.3380)
1.0000 0.6857 0.8599 0.9811 195
(—) (0.1296)
wrealijt
wreali,j−1,t−1
0.3175 0.8635 1.1368 1.4246 800
(0.4658) (0.3381)
0.0000 1.0309 1.2563 1.5498 546
(—) (0.3393)
1.0000 0.7164 0.8801 0.9910 254
(—) (0.1267)
subjective worsening 0.0950 800
in wages (0.2934)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
wrealijt
wreali,j−1,t−1
: Deflated gross wages (year 2005 = 100).
The share of workers who are mobile with wage markups, however, is very different
from the workers who are mobile to lower wages. The average wage markup amounts to
24.88% (nominal) and 25.63% (real) for upwardly mobile individuals. Downwardly mobile
workers, in turn, suffer an average wage cut of more than 10%. The wage markups and
wage cuts presented here are comparable to the ones presented in Fitzenberger and Garloff
(2007). Note that the subjective perception of declines (worsenings) in wages is, by far,
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smaller than the number of wage cuts. Precisely, 9.50% of transitions are accompanied
by subjective wage cuts while more than two in five transitions are to lower hourly wages.
This suggests that the disutility introduced by monetary losses might be offset by other
dimensions of the current job which directly adverts to trade-off reasoning in job mobility.
Figure 4.1: Share of wage cuts by subjective cognition about wage change
Number of observations: Nimproved = 521, Nstayed the same = 203, Nworsened = 76
Figure 4.2: Share of wage cuts by year
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Figure 4.1 presents the share of wage cuts by the categories of subjective comparison
of wages between two jobs. As expected, the share of workers with realized wage cuts
increases with increasing subjective worsenings about the wage change. In other words,
68.42% (nominal) and 76.32% (real) of individuals who report subjective worsenings in
wages indeed suffer wage cuts, whereas only 13.63% and 21.31% of individuals who report
a subjective improvement in wages actually experience wage cuts. Figure 4.2 shows that
the share of mobility with wage cuts within a certain period are rather unaffected by
the business cycle. To be more precise, the period between 1996 and 2006 was especially
characterized by a relatively stable share of transition to lower wages. Note that this does
not imply that mobility is equally common across the different phases of the business cycle
(see footnote 11). In sum, the descriptive statistics show that mobility to lower wages is
frequent across different phases of the business cycle, which accentuates the importance
of an analysis of the reasons for the acceptance of lower wages.
4.3.3 Methods and procedure
The research question on whether workers accept wage cuts in exchange for improvements
in job amenities can directly be addressed in a probit model because the dependent
variable on whether a wage cut was accepted or not is binary by construction. Literature
recommends the analysis of binary dependent variables by application of binary choice
models. Here, a probit model that relates to equation (4.4) was utilized. Equation
(4.7) shows the applied probit model, where Xijt stands for dummy variables which
describe improvements or worsenings between the previous and the current jobs, whereas
Sijt describes sociodemographic information and other determinants affecting mobility to
lower wages. The corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in Table A4.2.
Pr(Wage Cutijt = 1) = Φ(α + β′Xijt + δ′Sijt) (4.7)
Individual characteristics include gender, age, education (in years), and whether or not
individuals live with a partner. Regional mobility is included in the analysis because
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Yankow (2003) shows that changing locale affects wages. More specifically, I accounted
for the federal state (Bundesland) in which an individual is working. If a worker changes to
a job in a different federal state compared to the previous one, the corresponding dummy
variable for regional mobility equals one. In addition, transitions from blue-collar to
white-collar jobs are accounted for by a dummy variable. I also account for the economic
environment in different years. Precisely, I include the growth of unemployment rate
into the analysis.10 The number of individual mobility describes the calculated number
of quits on own initiative between 1985 and the year of the interview. Note that the
minimum is one because the current quit is included.11
In a next step, the marginal willingness to pay for different amenities is estimated via
application of OLS regression. The dependent variable describes the wage change while
the set of control variables is identical to the one in the probit model discussed previously.
w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
= a+ b′Xijt + d′Sijt + uijt (4.8)
Finally, the corner solution (tobit) estimation approach is applied which combines aspects
of the binomial probit for the distinction of w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
≥ 1 and w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
< 1 and the
10I apply the unemployment rate provided by the Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Table 090; with respect to share of civilian labor force). Unem-
ployment growth is defined as unempt − unempt−1.
11Table A4.2 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables which are included in the subsequent
multivariate analysis. Workers who voluntarily change jobs are, on average, about 35 years old. This
finding can be interpreted with the hypothesis that middle-aged workers assess their own aspiration
levels best (Clark et al. 1996). More than two in three mobile individuals are renters. The average
education in years is between 12 and 13 years. Regional mobility plays a minor role by simple
consideration of its frequency, since workers are shown to leave their federal state for a new job
rarely. Only 4.75% of individuals perform cross-border transitions between federal states in Germany.
A minority of mobile individuals life together with a partner (21.25%). About one in 20 transitions
are from a blue-collar job to a white-collar job. It is also necessary to account for the workforce in the
previous and the current firm (see, e.g., Brown and Medoff 1989). 13.25% of individuals are leaving
a firm with more than 2,000 employees while 17.13% of mobile workers are employed at a new firm
with more than 2,000 employees. The following cross-table illustrates the number of observations by
firm-size categories.
Number of observations by firm-size
Dummy variable for Dummy variable for workforcei,j,t > 2,000
workforcei,j−1,t−1 > 2,000 0 1 Total
0 604 90 694
1 59 47 106
Total 663 137 800
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regression model for E[ w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
|Xijt, Sijt, w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
< 1]. The setting is adequate for Tobit
because individuals decide on how much they are willing to pay for a better job rather
than first deciding on whether to accept a wage cut and then, if this first decision is
affirmative, decide on how much to pay for the new job.
w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
∗
= e+ f ′Xijt + g′Sijt + vijt (4.9)
w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
=

w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
∗
if w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
< 1
0 if w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
≥ 1
(4.10)
Estimation of the corner solution model, then, allows to compute the marginal willingness
to pay for different amenities by wage cuts, given that the individual changes to lower
wages.12 As the data are set up as a panel, I am able to make effort to control for
unobserved individual heterogeneity. All the tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no
individual heterogeneity.13
Note that the analysis of this particular trade-off reasoning might be characterized
by simultaneity in the acceptance of wage cuts and improvements in the new job. This
problem might introduce problems regarding endogeneity. One way to deal with this
type of problem is to utilize a two-stage least square estimator, where I need to identify
12The tobit approach can be viewed as a special case of the so-called Heckman sample selection model
(Heckman 1979) when the selection equation and the regression equation are identical. One reason
to refer to the tobit model is that it is problematic to define a reasonable selection equation because
of a lack of literature on the acceptance of wage cuts in voluntary mobility decisions.
13Precisely, different tests were conducted for the entire sample. A likelihood-ratio test was conducted
in order to assess whether individual random-effects were evident in the probit model which explains
whether a wage cut was accepted or not. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch and
Pagan 1979) was applied to test for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the linear model on the
wage change. Finally, a likelihood-ratio test was applied for the tobit model. The null hypothesis
cannot be rejected in all cases. Note that the Chow test type for poolability of the data over time
(see Baltagi 2008, chapter 4) also rejects the null hypothesis. For this reason, it is suggested that the
data should not be pooled across all periods. Few observations in certain periods, however, enforce
pooling of the data (see the number of observation per years below). In order to address this problem,
I conduct robustness checks for different time periods and discuss potential changes in the effects.
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of observations 25 28 51 43 48 81 85
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number of observations 116 81 84 48 30 31 49
Total number of observations: 800
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instrument variables. However, it is hard to find any variable which is partially correlated
with subjective improvements between two jobs and exogenous in the decision to accept
wage cuts. Given any simultaneity in trade-off reasoning, the following coefficients do
not have a causal interpretation.
4.3.4 Specification
This section concentrates on the choice of specification. As mentioned above, the data in-
clude a large set of dummy variables for subjective comparisons which can be included in
Xijt. Note that some of the dummy variables of subjective comparisons between jobs are
highly correlated. Table A4.3 presents the correlation coefficients where Spearman’s cor-
relation and Tetrachoric correlations for binary variables are applied. Obvious problems
regarding multicollinearity, however, are not revealed because of a maximum correlation
coefficient of 0.6501 for a worsening in fringe benefits and a worsening in job security.
Note that I abstract from Tetrachoric correlations of -1.000 between improvements and
worsenings in job-specific amenities which are plausible because an improvement can
never be associated of the same subjective comparison measure. Regarding the choice
of specification, the match-specific component (comparison of use of skills) is included
in all specifications because of its importance on the wage determination in economic
literature. As discussed in the framework above, individual preferences about trade-off
reasoning are also revealed when comparing flexible work schedules, strain, commuting,
promotion chances, and perceived job security between the previous job and the current
job. For this reason, these determinants are subject to the first (”preferred”) specification.
In a further step, I extended the preferred specification by inclusion of dummy variables
for subjective improvements and worsenings of fringe benefits and of the general job
type. This specification, then, might be referred to as the full specification because
all subjective comparisons (with exception of the subjective comparison of wages) are
considered. Please note that subjective perceptions about the general job type and the
use of skills are significantly correlated.14 This suggests that both variables might describe
14The corresponding Tetrachoric correlation equals 0.6173 for an improvement in the general job type
and and better use of skills and is the third highest correlation coefficient in Table A4.3. For worse
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the subjective change in the match quality when comparing the current job to the previous
job. Fringe benefits might be monetary amenities which are paid by the firm. For this
reason, this measure might reflect some redeployment of wages rather than trade-off
reasoning. The full specification, however, is expected to provide a valuable robustness
check of the results obtained by the preferred specification.
In a next step, factor analysis is utilized in order to reduce the dimension from the
multitude of dummy variables of subjective comparisons to a lower number of factors.
Precisely, principal component factor analysis with orthogonal varimax rotation is con-
ducted. The obtained factors are a set of independent and mutually orthogonal linear
combinations of all of the subjective comparisons between the jobs. Because the choice of
the number of factors is complex, one can rely on information criteria or one can search for
solutions which are to be interpreted in an economically meaningful way. The Bayesian
information criterion suggests considering six factors wherein the factor loadings can be
meaningfully interpreted. The corresponding results are shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 presents the factor loadings which are used for interpretation of the six
factors, where the bold numbers describe the highest loadings for the different factors.
One can learn from the table that factor 1 is highly affected by subjective comparisons
in strain and work time regulations. For this reason, these variables are used to assign
the label to factor 1 because workload and work schedules are dimensions of job-specific
working conditions. Analogously, factor 2 can be interpreted as an improvement in ’job
amenities’, as fringe benefits and the perceived job security against job loss exhibit the
highest factor loadings. Note that, for example, the factor loadings for an improvement
in work time also loads high on the factor two. For this reason, a more flexible work
schedule is suggested to affect factor 2 as well but is not directly included in the following
interpretation of this particular factor. The remaining factors are defined in a similar
way.
jobs in general and less use of skills, the correlation is similar (0.6066) and significant.
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Table 4.2
Factor analysis with six factors
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Uniqueness
Interpretation of job job
the factor working amenities match match amenities
conditions improved improved commuting worsened worsened
Strain ↓ 0.7224 0.0181 0.0862 0.0226 0.0176 0.0932 0.4609
Strain ↑ -0.6747 0.0571 0.2635 -0.0341 0.3162 -0.0612 0.3671
Work time ↓ 0.6259 -0.1730 0.2254 0.1308 0.3259 0.0014 0.4042
Work time ↑ -0.5616 0.4256 0.1224 -0.1563 0.0467 0.1743 0.4315
Fringe benefits ↑ -0.1447 0.7672 0.0955 0.0173 0.0550 0.0103 0.3780
Job security ↑ -0.0057 0.7061 0.1845 -0.0010 0.0774 -0.0601 0.4578
General job ↑ -0.1250 0.0378 0.7325 -0.0086 -0.1662 0.0269 0.4179
Use of skills ↑ 0.0808 0.1743 0.6448 0.0061 -0.4248 0.0557 0.3638
Promotion chances ↑ 0.0718 0.1430 0.6134 0.0895 0.1598 -0.4008 0.4040
Commuting ↑ -0.0590 0.0495 0.0760 -0.8640 0.0749 0.0420 0.2345
Commuting ↓ 0.0506 0.0533 0.1102 0.8457 0.0553 0.0812 0.2576
Use of skills ↓ -0.1225 0.0290 -0.1259 -0.0536 0.7662 0.0595 0.3748
General job ↓ 0.2454 0.2133 -0.2175 0.0325 0.5831 0.2444 0.4462
Promotion chances ↓ 0.0350 0.1279 -0.1654 0.0354 0.0489 0.7731 0.3537
Job security ↓ -0.0256 -0.3762 0.1573 0.0809 0.1791 0.5987 0.4359
Fringe benefits ↓ 0.2331 -0.4429 0.2563 -0.0766 0.1395 0.4473 0.4584
Method: principal component factors with orthogonal varimax rotation.
Number of observations: 800.
↑ describes improvements, ↓ refers to subjective worsenings.
The next step calculates the factor scores as proposed by Thomson (1951). Workers who
report improvements in strain and work time are likely to have a negative factor score
for ’working condition’, whereas workers who change to jobs with worse strain and worse
work schedules are more likely to be associated with positive scores for factor 1. Workers
who report an improvement in commuting never obtain a positive factor score for the
factor ’commuting’, whereas workers reporting a worsening never obtain a negative value.
Interpretation of the remaining factors is straightforward. Note that the determination
of a set of factors allows a reduction in the dimensionality of the analysis but it can also
hide what is going on at the disaggregated level. Therefore, inclusion of the factor scores
into the estimation framework should only be viewed as a further robustness check.15
In sum, the analysis concentrates on three different sets of variables included in Xijt.
15The following table shows the factor scores which have a mean close to zero and a standard deviation
of one.
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The first specification refers to the variables mentioned in the framework. Precisely,
subjective comparisons of the use of skills, flexible work schedules, strain, commuting,
promotion chances, and perceived job security are subject to the first specification. The
second specification additionally accounts for comparisons in fringe benefits and the gen-
eral job type. The set of variables in third specification contains the factor scores which
are described above.
4.4 Results
This section presents the results of the multivariate analysis. At first, I accounted for the
dummy variables for subjective improvements and worsenings in commuting, strain, work
time, promotion chances, security against job loss, and the match indicator (preferred
specification). Table 4.3 presents the results for the probit estimation framework on
whether workers accepted a wage cut when changing jobs. Note that the endogenous
variable varies over specifications. Precisely, specification (1) explains mobility to lower
wages when accounting for gross wages, specification (2) corresponds to deflated gross
wage cuts, and specification (3) presents the probit estimates for the subjective decline
in wages. The link test for the corresponding probit models shows that the following
specifications are satisfactory because yˆ2 is insignificant in all the test equations (see
Ramsey (1969) for a comparable test).
Regarding the above hypothesis of trade-off reasoning between subjective improvements
in amenities and mobility decisions to lower wages, different specifications in Table 4.3
provide distinct insights. One can learn from specification (1) that individuals pay for an
improvement in strain by lower wages. The coefficient is significant and positive, which
Descriptive statistics: Factor scores
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Factor score 1 1.39e-09 1 -2.314253 2.998188
Factor score 2 6.73e-10 1 -2.629714 3.765187
Factor score 3 7.42e-11 1 -1.978934 2.801363
Factor score 4 3.31e-10 1 -1.594935 1.68852
Factor score 5 -1.41e-09 1 -1.771901 4.142451
Factor score 6 -1.38e-10 1 -1.640562 5.140013
Number of observations: 800.
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implies that an improvement in strain compared to the previous job increases the prob-
ability for voluntary mobility to lower wages. As a result, trade-off reasoning is evident.
The estimated coefficient in specification (1) equals 0.0638, which can be interpreted in
that an improvement in strain increases the probability for mobility to lower wages by
0.0638 percentage points. This result reveals that trade-off reasoning between improve-
ments in strain and wages is evident. The coefficient of subjectively improved commuting
is comparable and is significant at the 10% level. Again, trade-off reasoning, as hypoth-
esized above, becomes evident. The subjective evaluation of promotion opportunities
also have sizable impact by considering the size as well as significance of the coefficients.
Workers changing to a job with subjectively improved opportunities to climb up the hi-
erarchy are less likely to accept wage cuts, whereas workers who change to worse future
career prospects are more likely to suffer earnings losses. This result contradicts the
ones obtained by Pfeifer and Schneck (2010), who report that a change in relative wage
positions is positively correlated to a change in wages. Accordingly, transitions to lower
relative wage positions which, in turn, increase future career prospects are accompanied
by lower wages. The results obtained here, however, suggest that workers who change to
jobs with better promotion opportunities are less likely to change to lower wages. The
differences might stem from the definition of the variables in both studies: This study
utilizes subjective comparisons between jobs which can be evaluated in a completely dif-
ferent manner when compared to an objective measure (the change in the relative wage
position) as utilized in Pfeifer and Schneck (2010).
When accounting for real wages, the coefficient for improvements in work time becomes
significant and indicates that an improvement in work schedules reduces the probabil-
ity of wage cuts (see specification (2) in Table 4.3). This result contradicts trade-off
reasoning between mobility decisions to lower wages and job-specific amenities. Note
that specification (2) confirms the estimated signs obtained in the first specification for
strain, work time, promotion opportunities, and the match indicator. The signs for the
estimated coefficients for a worsening in security against a job loss and for the subjective
worsenings in commuting differ across specifications. These effects, thus, are not only
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insignificant but also non-robust across specifications. The probability that an individ-
ual reports a subjective worsening in wages is described in specification (3). Note that
some of the coefficients for the subjective wage cut contradict the ones obtained for the
objective measures for wage cuts. An explanation for the effect that the sign of an im-
provement in work time is (insignificantly) positive in specification (3) but negative in
specifications (1) and (2) might be attributed to cognitive dissonance reduction (as men-
tioned by Festinger 1957), which resolves the perception of a wage cut. In other words,
workers might change their attitude toward the current job in a positive way (more flex-
ible work schedules) as a consequence of the decision to accept perceived wage cuts. An
interpretation for the different signs of the coefficient for a worsening in strain across
specifications is that workers who are less satisfied with the current job have a higher
probability to feel to be subjectively worse off in wages. A somewhat surprising result is
that the match indicator variable does not contribute any significant on the probability
to accept wage cuts. Individuals, however, are less likely to suffer wage cuts when better
use of skills is achieved in the new job compared to the previous one. For less use of skills,
negative effects are found in specifications (1) and (2), while a positive effect is revealed
in specification (3). An explanation for this result might be that workers who are not
able to use all of their skills might feel bored, which possibly introduces dissatisfaction
with wages or perceptions of earnings losses. The negative coefficients in specifications
(1) and (2) are hardly to explain. It might be hypothesized that workers change to jobs
where they are not able to use all of their skills, but instead apply one very special and
highly paid skill. Thus, especially for highly qualified specialists, less use of skills also
might reduce the probability of wage cuts. The remaining control variables are, to the
largest extent, insignificant. For the growth in the unemployment rate, I do not find any
significant impact that confirms the considerations above. Cyclical fluctuations only have
low impact on the acceptance of voluntary wage cuts.
96
Table 4.3
Probit model on whether workers accepted a wage cut
(1) (2) (3)
Variables mobility to mobility to subjective worsening
lower wages lower wagesreal of wages
Strain improved 0.0638* 0.0911** 0.0628**
(0.0373) (0.0406) (0.0244)
Strain worsened -0.0311 -0.0603 0.0203
(0.0424) (0.0468) (0.0309)
Work time improved -0.0263 -0.0695* 0.0183
(0.0347) (0.0381) (0.0217)
Work time worsened 0.0275 0.0340 0.0289
(0.0523) (0.0549) (0.0349)
Security against job loss improved 0.0277 0.0222 -0.00447
(0.0352) (0.0386) (0.0195)
Security against job loss worsened 0.0577 -0.0162 0.0103
(0.0655) (0.0648) (0.0337)
Use of skills improved -0.0369 -0.0408 -0.0172
(0.0336) (0.0374) (0.0182)
Use of skills worsened -0.0469 -0.0412 0.000916
(0.0453) (0.0521) (0.0242)
Commuting improved 0.0669* 0.0588 0.0110
(0.0386) (0.0421) (0.0226)
Commuting worsened -0.00235 0.00342 0.00761
(0.0390) (0.0420) (0.0228)
Chances for promotion improved -0.0765** -0.0715** -0.0850***
(0.0321) (0.0362) (0.0189)
Chances for promotion worsened 0.199*** 0.256*** 0.163***
(0.0754) (0.0764) (0.0604)
Homeowner 0.0617* 0.0422 0.0108
(0.0334) (0.0365) (0.0200)
Number of previous individual -0.00341 0.0116 0.00156
mobility (0.0167) (0.0188) (0.00870)
Age 0.0335** 0.00784 0.00860
(0.0152) (0.0166) (0.00803)
Age2 -0.000335* -5.56e-06 -8.12e-05
(0.000202) (0.000220) (0.000105)
Education in years -0.0187*** -0.0109 -0.00485
(0.00663) (0.00733) (0.00382)
Blue-collar to white-collar transition 0.000722 -0.0233 0.0265
(0.0645) (0.0704) (0.0411)
Male -0.00425 -0.0250 -0.0112
(0.0337) (0.0378) (0.0183)
Partner 0.0154 0.0128 0.0226
(0.0400) (0.0437) (0.0262)
Firm more than 2,000 workers 0.0423 0.0515 -0.0135
(0.0442) (0.0475) (0.0224)
Previous firm more than 2,000 workers -0.0185 0.00117 0.0634*
(0.0461) (0.0523) (0.0355)
Regional mobility -0.0683 -0.117 0.00173
(0.0641) (0.0713) (0.0425)
Growth in unemployment rate 0.0187 0.00228 -0.00481
(0.0190) (0.0218) (0.0107)
Number of observations 800
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.054 0.145
Predicted Pr(y = 1 |x¯) 0.226 0.309 0.066
Marginal effects at x¯ are presented.
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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In order to check the robustness of the results displayed in Table 4.3, I conducted pro-
bit estimation using the full sample of subjective comparisons between the current and
previous jobs and the factors discussed in section 4.3.4. Consideration of all subjective
comparison measures in the data (with exception of the subjective change in wages) con-
firms the estimated effects for strain. Table 4.4 shows that workers who change to a job
with a better level of strain compared to the previous job are significantly more likely to
accept wage cuts, where the estimated coefficients are larger in size compared to the ones
presented in Table 4.3. Although most of the effects for the objective wage cut are robust
to the effects presented in Table 4.3, the estimated coefficients for security against job loss
are non-robust in the specification for the perceived wage cut. A similarity to the results
shown in Table 4.3 is that most effects are statistically insignificant. This also holds for
the effects of the subjective comparison of the job in general. More fringe benefits in
the current job compared to the previous one significantly decrease the probability that
workers suffer wage cuts. Note that, however, fringe benefits can also be included in the
monthly payments, and thus, might be interpreted as monetary job-specific amenities.
Workers who change to less fringe benefits perceive significant wage losses. This might be
explained by habit-persistence, where workers get used to different amenities and react
with strong negative perceptions in case amenities disappear.
Before turning the focus on the absolute and relative wage change, the six factors
obtained via factor analysis described above are applied to check the robustness of the
results. Table 4.5 shows that a better match quality significantly reduces the probability
of the acceptance of earnings losses in all specifications. This might be explained by
economic literature where the match quality is a main factor of wage determination. A
worsening in job amenities is not suggested to be compensated for by higher wages. In
fact, the reverse is true because individuals are significantly more likely to suffer lower
wages at the new employer compared to the previous one. An interesting result is that the
factors ’working conditions’ and ’improved job amenities’ significantly affect the subjec-
tive perception of wage cuts while insignificantly affecting the probability of an objective
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wage cut. The size of the coefficients, however, is comparable across specifications. It
seems plausible that workers with improved job amenities are significantly less likely to
perceive worsenings in wages because of general satisfaction with the job which also might
result in more satisfaction with wages. Remember that it is not straightforward to inter-
pret the factor score for working conditions because it includes subjective worsenings and
improvements of strain and work time regulations. For this reason, I omit interpretation
of this factor.
In sum, Tables 4.3 to 4.5 reveal that workers accept lower wages for improved strain.
The remaining coefficients are, to the largest extent, imprecisely measured or are not
consistent with the hypothesis of trade-off reasoning in mobility decisions. Promotion
opportunities are shown to have a robust and highly significant effect on the probabil-
ity of mobility to lower wages. The estimates, however, reveal no evidence in favor of
trade-off reasoning as hypothesized above. The results, furthermore, contradict the ones
presented in Pfeifer and Schneck (2010), which might be reasoned by different definitions
of the measures for future career prospects. The authors use an objective measure for the
change in promotion opportunities, whereas this study applies a subjective measure which
depends on individual perceptions. Evidence on the basis of the factor scores (which po-
tentially hide the mechanisms on the less aggregated level) do not support the hypothesis
of trade-off reasoning between wages and job amenities in mobility decisions as well. In
fact, the coefficients for this particular factor score are estimated to be negative, which
suggests that a worker who changes to a new job with better amenities compared to the
previous one is less likely to accept wage cuts.
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Table 4.4
Probit model on whether workers accepted a wage cut (all subjective comparisons included)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables mobility to mobility to subjective worsening
lower wages lower wagesreal of wages
Strain improved 0.0702* 0.0991** 0.0733***
(0.0375) (0.0405) (0.0240)
Strain worsened -0.0312 -0.0624 0.0132
(0.0423) (0.0466) (0.0262)
Work time improved -0.0102 -0.0514 0.0341
(0.0365) (0.0398) (0.0210)
Work time worsened 0.0251 0.0252 0.00716
(0.0534) (0.0563) (0.0267)
Security against job loss improved 0.0489 0.0455 0.0138
(0.0377) (0.0409) (0.0186)
Security against job loss worsened 0.0535 -0.0398 -0.0281
(0.0701) (0.0671) (0.0202)
Use of skills improved -0.0233 -0.0341 -0.0120
(0.0357) (0.0393) (0.0172)
Use of skills worsened -0.0476 -0.0419 0.00150
(0.0455) (0.0521) (0.0228)
Commuting improved 0.0659* 0.0563 0.0101
(0.0385) (0.0422) (0.0200)
Commuting worsened -0.00415 0.00282 0.0128
(0.0389) (0.0420) (0.0212)
Chances for promotion improved -0.0700** -0.0658* -0.0751***
(0.0327) (0.0369) (0.0174)
Chances for promotion worsened 0.199** 0.254*** 0.141**
(0.0775) (0.0777) (0.0582)
Fringe benefits improved -0.0591* -0.0688* -0.0402**
(0.0354) (0.0402) (0.0169)
Fringe benefits worsened -0.000826 0.0490 0.156***
(0.0546) (0.0624) (0.0530)
Job in general improved -0.0322 -0.0142 -0.0202
(0.0354) (0.0388) (0.0178)
Job in general worsened 0.0209 0.0165 -0.00512
(0.0872) (0.0945) (0.0349)
Additional control variables yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.3)
Number of observations 800
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.059 0.194
Predicted Pr(y = 1 |x¯) 0.225 0.308 0.056
Marginal effects at x¯ are presented.
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All specifications are satisfactory by consideration of the link test because yˆ2 is insignificant in all test equations.
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Table 4.5
Probit model on whether workers accepted a wage cut (factors included)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables mobility to mobility to subjective worsening
lower wages lower wagesreal of wages
Factor score 1 -0.0180 -0.0198 -0.0165*
(working conditions) (0.0149) (0.0168) (0.00978)
Factor score 2 -0.0121 -0.0211 -0.0171**
(job amenities improved) (0.0155) (0.0177) (0.00865)
Factor score 3 -0.0312** -0.0288* -0.0204**
(match improved) (0.0158) (0.0171) (0.00940)
Factor score 4 -0.0262* -0.0194 -0.0102
(commuting) (0.0149) (0.0165) (0.00900)
Factor score 5 0.00930 0.0141 0.0113
(match worsened) (0.0152) (0.0170) (0.00782)
Factor score 6 0.0491*** 0.0470*** 0.0444***
(job amenities worsened) (0.0142) (0.0165) (0.00767)
Additional control variables yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.3)
Number of observations 800
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.038 0.127
Predicted Pr(y = 1 |x¯) 0.229 0.312 0.072
Marginal effects at x¯ are presented.
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Specifications (1) and (3) are satisfactory because yˆ2 is insignificant in the link test equations. The
link test associates a p-value of 0.052 to the coefficient of yˆ2 in specification (2).
As the probit model does not tell us something about the magnitude of a possible vol-
untary earnings loss, I conducted OLS estimation. Similar to the probit approaches,
different dependent variables are applied in order to quantify the willingness to pay for
amenities. Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 4.6 explain the relative (real) wage change,
whereas specifications (3) and (4) refer to the absolute (real) wage change in Euros. The
effects of the subjective comparisons in the first specification are measured somewhat
imprecisely. With the exception of an improvement in commuting, none of the remain-
ing subjective variables are significant at the 10% level. Examination of Tables 4.3 and
4.6 shows that some results obtained in the probit model on the objective wage cut are
consistent. Precisely, Table 4.3 shows that workers who change to a job with subjectively
better strain are, on average, more likely to accept a wage cut, and Table 4.6 reveals that
workers, on average, pay for better strain by about 1.50% of the hourly wage or by about
45 to 51 Cents when changing jobs. This effect, however, is not statistically significant in
the OLS regression because the standard errors are quite sizeable. Note that comparison
of Tables 4.3 and 4.6 also averts to some inconsistencies. An example is the worsening in
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strain. Although workers are shown to be, on average, less likely to pay for worse strain
by objective wage cuts (see specifications (1) and (2) in Table 4.3), OLS estimation sug-
gests that workers, on average, suffer wage cuts when changing to a job with worse strain.
The only statistically significant effect for the (real) relative wage change in Table 4.6 is
estimated for subjective improvements in commuting. The negative sign is in line with
the results obtained in the probit model where an improvement in commuting increases
the probability for the acceptance of a wage cut. The OLS estimates suggest that better
length of commuting to and from work is paid for by, on average, about 5% lower wages
compared to the previous job. Trade-off reasoning in the decision to accept earnings
losses and improvements in commuting is thus evident. Compensating wage differentials
might be indicated by the positive effects of a worsening in security against a job loss
and a worsening in work time. In other words, workers are compensated for disamenities
such as less job security and less flexible work schedules by higher wages. Note, how-
ever, that both effects are statistically insignificant but economically sizable. Some of
the effects of the subjective comparisons contradict each other when comparing absolute
and the relative wage changes. For example, more flexible work schedules are suggested
to be paid for by a wage cut when looking at the relative wage change, whereas a wage
markup is indicated for the absolute wage change. Analogously, the problem arises for
the coefficients for more security against job loss and a worsening in commuting which
are imprecisely measured by consideration of the corresponding standard errors.
Table 4.6 also refers to the absolute wage change of voluntarily mobile individuals in
Euros. The effect of the match indicator is significant (see specifications (3) and (4)),
whereas an improvement as well as a worsening of the match have a positive effect on
the wage by consideration of the (real) absolute wage change as dependent variable. The
positive coefficient for an improvement in the match quality can be explained by economic
theory, where an improvement in the match quality leads to an increase in wages. The
positive effect of a worsening might be reasoned in mobility from a multi-task job to a
highly specialized job where workers perceive less use of their skills. Specialists, however,
are to the largest extent paid for application of specific knowledge although specialists
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could also make use of a several different skills. Specification (4), moreover, shows that
workers pay for less career advancement opportunities by a significant lower wage of more
than one Euro. This effect is statistically insignificant in case of non-deflated wages but
economically significant when considering hourly wage changes. The control variables in
Table 4.6 reveal that homeowners are more likely to change to lower wages compared to
renters. Precisely, homeowners, ceteris paribus, accept an average wage cut of at least
4.20% or a minimum of 63 Cents when compared to renters. The growth in unemployment
does not significantly affect the wage change.16
It might be argued that outliers affect the results presented in Table 4.6. For this
reason, I excluded wage changes above the 90% percentile and below the 10% percentile.
The exact values for the cutoff of the relative wage change are shown in Table 4.1.17 The
results for the trimmed sample are presented in Table 4.7. Note that the specifications
differ in the number of individuals. Application of the trimmed sample reveals that the
only non-robust coefficient across specifications is the dummy variable for improved strain
because specification (3) suggests a positive effect, whereas the other specifications reveal
a negative impact while the remaining coefficients have the same sign for either (real)
relative wage changes as well as (real) absolute wage changes.
16Note that regression with annual dummies basically confirms the results shown in Table 4.6 in terms
of significance and sign.
17Descriptive statistics for the (real) absolute wage change are presented in this footnote. On average,
workers gain about 1.41 to 1.54 Euro when changing jobs voluntarily.
Descriptive statistics for absolute wage change
Variable 10% Percentile Mean 90% Percentile Observations
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 -1.7827 1.5411 5.4003 800
(4.5613)
wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1 -2.2389 1.4123 5.5858 800
(4.8488)
Standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 4.6
OLS estimation results for wage change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables wijtwi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt −wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt −wreali,j−1,t−1
Strain improved -0.0149 -0.0152 -0.446 -0.506
(0.0250) (0.0246) (0.328) (0.350)
Strain worsened -0.00483 -0.00597 -0.264 -0.343
(0.0361) (0.0353) (0.518) (0.547)
Work time improved -0.0196 -0.0182 0.219 0.251
(0.0255) (0.0250) (0.350) (0.370)
Work time worsened 0.0264 0.0269 0.740 0.851
(0.0461) (0.0450) (0.541) (0.583)
Security against job loss improved 0.0144 0.0141 -0.125 -0.133
(0.0246) (0.0242) (0.311) (0.329)
Security against job loss worsened 0.0666 0.0661 0.643 0.698
(0.0522) (0.0514) (0.628) (0.666)
Use of skills improved 0.0403 0.0393 0.700* 0.759*
(0.0268) (0.0263) (0.374) (0.396)
Use of skills worsened 0.0331 0.0327 0.687* 0.728*
(0.0330) (0.0325) (0.401) (0.420)
Commuting improved -0.0509* -0.0497* -0.832* -0.846*
(0.0278) (0.0273) (0.445) (0.468)
Commuting worsened 0.00482 0.00486 -0.0664 -0.0556
(0.0342) (0.0336) (0.423) (0.457)
Chances for promotion improved 0.00804 0.00792 0.256 0.215
(0.0264) (0.0259) (0.385) (0.406)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0712 -0.0703 -1.015 -1.121*
(0.0517) (0.0510) (0.618) (0.658)
Homeowner -0.0435* -0.0420* -0.635* -0.709*
(0.0223) (0.0219) (0.366) (0.384)
Number of previous individual -0.0188* -0.0187* -0.0781 -0.0951
mobility (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.164) (0.172)
Age -0.0185 -0.0179 -0.102 -0.102
(0.0133) (0.0130) (0.173) (0.181)
Age2 0.000187 0.000179 0.000967 0.000887
(0.000172) (0.000169) (0.00246) (0.00256)
Education in years 0.00837 0.00819 0.256*** 0.258***
(0.00510) (0.00501) (0.0703) (0.0732)
Blue-collar to white-collar transition -0.0315 -0.0299 -0.424 -0.368
(0.0371) (0.0365) (0.422) (0.447)
Male 0.00480 0.00486 0.357 0.344
(0.0312) (0.0306) (0.339) (0.368)
Partner -0.000611 -0.000110 0.00415 0.0191
(0.0385) (0.0377) (0.406) (0.440)
Firm more than 2,000 workers -0.00558 -0.00549 -0.0766 -0.133
(0.0313) (0.0309) (0.553) (0.578)
Previous firm more than 2,000 workers -0.00363 -0.00384 -0.271 -0.362
(0.0415) (0.0410) (0.599) (0.637)
Regional mobility 0.0934 0.0923 0.397 0.415
(0.0755) (0.0740) (0.852) (0.896)
Growth in unemployment rate -0.0120 -0.0113 -0.244 -0.219
(0.0144) (0.0141) (0.189) (0.196)
Constant 1.493*** 1.466*** 0.612 0.652
(0.245) (0.240) (2.802) (2.948)
R2 0.0500 0.0500 0.0582 0.0561
Number of observations 800
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.7
OLS estimation results for wage change (trimmed sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables wijtwi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt −wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt −wreali,j−1,t−1
Strain improved -0.00513 -0.00761 0.00541 -0.0444
(0.0125) (0.0123) (0.146) (0.157)
Strain worsened 0.00907 0.0125 0.128 0.153
(0.0154) (0.0155) (0.175) (0.189)
Work time improved 0.0191 0.0182 0.000151 0.129
(0.0122) (0.0121) (0.148) (0.157)
Work time worsened -0.00588 -0.00761 -0.180 -0.0929
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.190) (0.201)
Security against job loss improved 0.00857 0.00689 0.158 0.125
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.143) (0.152)
Security against job loss worsened 0.0183 0.0165 0.545* 0.447
(0.0254) (0.0249) (0.288) (0.312)
Use of skills improved 0.0311*** 0.0276** 0.350** 0.348**
(0.0118) (0.0116) (0.139) (0.150)
Use of skills worsened 0.0131 0.0126 0.0729 0.0742
(0.0175) (0.0173) (0.200) (0.215)
Commuting improved -0.0346** -0.0313** -0.325** -0.335*
(0.0140) (0.0138) (0.160) (0.171)
Commuting worsened -0.0188 -0.0167 -0.248 -0.218
(0.0138) (0.0136) (0.159) (0.172)
Chances for promotion improved 0.0151 0.0174 0.164 0.0989
(0.0123) (0.0120) (0.145) (0.155)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0559** -0.0565** -0.656** -0.757**
(0.0225) (0.0221) (0.301) (0.321)
Homeowner -0.00716 -0.00556 -0.0933 -0.0557
(0.0118) (0.0117) (0.135) (0.149)
Number of previous individual -0.000903 0.000695 0.0191 0.000632
mobility (0.00546) (0.00531) (0.0728) (0.0777)
Age -0.00699 -0.00731 -0.0390 -0.0432
(0.00549) (0.00544) (0.0646) (0.0690)
Age2 7.53e-05 8.18e-05 0.000419 0.000433
(7.44e-05) (7.37e-05) (0.000889) (0.000951)
Education in years 0.000542 0.000791 0.0384 0.0291
(0.00244) (0.00241) (0.0293) (0.0315)
Blue-collar to white-collar transition 0.00784 0.00995 0.229 0.302
(0.0226) (0.0221) (0.263) (0.285)
Male 0.0171 0.0164 0.345*** 0.410***
(0.0115) (0.0113) (0.129) (0.139)
Partner -0.00364 -0.00194 -0.0348 -0.0345
(0.0136) (0.0135) (0.156) (0.167)
Firm more than 2,000 workers 0.0113 0.00710 0.267 0.278
(0.0164) (0.0160) (0.199) (0.218)
Previous firm more than 2,000 workers 0.00189 0.00200 -0.00536 0.0363
(0.0171) (0.0168) (0.200) (0.219)
Regional mobility 0.0435 0.0431 1.109*** 1.135***
(0.0293) (0.0293) (0.370) (0.386)
Growth in unemployment rate -0.00605 -0.00550 -0.0649 -0.0304
(0.00676) (0.00674) (0.0810) (0.0867)
Constant 1.235*** 1.215*** 1.308 1.387
(0.0959) (0.0950) (1.114) (1.178)
R2 0.0606 0.0562 0.0848 0.0766
Number of observations 640
Individuals 544 545 551 550
Robust standard errors clustered for individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Consideration of the robustness across the different samples reveals that some coefficients
are non-robust because the effects in Table 4.7 have the opposite sign compared to the
ones presented in Table 4.6. An example is the worsening in strain, where the estimated
coefficient in Table 4.7 reveals a negative effect, whereas workers are, on average, com-
pensated for an increase in this disamenity by higher wages in Table 4.6. Analogous
argumentation holds for less flexible work schedules. In brief, trimming the sample has
considerable consequences for some of the coefficients when compared to application of
the full sample. Some effects, however, remain robust when trimming the sample. Tables
4.6 and 4.7 reveal a compensating wage differential for a worsening in perceived job secu-
rity. In other words, workers get a wage markup in exchange for lower security against a
job loss. This effect is robust, however, it is insignificant in most of the specifications. I
also found that better application of individual skills in the current job compared to the
previous one increases wages significantly. Workers changing to jobs with better promo-
tion opportunities in the current job compared to the last one are suggested to earn, on
average, (insignificantly) higher wages, whereas workers who change to jobs with fewer
career prospects, in turn, suffer sizable wage cuts. A possible interpretation is that mobile
individuals who accept fewer future career prospects in the new job are double losers who
suffer not only lower wages but also fewer career prospects in the new job compared to
the last one.
Next, I checked the robustness of the results presented in Table 4.6 by consideration
of all subjective comparisons between the current and the previous jobs as well as by
consideration of the six factor scores. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present the corresponding re-
sults. Table 4.8 shows that the (real) relative wage change is significantly affected by
improvements in commuting and better fringe benefits. The coefficient of improved com-
muting is significantly negative as in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 and, thus, is highly robust across
different specifications. Interpretation of this effect is in line with trade-off reasoning
where individuals pay for better commuting by lower wages. The effects are comparable
in size to the ones obtained in Table 4.6 and somewhat larger than for the ones pre-
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sented in Table 4.7. An improvement in fringe benefits increases wages by about 4.8%
to 4.9%. Specification (4) in Table 4.8 reveals a statistically significant compensating
wage differential for less flexible work time in the current job compared to the last one
because worse work schedules increase wages by about 96 Cents. The match indicator is
statistically significant and positive as in Table 4.6 whereas specialization might provide
an interpretation for this result.
Table 4.8
OLS estimation results for wage change (all subjective comparisons included)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables wijtwi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt −wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt −wreali,j−1,t−1
Strain improved -0.0168 -0.0171 -0.489 -0.550
(0.0247) (0.0243) (0.327) (0.348)
Strain worsened -0.00287 -0.00399 -0.241 -0.318
(0.0366) (0.0358) (0.522) (0.552)
Work time improved -0.0311 -0.0294 0.115 0.137
(0.0248) (0.0244) (0.371) (0.389)
Work time worsened 0.0312 0.0318 0.846 0.960*
(0.0471) (0.0461) (0.539) (0.580)
Security against job loss improved -0.000429 -0.000471 -0.240 -0.261
(0.0265) (0.0260) (0.356) (0.380)
Security against job loss worsened 0.0771 0.0770 0.837 0.899
(0.0619) (0.0609) (0.665) (0.711)
Use of skills improved 0.0434 0.0425 0.657* 0.722*
(0.0271) (0.0267) (0.373) (0.393)
Use of skills worsened 0.0376 0.0371 0.745* 0.791*
(0.0334) (0.0328) (0.417) (0.434)
Commuting improved -0.0485* -0.0473* -0.805* -0.816*
(0.0278) (0.0273) (0.452) (0.475)
Commuting worsened 0.00634 0.00632 -0.0632 -0.0504
(0.0348) (0.0342) (0.427) (0.462)
Chances for promotion improved 0.00590 0.00588 0.220 0.178
(0.0264) (0.0259) (0.384) (0.406)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0682 -0.0671 -0.913 -1.017
(0.0552) (0.0544) (0.622) (0.665)
Fringe benefits improved 0.0494* 0.0484* 0.383 0.428
(0.0266) (0.0262) (0.400) (0.423)
Fringe benefits worsened -0.0147 -0.0158 -0.431 -0.435
(0.0582) (0.0568) (0.562) (0.608)
Job in general improved -0.0122 -0.0124 0.0573 0.0381
(0.0272) (0.0268) (0.365) (0.384)
Job in general worsened -0.0342 -0.0336 -0.511 -0.546
(0.0750) (0.0740) (0.767) (0.807)
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.6)
R2 0.0542 0.0542 0.0608 0.0587
Number of observations 800
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Before turning the focus to the effect of the factor scores, I calculated the wage change
based on the logarithm of the hourly net wage in Euros in order to compare the results to
the ones obtained in Villanueva (2007). It is important to note that the net wage is not
directly bargained between employer and employee because it depends, among a variety
of aspects, on marital status or confession. I exclusively concentrate on observations
which are already included into the above analysis, and because of missing values on
the net wages this sample contains fewer observations. It is also important to note that
Villanueva (2007) examines a different time horizon (from 1984 to 2001) and that both
studies consider a somewhat different set of control variables. The results, however,
can be compared with each other because of the concentration on the effects of the same
subjective comparison variables between jobs on the wage change of voluntary mobility in
Germany. Specification (1) and (2) in Table 4.9 contradict Villanueva (2007) in subjective
improvements as well as worsenings in strain because the signs are reversed in both
studies. After trimming the sample at the 10% and 90% percentile (see specifications (3)
and (4)), the effect of an improvement in strain is similar in both studies, whereas the
effect of worsenings in strain remain contradictory. The highly significant and positive
coefficient for less use of skills after mobility in Villanueva (2007) cannot be confirmed
in this paper. Comparison of the effects presented in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 in this chapter
reveals that most effects advert to similar directions of the effects. Note, again, that most
of the estimated coefficients are insignificant. The most important inconsistency can can
be found in the coefficients for an improvement in strain because Table 4.8 adverts to
trade-off reasoning while Table 4.9 reveals a positive effect in specifications (1) and (2).
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Table 4.9
OLS estimation results for wage change (alternative dependent variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables log(wnetijt )− log(wnet,realijt )− log(wnetijt )− log(wnet,realijt )−
log(wneti,j−1,t−1) log(w
net,real
i,j−1,t−1) log(wneti,j−1,t−1) log(w
net,real
i,j−1,t−1)
(trimmed) (trimmed)
Strain improved 0.00299 0.00237 -0.0235** -0.0236**
(0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0111) (0.0110)
Strain worsened -0.0163 -0.0169 -0.0115 -0.0133
(0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0132) (0.0133)
Work time improved -0.00621 -0.00550 0.0152 0.0120
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0111) (0.0111)
Work time worsened 0.0636* 0.0640* -0.00214 0.000990
(0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0147) (0.0151)
Security against job loss improved -0.0320 -0.0319 -0.00885 -0.00718
(0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0109) (0.0108)
Security against job loss worsened 0.0153 0.0154 0.0276 0.0234
(0.0347) (0.0346) (0.0213) (0.0211)
Use of skills improved 0.0212 0.0211 0.0182 0.0170
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Use of skills worsened 0.0133 0.0138 -0.00904 -0.00931
(0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0150) (0.0151)
Commuting improved -0.0554** -0.0547** -0.0197* -0.0162
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0116) (0.0116)
Commuting worsened -0.0251 -0.0248 -0.00790 -0.00603
(0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0117) (0.0117)
Chances for promotion improved 0.00492 0.00463 0.00766 0.00506
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.00989) (0.00989)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0601 -0.0602 0.000610 -0.00606
(0.0430) (0.0429) (0.0232) (0.0228)
Fringe benefits improved 0.0373* 0.0369* 0.0220* 0.0212*
(0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Fringe benefits worsened -0.0471 -0.0473 -0.0291* -0.0340**
(0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0155) (0.0155)
Job in general improved -0.00808 -0.00829 0.00351 0.00552
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0101) (0.0102)
Job in general worsened -0.00383 -0.00402 -0.0205 -0.0177
(0.0492) (0.0491) (0.0218) (0.0218)
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.6)
R2 0.074 0.0733 0.0940 0.090
Number of observations 755 755 605 605
Robust standard errors clustered for individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.10 presents the results wherein the factor scores instead of dummy variables
for subjective worsenings and improvements in job characteristics are considered. An
improvement in the match quality increases wages by about 1.5%, and this effect is
statistically insignificant. Specifications (3) and (4) reveal that an improvement in the
match quality contributes to a statistically significant increase in wages of about 30
Cents. Commuting exhibits a significant impact on wages throughout all specifications.
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As discussed above, improvements in commuting lead to a reduction of the corresponding
factor score. For this reason, better commuting decreases wages, whereas subjectively
more commuting expenditures are compensated for by higher wages. Table 4.5 suggests
that less job amenities are more likely to be accompanied by wage cuts. This pattern
is generally confirmed in Table 4.10 where the corresponding coefficient is negative but,
however, it tends to be of small economic importance.
Table 4.10
OLS estimation results for wage change (factors included)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables wijtwi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt −wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt −wreali,j−1,t−1
Factor score 1 0.0155 0.0149 0.175 0.187
(working conditions) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.157) (0.165)
Factor score 2 0.00322 0.00330 0.00497 0.00203
(job amenities improved) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.144) (0.154)
Factor score 3 0.0150 0.0146 0.296* 0.304
(match improved) (0.0147) (0.0144) (0.178) (0.192)
Factor score 4 0.0275* 0.0269* 0.358** 0.370**
(commuting) (0.0141) (0.0138) (0.175) (0.188)
Factor score 5 -2.35e-05 0.000165 0.0113 0.00915
(match worsened) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.138) (0.145)
Factor score 6 -0.00717 -0.00702 -0.136 -0.136
(job amenities worsened) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.167) (0.178)
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.6)
R2 0.0439 0.0439 0.0485 0.0456
Number of observations 800
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Further robustness checks are summarized in Table A4.4 in the appendix. The table
presents OLS estimation results for different subsamples, taking into consideration the
variables strain, work time, security against job loss, commuting, promotion chances,
and the match indicator. The robustness checks divide the sample by homeowners and
renters, by age (below and above median age), and by different phases of the business
cycle (growth of unemployment smaller or larger than zero). The dummy variable for
homeowners in Table 4.6 suggests that homeowners are significantly worse off when com-
pared to renters with identical characteristics. Estimation by homeowner and renter
reveals that owners pay for improvements in commuting by an average of more than 9%
lower wages while renters only accept wage cuts of, on average, about 3% when changing
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jobs voluntarily. Although both coefficients are economically significant, only the effect
for homeowners is statistically significant (at the 5% level). The results also suggest that
renters are willing to pay for improvements in strain (partly significant) and for better
work time regulations (insignificant) compared to homeowners, who sacrifice large wage
gains for such improvements. When focusing on different phases of the business cycle, the
main result is that mobility during downturns (∆u > 0) is characterized by significant
wage gains if an improvement in the use of skills can be achieved. The relative wage
gain of better application of skills amounts to an average of more than 11%, whereas
the average absolute wage gain is 1.56 to 1.71 Euros for better use of individual skills.
The coefficient for worsenings in promotion opportunities is estimated to be significantly
negative during upswings (∆u ≤ 0). A possible interpretation might be that mobility to
worse future career prospects during booms signals low own career ambitions, where em-
ployers impose a penalty for this type of signal. A very interesting result can be obtained
when the sample is divided into workers who are at least 34 years old and workers who
are younger than the median age. In particular, young workers obtain an economically as
well as statistically significant compensating wage differential for less job security against
a job loss, whereas older workers, on average, even suffer wage cuts when being mobile
voluntarily to less secure jobs. Investigation of the standard errors of less job security
for workers above 34 years of age, however, reveals that this coefficient is imprecisely
measured.
In Table A4.5, I compared the results obtained for different time horizons (1998-2004
and 1999-2003). An improvement in strain is paid for by wage cuts in specifications
(1) and (2) by consideration of the time horizon from 1998 to 2004 while a positive
coefficient is estimated for the period from 1999 to 2003. Similar results are obtained for
an improvement in perceived security against job loss. Specifications (3) and (4) are also
sensitive to different time horizons (see work time improved and use of skills improved).
An investigation of Table A4.5 reveals evidence that poolability over time is problematic.
Finally, I conducted tobit (corner solution) estimation in order to explain the willing-
ness to pay for improvements in job-specific amenities, given the probability that the
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individual changes to lower wages. As a consequence, interpretation of the marginal ef-
fects in Table 4.11 is based on the condition that workers changed jobs voluntarily to
lower wages. The table reveals that workers significantly pay for improvements in strain.
The corresponding marginal effects suggest that workers with wage cuts pay for better
workload by an average of about 1.2% or 29 to 32 Cent, respectively. For worse strain,
a statistically insignificant as well as economically small moderating effect on wage cuts
is estimated. As above, the tobit model confirms positive effects for both indicators of
the match quality. The effects of promotion opportunities are also robust to the results
in the OLS regressions. Better promotion opportunities mitigate wage cuts while worse
career prospects in the new job compared to the previous one increase wage cuts. It is
also confirmed that workers seem to pay for less commuting expenses by earnings losses.
One can find only few inconsistencies or non-robust coefficients when utilizing the full
specification (see Table A4.6). The effects of a worsening in work time in specifications
(1) and (2) as well as the coefficient for worse commuting expenses in specification (2)
are non-robust compared to the results shown in Table 4.11. Note, however, that these
effects are statistically insignificant and of small economic importance in both tables.
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Table 4.11
Tobit regression results for wage cut, given that individuals change to lower wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables wijtwi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
Strain improved -0.0119* -0.0126** -0.289* -0.321**
(0.00639) (0.00566) (0.153) (0.143)
Strain worsened 0.00249 0.00400 0.0223 0.0589
(0.00739) (0.00681) (0.207) (0.204)
Work time improved 0.00379 0.00683 0.194 0.282*
(0.00605) (0.00546) (0.157) (0.155)
Work time worsened -0.000116 -0.000629 0.0593 0.0518
(0.00780) (0.00676) (0.195) (0.178)
Security against job loss improved -0.00662 -0.00611 -0.112 -0.102
(0.00576) (0.00524) (0.137) (0.131)
Security against job loss worsened -0.00143 0.00532 -0.0282 0.154
(0.00857) (0.00773) (0.212) (0.203)
Use of skills improved 0.00799 0.00753 0.283* 0.284*
(0.00571) (0.00519) (0.155) (0.146)
Use of skills worsened 0.0125* 0.0115* 0.332** 0.332**
(0.00691) (0.00617) (0.166) (0.152)
Commuting improved -0.0118* -0.00982* -0.305 -0.265
(0.00635) (0.00569) (0.195) (0.182)
Commuting worsened 0.000928 -3.97e-05 0.00465 -0.0211
(0.00621) (0.00557) (0.157) (0.148)
Chances for promotion improved 0.0114** 0.00982* 0.180 0.144
(0.00559) (0.00513) (0.146) (0.141)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0303*** -0.0315*** -0.706** -0.762***
(0.0116) (0.0111) (0.283) (0.274)
Homeowner -0.00973* -0.00678 -0.324** -0.260*
(0.00545) (0.00500) (0.161) (0.150)
Number of previous individual -0.00110 -0.00209 -0.0142 -0.0460
mobility (0.00282) (0.00265) (0.0714) (0.0685)
Age -0.00428* -0.00140 -0.115** -0.0416
(0.00256) (0.00227) (0.0581) (0.0521)
Age2 3.83e-05 3.61e-06 0.00107 0.000183
(3.43e-05) (3.06e-05) (0.000762) (0.000703)
Education in years 0.00352*** 0.00237** 0.0628** 0.0362
(0.00112) (0.000992) (0.0274) (0.0254)
Blue-collar to white-collar transition -0.00271 -0.00134 0.0367 0.0896
(0.0115) (0.0109) (0.246) (0.236)
Male -3.39e-05 0.00199 -0.0396 0.00864
(0.00531) (0.00484) (0.132) (0.126)
Partner -0.000874 -0.000211 -0.00978 0.00527
(0.00638) (0.00568) (0.153) (0.143)
Firm more than 2,000 workers -0.00564 -0.00545 -0.199 -0.201
(0.00744) (0.00672) (0.237) (0.228)
Previous firm more than 2,000 workers -0.00333 -0.00537 -0.151 -0.228
(0.00873) (0.00790) (0.259) (0.251)
Regional mobility -0.00281 0.000558 0.00295 0.105
(0.0158) (0.0151) (0.362) (0.357)
Growth in unemployment rate -0.00326 -0.00134 -0.0776 -0.0324
(0.00317) (0.00284) (0.0774) (0.0717)
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.130 0.0332 0.0247
Number of observations 800
Uncensored observations 195 254 195 254
Censored observations 605 546 605 546
Marginal effects after tobit regression.
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.12
Tobit regression results for wage cut, given that individuals change to lower wages (factor scores)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables wijtwi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
Factor score 1 0.00352 0.00297 0.0575 0.0478
(working conditions) (0.00242) (0.00225) (0.0569) (0.0555)
Factor score 2 4.03e-05 0.000575 0.0272 0.0446
(job amenities improved) (0.00249) (0.00237) (0.0592) (0.0589)
Factor score 3 0.00512* 0.00425* 0.151** 0.132*
(match improved) (0.00267) (0.00238) (0.0752) (0.0690)
Factor score 4 0.00533** 0.00402* 0.121* 0.0905
(commuting) (0.00251) (0.00230) (0.0716) (0.0668)
Factor score 5 -0.000386 -0.000560 -0.0128 -0.0138
(match worsened) (0.00236) (0.00217) (0.0540) (0.0514)
Factor score 6 -0.00662*** -0.00551*** -0.129** -0.102**
(job amenities worsened) (0.00215) (0.00206) (0.0507) (0.0509)
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.11)
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.094 0.027 0.017
Number of observations 800
Uncensored observations 195 254 195 254
Censored observations 605 546 605 546
Marginal effects after tobit regression.
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.12 presents the results for the tobit model when considering the factor scores.
Workers changing to lower wages, on average, pay for less commuting expenses by lower
wages. The factor score, however, reveals an economically small effect because, on aver-
age, less than 1% or an average maximum of 12 Cent are paid for the improvement in
commuting. This effect is considerably smaller compared to the one presented in Table
4.10 but reveals robustness of this particular coefficient. A further similarity to the re-
sults in the OLS regressions is the moderating effect on wage cuts if the match quality
in the current job is better than in the previous job. A worsening in job amenities is
significantly paid for by lower wages. This result is highly robust when compared to
Table 4.10. Albeit highly statistically significant, the effect is of small economic signifi-
cance. It might be argued that workers changing to worse job amenities are changing to
some sort of low-pay sector with dead-end jobs, low job stability (or low job security),
and low (or inexistent) fringe benefits. This result is also consistent with the ”segmented
labor market” in Villanueva (2007), where wage penalties are attached to job-specific
disamenities.
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An analysis for different subgroups is displayed in Table A4.7. The tobit approach re-
veals a much smaller negative impact of commuting on the acceptance of wage cuts, given
that the individual changes to lower wages. This general result is reflected by considera-
tion of different samples for homeowners and renters. The coefficients for less commuting
expenses in Table A4.7 are much smaller than the ones presented in Table A4.4. The
statistical significance of this particular effect, furthermore, is not given any longer for
the subgroup of homeowners, whereas the coefficient becomes statistically significant for
renters. It is, however, confirmed that renters pay for improvements in strain, while bet-
ter workload mitigates wage cuts of homeowners. Consideration of different phases of
the business cycle leads to statistical insignificance for almost all of the coefficients. The
finding of a negative effect of mobility to worse career prospects in the new job compared
to the previous one is confirmed across different phases of the business cycle. Similar to
Table A4.4, Table A4.7 reveals alleviation for worse security against a job loss for the
group of workers who are younger than the median age compared to the group of older
workers.
To sum up, trade-off reasoning, as hypothesized above, is a key feature of the acceptance
of wage cuts. Especially improved commuting is found to be paid for by lower wages.
There is also weak evidence for compensating wage differentials for worse commuting
to and from the workplace. This implies that the expenses for changes in commuting
and changes in wages are positively correlated, whereas workers with higher commuting
expenses compared to the ones in the previous job are paid for this disamenity, while
workers with lower commuting expenses accept wage cuts when changing jobs. There is
also some evidence in favor for individual trade-off reasoning between wages and improved
strain. I am, however, not able to find distinct support for the hypothesis that workers
trade off improvements in work time arrangements, better security against job loss, and
the acceptance of lower wages. There is weak (mostly statistically insignificant) evidence
in favor of compensating wage differentials for less security against a job loss. In addition,
the hypothesis that workers pay for better career prospects by wage cuts cannot be
supported in this paper. In fact, the reverse is suggested because individuals are not
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compensated for worse promotion opportunities by higher wages. The findings on some of
the job-specific amenities differ when considering subjective perceptions about worsenings
in wages instead of using objective measures for wage cuts. This might be driven by
cognitive dissonance reduction where workers adjust their perceptions about the job in a
positive way to resolve cognitive dissonance introduced by mobility to lower wages.
4.5 Discussion
This chapter investigates the relationship between subjective improvements between two
jobs and voluntary mobility to lower wages. This allows to assess the impact of trade-
off reasoning in individual labor market decisions. The results suggest that job-specific
(non-wage) amenities affect the job choice. More specifically, workers are shown to volun-
tarily accept wage cuts when improvements in commuting expenses or subjectively better
strain can be achieved. Note that commuting expenses are predictable before changing
employer. In fact, economic uncertainty is almost inexistent because the new firm’s lo-
cation and the frequency of commuting is known beforehand. Because workers are sure
about the improvements in this particular job characteristic, they are even willing to
accept wage cuts. The loss of utility through decreasing wages is, thus, compensated for
by an increase in utility through improvements in job-specific amenities in the new job.
The results also have important implications for employers. Offering non-wage ameni-
ties can attract workers of competitors who pay higher wages. This implies that those
employers who offer, for example, activities to decrease job-specific strain are suggested
to attract employees of competitors despite lower wages. In addition, employers are able
to attract workers by locating companies in regions where workers have low costs of com-
muting. This also includes the time component of commuting to the workplace. It is
also suggested that the absence of compensating wage differentials can be explained by
such non-wage amenities. Since Schneck (2010) showed that transitions to permanently
lower wages are common, it might be hypothesized that workers trade off permanent
lower wages with subjective improvements in certain job-specific characteristics. This
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study shows that commuting expenses are a potential candidate for the acceptance of
downward mobility.
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4.6 Appendix
Table A4.1
Frequencies of subjective comparisons between old and new job
How would you judge your present position compared to your last one? In what ways
has it improved, stayed the same, or worsened
Variable improved stayed the same worsened
Length of commute to and from work 280 274 246
Work load (strain) 269 367 164
Work schedule regulations (work time) 349 324 127
Security against job loss 276 471 53
Chances for promotion 348 402 50
General Job type 461 306 33
Fringe benefits 280 428 92
Wages 521 203 76
Are you able to use your professional skills and abilities today more, about the same,
or less than in your previous position?
more about the same less
(improved) (stayed the same) (worsened)
Use of skills 328 370 102
Number of observations 800
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Table A4.2
Descriptive statistics of the control variables
Mean Standard Deviation
Subjective improvement in
Work load (strain) 0.3363 0.4727
Work schedule regulations (work time) 0.4363 0.4962
Security against job loss 0.3450 0.4757
Use of skills 0.4100 0.4921
Commuting 0.3500 0.4773
Chances for promotion 0.4350 0.4961
Fringe benefits 0.3500 0.4773
Job type 0.5763 0.4945
Subjective worsening in
Work load (strain) 0.2050 0.4040
Work schedule regulations (work time) 0.1588 0.3657
Security against job loss 0.0663 0.2489
Use of skills 0.1275 0.3337
Commuting 0.3075 0.4617
Chances for promotion 0.0625 0.2422
Fringe benefits 0.1150 0.3192
Job type 0.0413 0.1990
Dummy variable for homeowners 0.3063 0.4612
Number of individual quits 1.7500 0.8992
Age 35.0725 7.9551
Age2 1293.2850 593.8163
Education (in years of schooling) 12.7719 2.5192
Dummy variable for blue-collar to white-collar 0.0575 0.2329
Dummy variable for males 0.6475 0.4780
Dummy variable for partner 0.2125 0.4093
Dummy variable for workforceijt>2,000 0.1713 0.3770
Dummy variable for workforcei,j−1,t−1>2,000 0.1325 0.3392
Dummy variable for regional mobility 0.0475 0.2128
Growth in unemployment rate -0.0571 0.7854
Number of observations 800
Number of individuals 670
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Table A4.4
OLS estimation results for wage change by groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables wijt
wi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
owner renter owner renter owner renter owner renter
Strain improved 0.0136 -0.0304 0.0137 -0.0306 0.0776 -0.659* 0.0934 -0.747*
(0.0375) (0.0320) (0.0369) (0.0315) (0.679) (0.389) (0.696) (0.422)
Strain worsened 0.0623 -0.0396 0.0608 -0.0406 0.943 -0.782 0.901 -0.876
(0.0444) (0.0482) (0.0437) (0.0471) (1.186) (0.531) (1.238) (0.566)
Work time improved 0.0275 -0.0486 0.0277 -0.0466 0.581 -0.139 0.632 -0.131
(0.0345) (0.0333) (0.0340) (0.0327) (0.680) (0.400) (0.697) (0.431)
Work time worsened 0.0151 0.0313 0.0155 0.0315 1.157 0.643 1.266 0.743
(0.0528) (0.0583) (0.0522) (0.0569) (1.306) (0.588) (1.363) (0.644)
Security against job loss 0.00786 0.0201 0.00747 0.0197 0.371 -0.299 0.363 -0.311
improved (0.0357) (0.0326) (0.0353) (0.0320) (0.746) (0.355) (0.758) (0.385)
Security against job loss 0.0254 0.0821 0.0250 0.0820 0.871 0.613 0.979 0.632
worsened (0.0698) (0.0665) (0.0684) (0.0655) (1.001) (0.804) (1.032) (0.854)
Use of skills improved 0.0573* 0.0348 0.0565* 0.0337 1.631** 0.307 1.751** 0.344
(0.0306) (0.0362) (0.0301) (0.0356) (0.739) (0.429) (0.761) (0.463)
Use of skills worsened 0.0994 0.00820 0.0994 0.00762 2.123** 0.0900 2.246** 0.0954
(0.0724) (0.0374) (0.0717) (0.0367) (0.976) (0.412) (0.984) (0.442)
Commuting improved -0.0959** -0.0319 -0.0933** -0.0312 -1.399 -0.505 -1.412 -0.507
(0.0416) (0.0358) (0.0411) (0.0351) (1.078) (0.431) (1.119) (0.459)
Commuting worsened -0.0248 0.0198 -0.0235 0.0192 -0.180 0.0687 -0.193 0.105
(0.0418) (0.0487) (0.0413) (0.0478) (0.827) (0.521) (0.848) (0.579)
Chances for promotion 0.0127 0.00687 0.0116 0.00728 0.138 0.333 0.103 0.291
improved (0.0378) (0.0347) (0.0372) (0.0340) (0.820) (0.395) (0.843) (0.427)
Chances for promotion -0.121 -0.0317 -0.121 -0.0301 -2.207* -0.324 -2.347** -0.388
worsened (0.0758) (0.0700) (0.0747) (0.0690) (1.149) (0.756) (1.172) (0.821)
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.6)
Number of observations 245 555 245 555 245 555 245 555
R2 0.120 0.046 0.120 0.046 0.088 0.063 0.088 0.058
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables wijt
wi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
∆u ≤ 0 ∆u > 0 ∆u ≤ 0 ∆u > 0 ∆u ≤ 0 ∆u > 0 ∆u ≤ 0 ∆u > 0
Strain improved 0.00291 -0.0322 0.00219 -0.0318 -0.151 -0.798 -0.191 -0.894
(0.0317) (0.0404) (0.0312) (0.0398) (0.422) (0.523) (0.445) (0.576)
Strain worsened 0.0159 -0.0407 0.0149 -0.0418 0.233 -0.995 0.195 -1.121
(0.0357) (0.0640) (0.0351) (0.0623) (0.739) (0.636) (0.772) (0.691)
Work time improved -0.0101 -0.0215 -0.00904 -0.0193 0.628 -0.114 0.663 -0.0799
(0.0331) (0.0399) (0.0325) (0.0391) (0.467) (0.504) (0.489) (0.551)
Work time worsened -0.0103 0.125 -0.00883 0.124 0.583 1.564 0.656 1.754
(0.0435) (0.0981) (0.0427) (0.0956) (0.605) (1.022) (0.645) (1.116)
Security against job loss 0.00539 0.0228 0.00523 0.0219 -0.0672 -0.343 -0.0820 -0.363
improved (0.0301) (0.0474) (0.0296) (0.0464) (0.389) (0.547) (0.406) (0.597)
Security against job loss 0.0327 0.162 0.0314 0.162 0.290 1.614 0.303 1.736
worsened (0.0501) (0.150) (0.0491) (0.148) (0.774) (1.315) (0.813) (1.429)
Use of skills improved -0.00102 0.116** -0.00119 0.114** 0.237 1.558*** 0.244 1.706***
(0.0297) (0.0494) (0.0292) (0.0484) (0.489) (0.564) (0.508) (0.614)
Use of skills worsened 0.00718 0.0748 0.00706 0.0734 0.432 1.073 0.444 1.154
(0.0414) (0.0691) (0.0408) (0.0683) (0.551) (0.688) (0.573) (0.744)
Commuting improved -0.0547 -0.0379 -0.0525 -0.0379 -0.747 -0.780 -0.749 -0.796
(0.0335) (0.0470) (0.0329) (0.0461) (0.605) (0.549) (0.630) (0.596)
Commuting worsened 0.0182 0.00322 0.0188 0.00286 0.612 -0.766 0.661 -0.779
(0.0491) (0.0480) (0.0482) (0.0471) (0.572) (0.646) (0.623) (0.694)
Chances for promotion 0.00530 0.0133 0.00450 0.0140 -0.0813 0.696 -0.131 0.668
improved (0.0312) (0.0439) (0.0307) (0.0430) (0.548) (0.537) (0.569) (0.579)
Chances for promotion -0.123** -0.0285 -0.122** -0.0277 -1.914** -0.0401 -2.099** -0.0281
worsened (0.0492) (0.0988) (0.0484) (0.0976) (0.836) (0.916) (0.878) (0.990)
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.6)
Number of observations 486 314 486 314 486 314 486 314
R2 0.083 0.093 0.083 0.094 0.083 0.115 0.080 0.112
Continued on next page
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Table A4.4 (continued)
OLS estimation results for wage change by groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables wijt
wi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
age ≤ 34 age > 34 age ≤ 34 age > 34 age ≤ 34 age > 34 age ≤ 34 age > 34
Strain improved -0.0273 0.00688 -0.0275 0.00592 -0.946** 0.0327 -1.030** -0.00458
(0.0389) (0.0350) (0.0382) (0.0345) (0.415) (0.529) (0.452) (0.555)
Strain worsened -0.0767 0.0257 -0.0772* 0.0243 -1.806** 0.636 -1.929** 0.580
(0.0469) (0.0505) (0.0462) (0.0492) (0.765) (0.732) (0.824) (0.761)
Work time improved -0.0532 -0.0125 -0.0523 -0.00999 -0.123 0.178 -0.120 0.224
(0.0410) (0.0334) (0.0403) (0.0327) (0.400) (0.550) (0.438) (0.571)
Work time worsened 0.0180 0.0435 0.0181 0.0442 0.803 0.735 0.870 0.894
(0.0632) (0.0711) (0.0622) (0.0691) (0.654) (0.873) (0.718) (0.933)
Security against job loss 0.0149 0.0276 0.0146 0.0269 -0.170 0.298 -0.211 0.333
improved (0.0352) (0.0370) (0.0346) (0.0362) (0.362) (0.564) (0.395) (0.588)
Security against job loss 0.198** -0.0207 0.197** -0.0205 2.523*** -0.290 2.696** -0.317
worsened (0.0991) (0.0576) (0.0976) (0.0567) (0.962) (0.868) (1.047) (0.907)
Use of skills improved 0.0592 0.0208 0.0580 0.0202 0.750 0.740 0.793 0.807
(0.0412) (0.0347) (0.0406) (0.0339) (0.479) (0.596) (0.527) (0.618)
Use of skills worsened 0.0262 0.0492 0.0258 0.0490 0.483 1.057 0.515 1.130*
(0.0590) (0.0418) (0.0583) (0.0411) (0.601) (0.653) (0.656) (0.670)
Commuting improved -0.0469 -0.0496 -0.0453 -0.0488 -0.428 -1.092 -0.410 -1.126
(0.0415) (0.0382) (0.0408) (0.0374) (0.418) (0.760) (0.447) (0.793)
Commuting worsened 0.000621 0.00384 0.000872 0.00360 -0.0650 -0.110 -0.0198 -0.125
(0.0629) (0.0344) (0.0618) (0.0337) (0.623) (0.565) (0.697) (0.586)
Chances for promotion -0.00854 0.0174 -0.00820 0.0167 0.140 0.207 0.112 0.143
improved (0.0409) (0.0344) (0.0403) (0.0337) (0.437) (0.655) (0.477) (0.680)
Chances for promotion -0.00375 -0.0872* -0.00445 -0.0854* -0.602 -1.051 -0.678 -1.150
worsened (0.106) (0.0480) (0.105) (0.0474) (0.977) (0.765) (1.072) (0.793)
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.6)
Number of observations 370 430 370 430 370 430 370 430
R2 0.077 0.066 0.076 0.066 0.098 0.081 0.092 0.080
Robust standard errors clustered for individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
’∆u’ refers to growth in unemployment rate.
122
Table A4.5
OLS estimation results for different time horizons
1998–2004 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables wijt
wi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
Strain improved -0.00984 -0.0100 -0.199 -0.219
(0.0263) (0.0260) (0.382) (0.405)
Strain worsened -0.00491 -0.00451 -0.212 -0.240
(0.0340) (0.0335) (0.685) (0.727)
Work time improved 0.00965 0.0103 0.139 0.173
(0.0241) (0.0237) (0.398) (0.419)
Work time worsened 0.0539 0.0532 0.977 1.048
(0.0395) (0.0390) (0.653) (0.690)
Security against job loss improved -0.00241 -0.00217 -0.0781 -0.0669
(0.0231) (0.0229) (0.358) (0.377)
Security against job loss worsened 0.0604 0.0584 0.550 0.578
(0.0483) (0.0476) (0.710) (0.748)
Use of skills improved 0.0130 0.0126 0.405 0.425
(0.0259) (0.0256) (0.409) (0.431)
Use of skills worsened 0.0182 0.0183 0.375 0.407
(0.0342) (0.0339) (0.398) (0.422)
Commuting improved -0.0704** -0.0685** -1.021* -1.064*
(0.0279) (0.0275) (0.557) (0.584)
Commuting worsened -0.0332 -0.0316 -0.538 -0.556
(0.0293) (0.0290) (0.409) (0.433)
Chances for promotion improved 0.0302 0.0289 0.483 0.487
(0.0269) (0.0265) (0.449) (0.472)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0859* -0.0848* -0.897 -0.997
(0.0492) (0.0487) (0.745) (0.793)
Number of observations 543
R2 0.091 0.090 0.086 0.084
1999–2003 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables wijt
wi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
Strain improved 0.0103 0.00956 -0.133 -0.156
(0.0299) (0.0295) (0.403) (0.432)
Strain worsened -0.00845 -0.00788 -0.537 -0.579
(0.0391) (0.0386) (0.770) (0.821)
Work time improved 0.00666 0.00756 -0.0320 -0.00731
(0.0264) (0.0261) (0.357) (0.379)
Work time worsened 0.0887* 0.0876* 1.461** 1.564**
(0.0453) (0.0446) (0.730) (0.774)
Security against job loss improved 0.00700 0.00721 -0.0396 -0.0198
(0.0266) (0.0263) (0.355) (0.377)
Security against job loss worsened 0.0857* 0.0832* 1.161* 1.216*
(0.0510) (0.0503) (0.662) (0.701)
Use of skills improved -0.00750 -0.00792 -0.0371 -0.0519
(0.0292) (0.0289) (0.389) (0.414)
Use of skills worsened -0.00412 -0.00360 0.00277 0.0136
(0.0393) (0.0389) (0.439) (0.466)
Commuting improved -0.0663** -0.0642** -0.631 -0.659
(0.0308) (0.0304) (0.443) (0.471)
Commuting worsened -0.0357 -0.0341 -0.505 -0.534
(0.0338) (0.0334) (0.461) (0.488)
Chances for promotion improved 0.0414 0.0399 0.941** 0.965**
(0.0296) (0.0292) (0.383) (0.407)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0808 -0.0797 -0.696 -0.790
(0.0567) (0.0560) (0.830) (0.885)
Number of observations 447 447 447 447
R2 0.097 0.097 0.117 0.112
Robust standard errors clustered for individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.6
Tobit regression results for wage cut, given that individuals change to lower wages (full specification)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables wijtwi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
Strain improved -0.0128** -0.0136** -0.318** -0.355**
(0.00636) (0.00563) (0.153) (0.142)
Strain worsened 0.00261 0.00426 0.0223 0.0624
(0.00734) (0.00676) (0.206) (0.203)
Work time improved 0.00154 0.00467 0.146 0.231
(0.00621) (0.00555) (0.164) (0.161)
Work time worsened 0.00109 0.00108 0.0715 0.0787
(0.00783) (0.00671) (0.195) (0.176)
Security against job loss improved -0.00964 -0.00886 -0.180 -0.170
(0.00631) (0.00569) (0.155) (0.149)
Security against job loss worsened -0.000167 0.00808 -0.0213 0.207
(0.00922) (0.00802) (0.224) (0.207)
Use of skills improved 0.00594 0.00618 0.210 0.227
(0.00590) (0.00540) (0.150) (0.144)
Use of skills worsened 0.0132* 0.0123** 0.333** 0.334**
(0.00688) (0.00613) (0.166) (0.151)
Commuting improved -0.0117* -0.00967* -0.306 -0.264
(0.00634) (0.00568) (0.196) (0.182)
Commuting worsened 0.00126 9.43e-05 0.0112 -0.0210
(0.00615) (0.00552) (0.156) (0.147)
Chances for promotion improved 0.0105* 0.00908* 0.148 0.117
(0.00573) (0.00526) (0.150) (0.144)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0291** -0.0297*** -0.696** -0.738***
(0.0119) (0.0113) (0.289) (0.276)
Fringe benefits improved 0.00880 0.00849 0.178 0.186
(0.00608) (0.00559) (0.155) (0.152)
Fringe benefits worsened -0.000998 -0.00540 0.0100 -0.116
(0.00851) (0.00762) (0.202) (0.190)
Job in general improved 0.00412 0.00215 0.184 0.133
(0.00560) (0.00516) (0.150) (0.141)
Job in general worsened -0.00778 -0.00790 -0.0816 -0.0718
(0.0134) (0.0127) (0.293) (0.281)
Control variables yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.11)
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.138 0.035 0.026
Number of observations 800
Uncensored observations 195 254 195 254
Censored observations 605 546 605 546
Marginal effects after tobit regression.
Robust standard errors clustered for individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.7
Tobit regression results for wage cut, given that individuals change to lower wages by groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables wijt
wi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
owner renter owner renter owner renter owner renter
Strain improved 0.00968 -0.0191** 0.00950 -0.0196*** 0.279 -0.375** 0.283 -0.415***
(0.0108) (0.00759) (0.0100) (0.00676) (0.340) (0.159) (0.333) (0.157)
Strain worsened 0.00520 0.00120 0.0105 0.000293 0.148 -0.00401 0.314 -0.0191
(0.0133) (0.00883) (0.0127) (0.00789) (0.488) (0.176) (0.496) (0.169)
Work time improved -0.00239 0.00502 -0.000745 0.00841 0.147 0.145 0.205 0.228
(0.0102) (0.00730) (0.00975) (0.00645) (0.322) (0.149) (0.322) (0.148)
Work time worsened 0.00286 -0.00235 -0.00292 -2.98e-05 0.327 -0.0247 0.140 0.0236
(0.0156) (0.00887) (0.0152) (0.00749) (0.473) (0.178) (0.465) (0.164)
Security against job loss improved 0.000284 -0.01000 -0.00229 -0.00783 0.139 -0.189 0.0350 -0.157
(0.0102) (0.00686) (0.00947) (0.00620) (0.338) (0.132) (0.312) (0.129)
Security against job loss worsened -0.00690 0.000745 -0.00123 0.00819 -0.210 -0.0185 0.00864 0.128
(0.0130) (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0101) (0.405) (0.250) (0.387) (0.237)
Use of skills improved 0.0164* 0.00552 0.0152* 0.00524 0.674* 0.146 0.644* 0.152
(0.00936) (0.00705) (0.00917) (0.00632) (0.347) (0.139) (0.344) (0.135)
Use of skills worsened 0.0133 0.0108 0.0106 0.0110 0.436 0.227 0.373 0.255*
(0.0130) (0.00812) (0.0113) (0.00728) (0.385) (0.152) (0.332) (0.147)
Commuting improved -0.00387 -0.0144** -0.00968 -0.0100 -0.123 -0.293** -0.343 -0.224*
(0.0124) (0.00727) (0.0120) (0.00627) (0.457) (0.145) (0.488) (0.133)
Commuting worsened -0.000736 0.00349 -0.00350 0.00230 0.0236 0.0242 -0.0639 -0.00114
(0.0109) (0.00756) (0.0107) (0.00655) (0.341) (0.148) (0.343) (0.141)
Chances for promotion improved 0.00186 0.0154** 0.00589 0.0114* -0.152 0.265** 0.0117 0.197*
(0.0103) (0.00645) (0.00976) (0.00585) (0.372) (0.123) (0.345) (0.118)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0453** -0.0211 -0.0421** -0.0236* -1.197* -0.410 -1.057* -0.493*
(0.0228) (0.0133) (0.0208) (0.0133) (0.636) (0.258) (0.555) (0.281)
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.11)
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.153 0.175 0.145 0.037 0.045 0.031 0.031
Number of observations 245 555 245 555 245 555 245 555
Uncensored observations 72 123 87 167 72 123 87 167
Censored observations 173 432 158 388 173 432 158 388
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables wijt
wi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
∆u ≤ 0 ∆u > 0 ∆u ≤ 0 ∆u > 0 ∆u ≤ 0 ∆u > 0 ∆u ≤ 0 ∆u > 0
Strain improved -0.0102 -0.0143 -0.00936 -0.0158 -0.245 -0.338 -0.224 -0.409
(0.00782) (0.0106) (0.00695) (0.00967) (0.196) (0.242) (0.180) (0.251)
Strain worsened 0.00910 -0.00673 0.0127 -0.00815 0.196 -0.186 0.304 -0.239
(0.0101) (0.0103) (0.00913) (0.00989) (0.320) (0.216) (0.308) (0.230)
Work time improved 0.00741 0.00288 0.00901 0.00734 0.292 0.130 0.350* 0.247
(0.00746) (0.00957) (0.00668) (0.00894) (0.216) (0.209) (0.208) (0.224)
Work time worsened 0.00763 -0.00342 0.00412 -0.00162 0.251 -0.0116 0.156 0.0410
(0.00921) (0.0125) (0.00779) (0.0112) (0.258) (0.253) (0.222) (0.248)
Security against job loss improved -0.00878 -0.00679 -0.00699 -0.00840 -0.141 -0.152 -0.0899 -0.201
(0.00725) (0.00940) (0.00650) (0.00897) (0.184) (0.196) (0.170) (0.211)
Security against job loss worsened -0.00971 0.0143 0.000798 0.0156 -0.190 0.237 0.115 0.281
(0.0107) (0.0132) (0.00955) (0.0118) (0.279) (0.254) (0.268) (0.246)
Use of skills improved 0.00631 0.0119 0.00562 0.0117 0.305 0.271 0.285 0.299
(0.00713) (0.00845) (0.00644) (0.00801) (0.216) (0.178) (0.200) (0.186)
Use of skills worsened 0.00900 0.0181 0.00964 0.0163 0.313 0.363 0.345* 0.367
(0.00880) (0.0111) (0.00755) (0.0105) (0.230) (0.231) (0.202) (0.238)
Commuting improved -0.0167** -0.00420 -0.0155** -4.60e-05 -0.452 -0.0858 -0.436 -0.00646
(0.00830) (0.00895) (0.00755) (0.00798) (0.289) (0.173) (0.273) (0.170)
Commuting worsened 0.00106 0.00413 -0.00105 0.00551 0.0558 -0.0162 -0.00122 0.00844
(0.00787) (0.00892) (0.00730) (0.00805) (0.212) (0.188) (0.201) (0.187)
Chances for promotion improved 0.00907 0.0116 0.00771 0.0101 0.0984 0.199 0.0687 0.174
(0.00758) (0.00792) (0.00693) (0.00745) (0.223) (0.160) (0.210) (0.164)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0385** -0.0302* -0.0385** -0.0322* -1.020** -0.515 -1.037** -0.590*
(0.0163) (0.0171) (0.0155) (0.0169) (0.447) (0.315) (0.420) (0.342)
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.11)
Pseudo R2 0.191 0.130 0.185 0.154 0.048 0.034 0.035 0.030
Number of observations 486 314 486 314 486 314 486 314
Uncensored observations 116 79 153 101 116 79 153 101
Censored observations 370 235 333 213 370 235 333 213
Continued on next page
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Table A4.7 (continued)
Tobit regression results for wage cut, given that individuals change to lower wages by groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables wijt
wi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt − wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt − wreali,j−1,t−1
age ≤ 34 age > 34 age ≤ 34 age > 34 age ≤ 34 age > 34 age ≤ 34 age > 34
Strain improved -0.0157* -0.00641 -0.0140* -0.00886 -0.409* -0.147 -0.399* -0.214
(0.00851) (0.00899) (0.00743) (0.00816) (0.221) (0.213) (0.204) (0.198)
Strain worsened -0.0108 0.00847 -0.0127 0.0135 -0.375 0.245 -0.435 0.386
(0.0122) (0.00918) (0.0106) (0.00877) (0.358) (0.267) (0.349) (0.281)
Work time improved 0.00115 0.00429 0.00231 0.00689 0.110 0.214 0.144 0.290
(0.00793) (0.00860) (0.00711) (0.00800) (0.182) (0.227) (0.176) (0.224)
Work time worsened 0.00111 -0.00135 0.00144 -0.000574 0.0859 0.0125 0.0924 0.0398
(0.0111) (0.0106) (0.00873) (0.0101) (0.254) (0.271) (0.215) (0.270)
Security against job loss improved -0.00673 0.00135 -0.00882 0.00236 -0.150 0.149 -0.212 0.187
(0.00737) (0.00817) (0.00667) (0.00759) (0.167) (0.218) (0.164) (0.216)
Security against job loss worsened 0.0145 -0.0111 0.0267** -0.00571 0.382 -0.252 0.695** -0.0963
(0.0130) (0.0121) (0.0103) (0.0113) (0.315) (0.309) (0.295) (0.301)
Use of skills improved 0.0130 0.00334 0.0143** 0.00260 0.316 0.254 0.371* 0.242
(0.00864) (0.00725) (0.00729) (0.00709) (0.206) (0.212) (0.195) (0.210)
Use of skills worsened 0.00811 0.0168* 0.0158* 0.0117 0.197 0.497* 0.424** 0.386
(0.0103) (0.00944) (0.00888) (0.00861) (0.222) (0.262) (0.215) (0.239)
Commuting improved -0.00943 -0.0142 -0.00525 -0.0137* -0.175 -0.435 -0.0849 -0.434
(0.00849) (0.00879) (0.00745) (0.00819) (0.195) (0.312) (0.190) (0.302)
Commuting worsened -0.00302 0.00560 -0.00655 0.00583 -0.0856 0.143 -0.185 0.157
(0.00897) (0.00832) (0.00771) (0.00783) (0.208) (0.218) (0.195) (0.213)
Chances for promotion improved 0.0100 0.0109 0.0110 0.00761 0.235 0.0788 0.267 -0.0173
(0.00783) (0.00758) (0.00685) (0.00742) (0.187) (0.213) (0.170) (0.229)
Chances for promotion worsened -0.0232 -0.0218* -0.0236 -0.0273** -0.476 -0.578 -0.504 -0.755**
(0.0180) (0.0129) (0.0182) (0.0122) (0.374) (0.353) (0.397) (0.351)
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(as in Table 4.11)
Pseudo R2 0.245 0.145 0.232 0.178 0.074 0.035 0.049 0.034
Number of observations 370 430 370 430 370 430 370 430
Uncensored observations 74 121 108 146 74 121 108 146
Censored observations 296 309 262 284 296 309 262 284
Marginal effects after tobit regression.
Robust standard errors clustered for individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
’∆u’: Growth in unemployment rate.
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